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Remote Kill & Track

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I think a feature that could only be implemented by Tesla (owner would have to call in and verify who there were-not foolproof of course) that would disable the car after X number of miles. I could send a large message on the 17" screen "This car has been reported stolen by owner-you have 5 miles to pull over to a safe location".

I dunno. The warning is likely to make the thief mad and cause him to damage the car. I'd think the best way would be to have the car slowly limit the speed so that after five minutes or so it's down to two mph. Then once the car senses that's it's stopped, shut down. Maybe also take a picture of the driver with the built-in camera.
 
Don't know if that would work with slightly more sophisticated "handshaking" protocols or not.

The trick is to use an antenna very close to the car and an antenna close to the (original) key fob. This can e.g. be achieved when the owner is in a movie theater, restaurant or other public place.

Now these antenna's (and the required hardware) establish a link so that the car thinks the key fob is actually in the car. The car and the key fob - no matter how complex the protocol - can communicate through the two-antenna relay system just like they normally would with the key fob in car.

More details here: http://www.technologyreview.com/news/422298/car-theft-by-antenna/
 
I dunno. The warning is likely to make the thief mad and cause him to damage the car. I'd think the best way would be to have the car slowly limit the speed so that after five minutes or so it's down to two mph. Then once the car senses that's it's stopped, shut down. Maybe also take a picture of the driver with the built-in camera.

That would be the idea. After a certain distance or time, the car wouldn't simply come to a stop (could be unsafe) but would drop to a low speed like you said. Then with sufficient warning it would stop.
 
That would be the idea. After a certain distance or time, the car wouldn't simply come to a stop (could be unsafe) but would drop to a low speed like you said. Then with sufficient warning it would stop.

Exactly........giving the thief an adequate amount of time to pull over....run....etc.....

By suggesting a kill switch....I wasn't suggesting that the car being driven 70 mph would just turn off.......I said kill, but meant more like slowly strangle....:)
 
Aren't most cars like this stolen by simply putting them on a flatbed and driven away? That's probably much quicker than bypassing security on the car so this kind of system wouldn't help. Whatever system is implemented, they should make it hard to simply trick the other person on the phone at Tesla into thinking it was you. I'm not sure what protocols could be set in place to do this though.
 
Aren't most cars like this stolen by simply putting them on a flatbed and driven away?

After a bit of searching all I could find is that towing theft happens less than 5% nationally. In another (rather old) article the tow truck thief usually sells the car for scrap value and is looking for older (and heavier) cars. I suspect if you wanted to scrap a Model S some questions would be raised (although a rash of tow truck thefts might sooth the concerns mentioned in another thread about Canadian Signature cars diluting the U.S. Signature cars' value:mad:)

That's probably much quicker than bypassing security on the car so this kind of system wouldn't help.

It would help for valet thefts and also if kiddie scripts are ever developed.
 
Password? Actually Tesla should already have enough information on you to ask a few security questions.

I thought of that too. The problem is that depending upon where the car is stolen, a number of reasonable questions that Tesla would have on record (like billing zip code or fob serial number) might already be known by the thief or, in the case of the fob, the thief might have it.

Acombination of a password and two security questions would be adequate. Of course, if you chose a voice password similar to superfragilisticexpialidocious they might ask you to spell it out and then you'd likely be in trouble :)
 
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Now these antenna's (and the required hardware) establish a link so that the car thinks the key fob is actually in the car. The car and the key fob - no matter how complex the protocol - can communicate through the two-antenna relay system just like they normally would with the key fob in car.

This attack can be defeated by measuring the round-trip time to prove that you are in fact close (can't cheat the speed of light!). This technique is already used in (for example) some DRM systems - to enforce that you are playing your protected audio/video content on a nearby device, not extending it across the internet to someone else who hasn't purchased the material. (you may or may not like the objective behind this, but the technology works).

I don't know if it has been implemented in keyfob systems yet.
 
This attack can be defeated by measuring the round-trip time to prove that you are in fact close (can't cheat the speed of light!). This technique is already used in (for example) some DRM systems - to enforce that you are playing your protected audio/video content on a nearby device, not extending it across the internet to someone else who hasn't purchased the material. (you may or may not like the objective behind this, but the technology works).

I don't know if it has been implemented in keyfob systems yet.

I thought all key fobs used a crypto key progression system, and repeating the same previous code definitely doesn't work. It would take exceptional knowledge of the algoritmm and creation of the next sequence code to get the car to accept it...
 
I thought all key fobs used a crypto key progression system, and repeating the same previous code definitely doesn't work. It would take exceptional knowledge of the algoritmm and creation of the next sequence code to get the car to accept it...

The attack being discussed in the item you quoted gets around that by using the GENUINE FOB to generate the data. Attacker #1 sips a coffee at the next table to you, holding a briefcase with radio transmitters/receivers in it that communicate with the fob in your pocket. Attacker #2 has a similar briefcase that he holds near your car. Signals are relayed in both directions so that the fob 'hears' the car calling for it to authenticate, and the fob replies with a genuine response which causes the car to unlock, drive off etc.

This is a new attack that only works with keyless entry rather than press-to-unlock fobs. It doesn't matter how good the crypto is in the fob, because the crypto isn't being broken here.

The new attack can be defeated by measuring the time taken between sending one signal and the response.

We don't know whether Model S does this, though it seems quite likely given that people report the fob working for actual button-presses at a greater distance than the auto lock/unlock. But it could just be signal-strength based.
 
Seems to me the easiest way to steal the Model S is through carjacking. I didn't see anyone discuss this. That's when some type of kill function would stop the thief.

Barring that, if you could get the police to pick you up quickly, you could track and intercept the car with the app.

Also, what happens as the car drives away from the fob? Does the alarm trigger? At least the car would be locked after the thief got out (if he was stupid enough to steal it without the fob).
 
Also, what happens as the car drives away from the fob?

Nothing happens other than that you won't be able to turn the car back on again until the fob is in range. Actually, you wouldn't want anything to happen because if the fob battery died or something in your pocket blocked the signal, taking some kind of action could create a dangerous situation. All cars with fobs work similarly.