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Russia/Ukraine conflict

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The OSINT community has covered this war in a breadth and depth far beyond what I'd have thought to be possible, despite being aware of open source aerial imagery, AI and other tools. The russian fortifications have been mapped for several weeks now but today, I stumbled on this detail analysis that once more blew me away:

Now, if volunteers can go this deep with publicly available data in their spare time, imagine how much more detail a professional intelligence team can collect and draw their conclusions on.

This makes me wonder, and I'd appreciate the experts here sharing their take, if such WW2-style fortifications will go the same way as medieval castles after the invention of firearms. How much of an obstacle pose dug-in tanks to an army equipped with high-precision artillery? Tank-ditches that are mapped to centimeter precision so the advancing forces know how to bypass or where best to fill them. Mere annoyance or still capable to bog down an attack? Mine fields appear the only threat that cannot be remotely sensed but still some locations are more likely to be mined than others.
Yes that thread has been posted twice now, it is in great detail and that's only the tip of the iceberg of the data they have.
 
Instead of quoting drunk Russian twitter bots, try doing some basic googling:

“As long as Russia uses Crimea as a large military base, it dominates every port that Ukraine has. We saw that demonstrated here recently. And so if Russia remains there and can use that as a military launching base for both air and sea power, and as we saw most recently a place to refit and refurbish their defeated land forces that left the south and went into Crimea, as long as that sanctuary and that military platform is there for them I do not believe we will ever have a defensible and/or a secure Ukraine. So I am among the ilk—and I don’t—I don’t hide from it—that [****] Crimea has to be retaken, or else we can’t achieve these things that the administration wants to achieve.[****]“. —— General Breedlove

 
Instead of quoting drunk Russian twitter bots, try doing some basic googling:

“As long as Russia uses Crimea as a large military base, it dominates every port that Ukraine has. We saw that demonstrated here recently. And so if Russia remains there and can use that as a military launching base for both air and sea power, and as we saw most recently a place to refit and refurbish their defeated land forces that left the south and went into Crimea, as long as that sanctuary and that military platform is there for them I do not believe we will ever have a defensible and/or a secure Ukraine. So I am among the ilk—and I don’t—I don’t hide from it—that [****] Crimea has to be retaken, or else we can’t achieve these things that the administration wants to achieve.[****]“. —— General Breedlove

And this week he said:

"The West has built a sanctuary for Mr. Putin," He says that the West, forbidding Ukraine from using NATO weapons to strike Russia, is guaranteeing Russia safety.

"I would hope that Ukraine uses their capability to cut the land bridge to Crimea, to retake the water supply to Crimea, to cut the Kerch Strait Bridge, and then to bring all of Crimea under attack. And I don't necessarily mean land attack, but precise long-range fires, push as far south as they can on the continent and then fire into Crimea and bring it at risk."
 
Instead of quoting drunk Russian twitter bots, try doing some basic googling:

“As long as Russia uses Crimea as a large military base, it dominates every port that Ukraine has. We saw that demonstrated here recently. And so if Russia remains there and can use that as a military launching base for both air and sea power, and as we saw most recently a place to refit and refurbish their defeated land forces that left the south and went into Crimea, as long as that sanctuary and that military platform is there for them I do not believe we will ever have a defensible and/or a secure Ukraine. So I am among the ilk—and I don’t—I don’t hide from it—that [****] Crimea has to be retaken, or else we can’t achieve these things that the administration wants to achieve.[****]“. —— General Breedlove

That was well worth watching.
 
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Russian anti-Putin resistance takes credit for Kremlin drone attack via their ally Ilya Ponomarev who says he discussed the planning of the attack with them. They originally wanted to attack on Victory Day but he got them to move it to avoid hurting civilians and to avoid offending Russians who see Victory Day as sacred. This group also took credit for the assassinations of Darya Dugina and Vladlen Tatarsky.


Russian resistance is growing. It's behind many attacks already inside Russia. There are at least thousands of people who are involved in the resistance inside the country. It's not Ukrainians. They're trying to stop the war. These are brave anti-fascists of today doing their best to save the honor of their country.

It makes sense for a group trying to overthrow Putin to make him look weak on the world stage a few days before the Victory Day celebrations. It's less clear why a strongman dictator would intentionally make himself look weak and unable to defend the people he subjugates.

In my (optimistic) opinion, the Russian resistance could play a role in ending this senseless war. Convincing Russians that Putin can no longer protect them would be key.
 
The OSINT community has covered this war in a breadth and depth far beyond what I'd have thought to be possible, despite being aware of open source aerial imagery, AI and other tools. The russian fortifications have been mapped for several weeks now but today, I stumbled on this detail analysis that once more blew me away:

Now, if volunteers can go this deep with publicly available data in their spare time, imagine how much more detail a professional intelligence team can collect and draw their conclusions on.

This makes me wonder, and I'd appreciate the experts here sharing their take, if such WW2-style fortifications will go the same way as medieval castles after the invention of firearms. How much of an obstacle pose dug-in tanks to an army equipped with high-precision artillery? Tank-ditches that are mapped to centimeter precision so the advancing forces know how to bypass or where best to fill them. Mere annoyance or still capable to bog down an attack? Mine fields appear the only threat that cannot be remotely sensed but still some locations are more likely to be mined than others.
The US DOD probably has its supercomputers working overtime simulating the best scenarios for Ukraine's battle plan.
 
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"might be" and "possible" and "could be" are the same weasel words.

I don't mean to specifically pick on you, but I do find the language .... annoying, whenever I read it.
The world however is not black or white. That is why we have probabilities.

I appreciate the notion that UKR will plan for a slow advance but will seize an opportunity to blast through if it presents itself.

If you want probabilities I'd say there is a 70-80% chance Ukraine will move fast when the offensive starts.

The OSINT community has covered this war in a breadth and depth far beyond what I'd have thought to be possible, despite being aware of open source aerial imagery, AI and other tools. The russian fortifications have been mapped for several weeks now but today, I stumbled on this detail analysis that once more blew me away:

Now, if volunteers can go this deep with publicly available data in their spare time, imagine how much more detail a professional intelligence team can collect and draw their conclusions on.

This makes me wonder, and I'd appreciate the experts here sharing their take, if such WW2-style fortifications will go the same way as medieval castles after the invention of firearms. How much of an obstacle pose dug-in tanks to an army equipped with high-precision artillery? Tank-ditches that are mapped to centimeter precision so the advancing forces know how to bypass or where best to fill them. Mere annoyance or still capable to bog down an attack? Mine fields appear the only threat that cannot be remotely sensed but still some locations are more likely to be mined than others.

The 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that old style fortifications are mostly useless against a force equipped with enough advanced engineering equipment. The US and UK especially have put a lot of thought into how to neutralize fortifications. They have been doing it since WW II. At this point they have virtually perfected it.

The static wars in the Donbas from 2014 to 2022 and the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s showed that armies that don't have advanced fortification clearing equipment can get bogged down in wars that go nowhere.

Russia never developed the advanced fortification clearing tools the west has. Their way of taking fortifications has been to pummel them with incredible amounts of artillery then roll over them with tanks and infantry once they are too stunned to fight back. It requires a massive stockpile of artillery ammunition and guns which it appears they don't have anymore.

Ukraine now has good western breaching equipment with training, though I don't know exactly how much. There is definitely enough there to punch at least one good sized hole in one place. Hopefully there is enough to do it in more than one place at once.

Russia's defensive structures are extensive, but I'm pretty convinced they don't have the personnel to man all those positions. It looks to me like they are trying to recreate the victory at Kursk in 1943, but they have 4X the frontline to cover with much fewer troops. Zhukov had around 1.4 million troops and a huge fleet of tanks to support all those fortifications. The Russians today might have 200K troops and their tank fleet is much weaker than it was a year ago. With all the Russian losses I suspect their forces at this point are lopsided with more behind the lines forces than frontline. The behind the line forces include air support, naval support, supply troops, headquarters, air defense, and artillery.

They are showing signs of shortages in artillery ammunition and their gun barrels are very worn from a year of continuous combat. We see more towed artillery now and rarely see SP artillery. The SP artillery probably are out of action with too much barrel wear and no spares. Towed artillery is a handicap in a mobile battle. They are at risk of getting overrun by advancing forces.

Russia still has artillery forces, but they are not as effective as they were a year ago.

The attacking Ukrainian force is also smaller than the German army in 1943, but Ukraine has modern equipment in it's first line and a much larger force overall.

Russia conscripted a lot of infantry last fall, but they got a lot of them killed or maimed in the winter fighting and leaving them exposed to the weather. Poorly trained troops will perform better in defense than offense, but they aren't exactly going to perform all that well. Troops with bad morale tend to break and run when things get even mildly intense. Troops with good morale will be able to take a lot more before breaking and running. The kill squads have kept them in place up to now, but that tactic has its limits. The choice of certainly getting crushed by the enemy or maybe getting shot by your own people, a lot of mobiks will probably take the latter choice or they will try to figure out how to surrender to the Ukrainians.

Ukraine has advantages in numbers in uniform, equipment quality, morale, and a clear reason to be there. Russia has advantages being on defense and a willingness to get everyone killed to stop the Ukrainians. In the latter they are similar to the Japanese in WW II, though without the ethos going all the way down to the lowest ranks. Japan would fight to the last man which did keep them in the war longer than another army would have, but they still lost in the end. The Allies just got used to mowing them down. Ultimately a superior force with the will to hang in there is going to win.

The US DOD probably has its supercomputers working overtime simulating the best scenarios for Ukraine's battle plan.

A lot hinges on unknowns though. How much of a fight the Russians have left in them is a big factor. They have kill squads behind the lines trying to keep the mobiks on the line, but they can't stop a stampeded if everyone decides to cut and run at once. And the kill squads aren't going to hang around if they realize they are about to be the frontline troops facing the AFU.
 

Funny take on why Ukraine won't target senior russian commander
 

Funny take on why Ukraine won't target senior russian commander

Reading that I was just thinking in an authoritarian regime loyalty is more important than competency and came to the part where he said it.


What comes after the counter offensive. Rob Lee is on my short list to check in on, with Ben Hedges, Mick Ryan, and a few others.

I've found Foreign Affairs to be a bit more pessimistic about Ukraine's chances for big gains. The offensive could bog down and the Russians could stabilize the line, but I think there is a higher chance that the Russians cut and run when things heat up and Ukraine will gain a lot of territory.

The Russians cut and run at Kharkhiv because they had stripped their forces in the region to support the south and were caught by surprise. But Russia is weaker now. They lost a lot of their more modern equipment since Kharkhiv, the quality of their troops is lower, and morale can't be any better, it's likely worse. The Russians had the partial mobilization since Kharkhiv, but they got a lot of the mobilized killed in the meantime.

A lot of people are quoting the US intelligence report that estimates 20K Russians dead since January and 80K wounded. I strongly doubt Russia is able to evacuate 4/5 of the casualties. There are many reports they don't have the basic means to move the wounded off the battlefield and also a lot of stories of Russians leaving their wounded to die. They may be achieving a 1:1 wounded to dead ratio. Wounded who can get themselves off the battlefield are more likely to be evacuated than those who are not able to move on their own.

In that case a lot of the wounded would be able to eventually return because they aren't severely wounded.

From the anecdotal evidence I've seen, Russia's dead since January are almost certainly much higher than the 20K the US is saying.

There is talk about planning for the war to continue, but what if the Russians collapse in Ukraine and the war essentially morphs into a Russian civil war? That is a possible scenario too.
 
I've found Foreign Affairs to be a bit more pessimistic about Ukraine's chances for big gains. The offensive could bog down and the Russians could stabilize the line, but I think there is a higher chance that the Russians cut and run when things heat up and Ukraine will gain a lot of territory.
The most interesting question is if Russia has sufficient troops to protect all areas, and if Ukraine is good at picking when and where to attack.

It is always good to hit Russian logistics and fuel to stop the rapid redeployment of Russians to shore up the defence as needed.

Say area A is attacked and Russia needs to move troops and resources from areas B and C to shore up the defences there. (Or move spare resources from Russia to area A).

Next Ukraine might attack area B. more specifically the weakest part of area B.

So I don't know if it is a single large offensive or a series of smaller geographically separated offensives. And a large distance between areas being attacked in sequence, makes Russian redeployments more difficult and time consuming.

The area intended to be the major counter offensive, might be the last one attacked or it may simply be a return to an areas attacked earlier, but postponed for a more suitable set of circumstances.

IMO being to pick the locations and the timing of the offensives is one advantage the attacker has.

And finally if 3 separate areas are attacked, Ukraine only need Russian troops to flee in one of those areas, to gain territory and an advantage over other Russian positions. So as well as having sufficient troops and resources to defend all areas, Russia needs troops to stay and fight in all areas. Which brings us to motivation and purpose. How many Russian troops understand the purpose of the war, are fully on board with the mission, and want to be there?
 
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The most interesting question is if Russia has sufficient troops to protect all areas, and if Ukraine is good at picking when and where to attack.

It is always good to hit Russian logistics and fuel to stop the rapid redeployment of Russians to shore up the defence as needed.

Say area A is attacked and Russia needs to move troops and resources from areas B and C to shore up the defences there. (Or move spare resources from Russia to area A).

Next Ukraine might attack area B. more specifically the weakest part of area B.

So I don't know if it is a single large offensive or a series of smaller geographically separated offensives. And a large distance between areas being attacked in sequence, makes Russian redeployments more difficult and time consuming.

The area intended to be the major counter offensive, might be the last one attacked or it may simply be a return to an areas attacked earlier, but postponed for a more suitable set of circumstances.

IMO being to pick the locations and the timing of the offensives is one advantage the attacker has.

And finally if 3 separate areas are attacked, Ukraine only need Russian troops to flee in one of those areas, to gain territory and an advantage over other Russian positions. So as well as having sufficient troops and resources to defend all areas, Russia needs troops to stay and fight in all areas. Which brings us to motivation and purpose. How many Russian troops understand the purpose of the war, are fully on board with the mission, and want to be there?

The one-two punch you describe would probably be very effective, but the big unanswered question is whether they have the supply and enough support for two full offensives at the same time. If they do, Russia would be hard pressed to deal with it.
 
And finally if 3 separate areas are attacked, Ukraine only need Russian troops to flee in one of those areas, to gain territory and an advantage over other Russian positions. So as well as having sufficient troops and resources to defend all areas, Russia needs troops to stay and fight in all areas. Which brings us to motivation and purpose. How many Russian troops understand the purpose of the war, are fully on board with the mission, and want to be there?

Maybe one small data point on Orc troop motivations. This is a thread reportedly about data found on dead Orc phones. I have no idea about accuracy or reliability of this info, but it matches what we saw in early fighting- looting, raping, random killings. If this is true, it's purely mercenary for most of them.

 
Maybe one small data point on Orc troop motivations. This is a thread reportedly about data found on dead Orc phones. I have no idea about accuracy or reliability of this info, but it matches what we saw in early fighting- looting, raping, random killings. If this is true, it's purely mercenary for most of them.


They all seem to be in it for themselves. Patriotism takes a back seat to their greed.

Seems like Ukraine have been breaching through south of Bakhmut and may be looking to surround the town from the south.


I heard about that earlier today. The Ukrainians are doing just what the Soviets did to break the impasse at Stalingrad. Hit the flanks, breakthrough and surround the city.

If the Russian start abandoning positions around Bakhmut trying to escape encirclement combined with a full Ukrainian offensive elsewhere could collapse Russian forces all over Ukraine.
 
I don't speak Russian, but in this video Prigozhin is allegedly calling The Russian Dictator for a word that I don't think that I'm allowed to use on this forum. It's the word for the where the human digestive system ends. The one with seven letters that starts with an a and ends with an e...

I don't think that has happened before...

So I guess the video below is NSFW and/or inappropriate if you're a minor that understands Russian...


Credit goes to:

No major media outlet seem to have picked up on this. Makes me wonder if it is accurate or not. Mot likely not it would seem...
 
A nearly hour long enlightening conversation with Anders Puck Nielsen. I found it to be a nice break from the breathless rah rah daily updates we frequently get. The conversation covers a broad range of topics about the war. There was a good discussion about Ukraine becoming a technical powerhouse after the war. The Russian plan to liquidate the Ukrainian intelligentsia was shocking news to me.

How Fragile will Russia be after a Major Humiliation on Battlefield in Ukraine


The last 6 months or so has seen a vicious war of attrition unfold in towns like Ugledar, Soledar and Bakhmut. But this should not be interpreted as a stalemate, as those struggles seems to have degraded the quantity of functional Russian equipment and depleted their fighting manpower. Will the much-vaunted spring offensive and defeat of its forces in 2023 finally bring an end to Russia’s genocidal and pointless war against its neighbour? And how fragile would Russia’s autocratic, propaganda-controlled system actually be after a major humiliation on the battlefield?
One tidbit: Anders suggests that we can mark the start of the Ukrainian counter-offensive when we see Western tanks on the battlefield. He says the prelude to the counter-offensive has already started and it may just gradually ramp up from there.
 

Mick has a new piece on how Russia is adapting. Very well researched- great read for someone wanting to understand historical evolution of USSR/Russian operations