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Russia/Ukraine conflict

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But according to British Intelligence, those women are not young, intelligent, professional or high earning :)
You really are tough to please.

My wife has a Russian female friend who told her that many Russian men divorce their wives when they turn 40. Are you Russian? 🤔
 
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Interesting that Zelensky says that in the arms package there was something that could not be discussed, 2nd largest shipment to date. When I posted earlier today I could not understand what was driving up the costs but obviously some was and we will see it is air related when we finally find out what it was.
My (optimistic) guess is long range missiles. From the comfort of my armchair I think that in order for Ukraine to gain a decisive victory this summer they will need two or three big surprises that Russia is not ready for. Long range missiles could be one of them.

Russia has pulled their depots and HQs back from the front lines to get out of range of the 80 km HIMARS that Ukraine has been using. This is why we don't see a lot of them blowing up like we used to. Some 300 km ATACMS missiles that can be launched by HIMARS would be devastating if Russia is not prepared for them.

 
If Ukraine decides to do the counter offensive north/south of Bakhmut that would be a pretty epic move. Wagner has been told that if they leave they are traitors and all the activity is there so there would be many troops that would be without ammunition and supplies if their lines get cut from behind. And that was the only front Russia made any progress from, if they cannot even hold there they should pretty much give up any hope of winning the war and they will solely be on the defence. Maybe easier to break Russia there that to slowly starve out Crimea and then have to supply troops across the water to retake Crimea.

But I am no military expert, maybe opening the front towards Mariupol makes more sense...
 
If Ukraine decides to do the counter offensive north/south of Bakhmut that would be a pretty epic move. Wagner has been told that if they leave they are traitors

The AFU moved to retake land South of Bakhmut today (N. yesterday):

09 May: 3 km Deep in 1 Day. RUSSIAN FLANK IS COLLAPSING | War in Ukraine Explained


Russian mercenary chief says he's been told to stay in Bakhmut or be branded traitor | Reuters


Happy VD day, Putter... :p
 
If Ukraine decides to do the counter offensive north/south of Bakhmut that would be a pretty epic move. Wagner has been told that if they leave they are traitors and all the activity is there so there would be many troops that would be without ammunition and supplies if their lines get cut from behind. And that was the only front Russia made any progress from, if they cannot even hold there they should pretty much give up any hope of winning the war and they will solely be on the defence. Maybe easier to break Russia there that to slowly starve out Crimea and then have to supply troops across the water to retake Crimea.

But I am no military expert, maybe opening the front towards Mariupol makes more sense...
Several sources (some Russian) have suggested an attack north of Bakhmut to cut off the city will be a feint to keep Russian forces pinned there while the "real" offensive takes place in the south. I posted about this last week.
I don't think [Pigozhin's talk of withdrawal is a distraction] because according to Reporting from Ukraine, both sides were already expecting a diversionary attack by the Ukrainians north of Bakhmut to threaten encircling the city.


This was published before the Russian withdrawal from Bakhmut was announced. Therefore I don't think a withdrawal from Bakhmut (real or otherwise) would change Ukraine's strategy so there is no point in Russia pretending.

OTOH, it would make sense for Prigozhin to actually withdraw before getting encircled. He reported an increase in Ukrainian armor in this region which helped telegraph a possible diversionary attack here. As we have discussed before, the Russians are very keen to avoid getting encircled.

Blaming the withdrawal on lack of ammunition and in-fighting instead of on the threat of getting encircled could well be a face saving subterfuge right before the May 9th Victory Day celebration.
The one thing that has changed is the Russian military is insisting that Prigozhin not withdraw, perhaps with the intent of eliminating their competition.
 

Scorecard on who delivered what weapons to date. News to me is the actual volume of helicopters delivered- Impressive. Western tank deliveries are slow and small in number. Lots wont' show up til this summer. IFV (basically heavy armored personnel carriers) are in better shape with the bradleys having been delivered but it seems sweden has not yet delivered the cv90s. Those are fantastic machines so they will be missed. Hopefully they arrive with the abrams for continued progress in the summer. Hundreds of MRAPS (mine resistant off road trucks for carrying infantry) mostly delivered. Over 1800 Hummers (offroad jeep/trucks with optional gun mounts). Some 140 self propelled anti air gun systems but most still getting fixed up- I had no idea so many.

Anyway interesting stuff hope so of you find it useful.

There's this daily blog about the war in Swedish that I've followed since the war began (not quite, but almost since the start of the war). It's the one I've been inserting links to at times throughout this thread. The dude writing that blog have speculated that Sweden might have requested that Ukraine doesn't show any kind of Swedish heavy equipment. We are after all not a member fo NATO yet (even though we have received several bilateral security guarantees). But I'll admit that I have no clue whether any heavy Swedish equpiment have reached Ukrainian soil or not...

Today's edition fo that blog. No speculation on this topic in todays 'edition' though (in Swedish):
 
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If Ukraine decides to do the counter offensive north/south of Bakhmut that would be a pretty epic move. Wagner has been told that if they leave they are traitors and all the activity is there so there would be many troops that would be without ammunition and supplies if their lines get cut from behind. And that was the only front Russia made any progress from, if they cannot even hold there they should pretty much give up any hope of winning the war and they will solely be on the defence. Maybe easier to break Russia there that to slowly starve out Crimea and then have to supply troops across the water to retake Crimea.

But I am no military expert, maybe opening the front towards Mariupol makes more sense...

The two best places to launch a major offensive are the north part of the Donbas and in the south somewhere along the stretch from the bend in the Dnipro to the Donbas. Both have advantages and disadvantages.

The south is dry enough to launch now, but the northern Donbas is still a bit wet. A southern thrust in both places holds the possibility of cutting the land bridge to Crimea and the south.

Taking back the Donbas and getting to the Azoz would have all Russian troops left in Ukraine trapped with only the Kerch Strait or longer runs to Sevastapol being the only supply lines left. Both of which will be under attack from the shores of the Azoz. The Ukrainians would likely be able to exert enough force from the shore of the Azoz to shut down the Kerch Strait forcing the Russians to set up a sea lift to Sevastapol to keep the army supplied.

The Donbas attack route has its risks. The most Russian troops are around Bakhmut and the Russians could try to pivot to stop a southern advance. Terrain would not be on their side and the Russians would be dealing with the Ukrainians pressuring them from the west while the main force was coming down from the north. Reserves in Russia would be able to be thrown into the fight if they have any. Getting troops around from Belarus would be easier than getting them all the way around, into Crimea and then up into the front lines in the south or snaking them across Donesk oblast and into the south while under the threat of HIMARS fire.

The reward for taking back the Donbas would be high. It would put an end to the 9 year war in the region and as I said put the rest of Russian forces in country in a difficult position.

The southern route leave Donbas in Russian hands, but it has a shorter route to the Azoz and in the event of a Russian collapse gives the Ukrainians a shot to get into Crimea before the Russians can organize a defense of the choke points. Once an army gets past the choke points between the Ukrainian mainland and Crimea, there is little any army can do to stop a well equipped army from rolling up the entire peninsula.

In WW II the Russians had heavily fortified Sevastapol which was a major siege to capture. The Germans employed some of the largest guns of the war to take out Sevastapol's fortifications. One rail gun had twice the bore of the guns on the Iowa class battleships. But those fortifications are gone now. There may be some ruins, but they aren't active strong points anymore.

If Ukraine has quick success in one of these areas, that could free up assault units that were held in reserve to launch an attack in the other region. If the Russians do prove to be weak, Ukraine has the forces to do that, though they might be a bit short on fuel tankers for both offensives at once. It's possible that they have more fuel tankers than reported. That is the sort of thing that could be slipped into the country without a lot of news coverage.
 

Interesting thread on Russian defeat
 

"might be" and "possible" and "could be" are the same weasel words.

I don't mean to specifically pick on you, but I do find the language .... annoying, whenever I read it.
The world however is not black or white. That is why we have probabilities.

I appreciate the notion that UKR will plan for a slow advance but will seize an opportunity to blast through if it presents itself.
 
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"might be" and "possible" and "could be" are the same weasel words.

I don't mean to specifically pick on you, but I do find the language .... annoying, whenever I read it.
The world however is not black or white. That is why we have probabilities.

I appreciate the notion that UKR will plan for a slow advance but will seize an opportunity to blast through if it presents itself.
Frankly no one has a clear idea of what Ukraine will do and that is great. Based on their history I expected them to begin a careful slow advance somewhere, for instance lots of talk about curfew in Kherson, and attacks in the south. See if Russia moves and then begin slowly attacking in that direction, sucker punch them elsewhere and then ramp up the real attack that had at this point been under long constant attrition. So deception, a feint that fixes them, then an exploitive attack on weakly defended lines, then back to the area that was the feint (which was always the primary target).

For the Feint I always assumed they'd demonstrate in the south and feint somewhere there. Why? first they have only received 1/3 of the western heavy tanks and the south is tank country. By mid summer they should have 2/3 or even all of them. They publicly make a big deal of a curfew in Kherson which would indicate that troops are moving in to be sent across the Dnipro. They have been hitting russian occupied cities in the south with HIMARS recently, 3-4 launchers going all out which is a considerable amount of a scarce resource so Ukraine gets 2 for 1- the HIMARS rounds destroy something but they also indicate you are serious about that direction of attack. Indicating you are serious days in advance is a key component of a feint. It both keeps the enemy in place but might even get them to reinforce. Lastly, southern Ukraine is flat with little cover available. Nearly impossible to move 20k troops up to the border to launch an attack without being observed for days. So you move them but keep them out of artillery range. They are staged, in minimal danger, and support the feint.

In the meantime a hundred miles north Bahkmut is sitting , boiling over. Lots of troops and an interesting option for the blow that would attract a serious response as well as possibly yield significant results, the opportunity to encircle the russian positions is actually high. I am sure Ukraine could pull this off if they wanted. For now I don't think it really likely but that is also what makes it perfect. After this operation you could rotate those forces to support the main attack in the south. That's another advantage. Last year the two attacks Kherson and Kharkiv were so far apart they could not support one another.

I think the sucker punch comes in the Svatove/Kremina line because that cripples logistics in northern occupied Ukraine, threatens a broad envelopment, and it has been really really calm. No news here of curfews, no massive HIMARS attacks, almost no bloggers at all writing about Svatove. There is nothing going on there. Which to me says that yeah...this is the spot to watch. Kremena-Svatove is where I think the first heavy blow falls after a serious demonstration in the south. I thought they'd do something serious in the south starting yesterday (they like dates with history). The one gotcha in all my thinking is that Svatove is still wet. It's been wet. So even if we figure 2 weeks of enhanced artillery fire in the south and raids it might not be really dry by late May which would be the time for an attack in the north. Given that...maybe it dries out more first or there is a different plan and I am off base entirely. There is ample cover in Northern Ukraine to hide a significant strike force, the rail connections are there, the logistics risk to Russia is there.
 
The OSINT community has covered this war in a breadth and depth far beyond what I'd have thought to be possible, despite being aware of open source aerial imagery, AI and other tools. The russian fortifications have been mapped for several weeks now but today, I stumbled on this detail analysis that once more blew me away:

Now, if volunteers can go this deep with publicly available data in their spare time, imagine how much more detail a professional intelligence team can collect and draw their conclusions on.

This makes me wonder, and I'd appreciate the experts here sharing their take, if such WW2-style fortifications will go the same way as medieval castles after the invention of firearms. How much of an obstacle pose dug-in tanks to an army equipped with high-precision artillery? Tank-ditches that are mapped to centimeter precision so the advancing forces know how to bypass or where best to fill them. Mere annoyance or still capable to bog down an attack? Mine fields appear the only threat that cannot be remotely sensed but still some locations are more likely to be mined than others.