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An under-the-radar way to measure economic growth in China is painting a bleak picture


This is a curious example of how journalists and even economists can misunderstand the impact of vehicle electrification on the economy. China reports GDP growth at 6.4% in Q1 this, but this is called into question as diesel demand has be plummeting, down 14% and 19% in March and April. The journalist congratulates himself on finding the dark underbelly of the Chinese economy.


But wait a minute, what else could be impacting specific diesel demand in China and growth in the economy. The journalist overlooks the fact that China has be growing a massive fleet of electric buses and is also building out electric trucks too. BNEF has estimated that electric buses displace about 270 kb/d of diesel. This displacement should be taken with a grain of salt, however, because there are microeconomic factors that can greatly amplify the displacement effect. Electric buses operate within fleets that also include diesel buses, but the electric have a much lower operating cost. Both the fuel cost per mile and maintenance per mile are lower, and this is a strong enough opex advantage as to offset the higher capex requirement for electric buses. But low cost per mile is what drives utilization throughout the year. To minimize fleet opex, an operators will seek to get the most mileage out of vehicles with the least running cost. This means an electric bus could have twice the displacement of fuel if it is utilized twice as much as the average diesel bus. So BNEF’s nominal estimate of displacement 270 kb/d could be off by a factor of 2 over the course of a year.


This ratio also depends on what fraction of the fleet electrics comprise. Suppose it is some fraction P. If P/(1-P) is small, then diesel utilization must be close to the average for the fleet because there are just not enough electric buses to relieve diesels from duty when demand is low. But as P/(1-P) increases, then diesel service can be relegated to being backup vehicles used only when demand really high. So here the utilization of diesel buses can fall off a cliff. Maybe they used to be operated 80% of the time, but that falls to less than 20%. Meanwhile, the electrics are used near 90%. So when P was small, one electric maybe did the work of 1.125 diesels, but as P increases, one electric does the work of 5 marginal diesels. So the point here is that in fleet service fuel displacement is not constant, but an increasing function of P.


Furthermore, let’s consider how demand for transit bus service can change with the seasons. It is possible that on a nice spring day, some riders will prefer to do more walking, riding bikes or scooters. This means that marginal, backup diesels are not needed so much and spend less time in service. Seasonal variation in demand can also induce the leveraging effect of P in the previous paragraph. If this leverage is strong enough would could see an amplification of seasonality in diesel demand. As electrics displace diesel, seasonal fall off in demand will be sharper than it was in prior years. So a seasonal fall off in spring could be a function more electrics in transit fleets.


Is this enough to see diesel demand fall off 14% and 19% in March and April? Maybe not entirely, but energy economists need to be doing a much better job at analyzing the impact of electric fleets on the seasonality of diesel demand.


Turning to the GDP side, we also can note that building out these electric fleets of buses, trucks and cars is consistent with growing China’s economy while reducing fuel demand. Specifically, net imports of fuel can be offset by China’s manufacturing prowess. So this has implications both for the labor market and the balance of trade. And in particular, it makes China’s economy more resilient to the effects of a tariff ‘war’ with the US. It is simply a matter of time and scale. At some point the growing EV industry adds more to GDP growth while displacing oil demand that undermine diesel demand as a proxy for economic growth. Yes, the economy can be growing just fine as diesel demand plummets. This is not a “bleak picture.” It is a brighter horizon.
 
Hmm. What is this telling us? Does California get gasoline from out of state refiners too?

I think it is telling us total gasoline sales.

California has in the last few years been importing gasoline from Nevada, Washington, and British Columbia.

But I did not read that as being only California refineries. California gets data from taxes being paid, out of State refiners also pay taxes.
 
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I think it is telling us total gasoline sales.

California has in the last few years been importing gasoline from Nevada, Washington, and British Columbia.

But I did not read that as being only California refineries. California gets data from taxes being paid, out of State refiners also pay taxes.
I disagree. EIA measures consumption by "product supplied". I couldn't find CA product supplied, but here is product supplied for PADD5 which is dominated by CA (plus AK, WA, OR, NV, AZ and HI). Note that it does not show a dramatic decline over the past decade. Now look at your metric, retail gasoline sales by refiners, for PADD 5. It does show the dramatic decline.

I'm too lazy to research it, but I think retail sales by refiners only applies to gas stations owned by companies with refineries. Shell, Chevon, Exxon, etc. That used to be the norm, but these days there is much less vertical integration. Even a lot of branded stations are independently owned and may or may not count as "retail sales by refiners".
 
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I disagree. EIA measures consumption by "product supplied". I couldn't find CA product supplied, but here is product supplied for PADD5 which is dominated by CA (plus AK, WA, OR, NV, AZ and HI). Note that it does not show a dramatic decline over the past decade. Now look at your metric, retail gasoline sales by refiners, for PADD 5. It does show the dramatic decline.

I'm too lazy to research it, but I think retail sales by refiners only applies to gas stations owned by companies with refineries. Shell, Chevon, Exxon, etc. That used to be the norm, but these days there is much less vertical integration. Even a lot of branded stations are independently owned and may or may not count as "retail sales by refiners".

There's a "referrer page" link that seems to focus on just the refinerer sales: California Motor Gasoline Refiner Sales Volumes

View media item 119795View media item 119796

I don't know what the breakout of the resales mean, but it seems to support your thought. What's interesting is the historical data for the resales still shows a ~4,000 thousand-gallons-per-day reduction over the same 5 years.

California consumes its own blend of gasoline during the summer months to help fight smog. So the refinerer resales should still represent statewide consumption, which is trending down significantly. If the culmulative EV (BEV + PHEV) sales for the past 7 years could be overlayed over it, couldn't we get a better idea of how many ICE vehicle-miles are displaced per BEV sale?
 
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I did the same thing when I first got my Leaf. Almost all of our local driving was done on the leaf, which skewed the reduction of our gas consumption to 1.5 ICE vehicles displaced by a single BEV.

displaced about 16k miles per year,
Most two car households do this. The first EV becomes the preferred car with the old ICE becoming the backup car. We did this. For a while EVs will displace about 1.5 to 1.9 cars worth of oil demand in two car households... Until the second car is replaced with an EV too.
 
Most two car households do this. The first EV becomes the preferred car with the old ICE becoming the backup car. We did this. For a while EVs will displace about 1.5 to 1.9 cars worth of oil demand in two car households... Until the second car is replaced with an EV too.
Yes, my family too, but we moved to buy a second Model S within a year of the first. Tomorrow we will trade in that S for a new X. We may name the back ext/white int X, Henri.

But I digress. This phenomena is particularly important for understanding the impact of fleet EVs like EV buses. If you look at the chart in the article I linked, you can see that diesel demand peaked in 2014 in China and has been in steady decline. So much is compatible with diesel buses being replaced with EVs and natgas vehicles. But diesel demand is volatile and seasonal. I think that there are reasons why heavy duty EVs could amplify seasonality and other volatility in addition to causing average consumption to decline. So it has everything to do with fuel powered vehicles playing a backup role to EVs in fleets. The backup vehicles respond to residual demand for fleet service.

This is dynamic I had not anticipated before, but we could see diesel and gasoline demand become much more volatile as EVs become the low opex vehicles of choice. To use a rough analogy from power generation, EVs are becoming "baseload" transport, while fossil powered vehicles become the "peaking" transport. In any case, the peaking role or backup role leads to much more seasonality and volatility of fuel demand.

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This is dynamic I had not anticipated before, but we could see diesel and gasoline demand become much more volatile as EVs become the low opex vehicles of choice. To use a rough analogy from power generation, EVs are becoming "baseload" transport, while fossil powered vehicles become the "peaking" transport. In any case, the peaking role or backup role leads to much more seasonality and volatility of fuel demand.
Makes sense. Luckily, it's quite possible to store fossil fuels, which makes them great for peaking transport applications. Whereas it's more expensive to store electricity. So when the seasonal peak hits, we will see diesel supplies drawn down, and then during the other months when there's no demand, they'll slowly be replenished. The refineries *should* see the seasonality averaged out to some extent by local storage -- bus fleets often have their own diesel tanks at their bus bases.
 
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An under-the-radar way to measure economic growth in China is painting a bleak picture


This is a curious example of how journalists and even economists can misunderstand the impact of vehicle electrification on the economy. China reports GDP growth at 6.4% in Q1 this, but this is called into question as diesel demand has be plummeting, down 14% and 19% in March and April. The journalist congratulates himself on finding the dark underbelly of the Chinese economy.
The same messaging now coming from oil traders. Farther out futures are dropping so inventories must be tight. Meanwhile US stockpiles remain near record levels and rising. The rest of the globe is opaque.

Tumbling spot price of oil does not tell full story, say traders

Brent crude lost more than 10 per cent in May to fall back below $65 a barrel, as fears over the worsening US-China trade war rattled investors and put oil on course for its worst month this year.

But traders are warning that the spot price is not telling the full story. Instead, some are pointing at the way oil prices are moving for contracts on different delivery dates to tell a more nuanced tale. Brent contracts for the next few months are trading at large premiums versus those for delivery later this year — a classic sign of tightness in the market.
 
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Clearly OPEC can cut production faster than the US can increase it.
Time to revisit this sentiment from 17 months back. Looks in retrospect like the Saudis did a more than decent job keeping prices high through a period that was in reality oversupplied for the duration.
So the question is whether Saudi Arabia will quietly accept being bumped into the number 3 position? Would this symbolic demotion hurt prospects for a favorable Aramco IPO valuation?

Dunno. But 2018 will pose new questions.
So far....relatively quiet. Maintaining the same strategy of "OPEC"+R supply cuts has "worked" up til now, but things look to be coming apart at the seams with Brent drifting down to $60. This could be a major turning point that forces a pivot in Saudi strategy and action.

US production is skyrocketing as projected.
Global demand is plateauing faster than projected.
Monetizing Aramco is off the table.
Banks barely let Aramco buy Sabic.

There are some smaller revenue levers left to pull, but an extended 6 month run of Brent <$60 should force drastic action from MBS. What could it be other than to pump like mad and hope US fracking goes under? At some point this is the only option left.

All this pending drama would be a lot more exciting if TSLA weren't in the shitter. (<--hoping to bump this bit ironically in 9 months:))
 
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So cheap oil should be a bit of a headwind for EV adoption. Do we think it'll reach the critical $20/bbl levels at which switching back from electricity to gasoline may save people money? (My guess: no. Even if the Saudis decide to kill shale with massive pumping, I bet they stop around $30/bbl.)
 
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Bad headline. It's now possible to sue over the new order, arguing that it exceeded Presidential delegated powers (perhaps by violating the National Environmental Policy Act) or that it had no rational basis. Expect another round of lawsuits -- which has already started.

Washington Examiner is an untrustworthy right-wing rag but they got this one right:

Trump court victory offers temporary relief for Keystone XL

No construction will start this year.
 
So now I am following up on BNEF battery pack cost prediction. BNEF predicts a pack cost of $94/kWh in 2024. Does this accord to basic statistical analysis? Let's see.
A Behind the Scenes Take on Lithium-ion Battery Prices | BloombergNEF
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So BNEF is getting to their prediction through three steps.
1) Estimate the experience curve on cumulative battery volume. They get 18% price decline per doubling of volume.
2) Predict future pack size per vehicle.
3) Predict future EV sales and compute cumulative pack volume.

Steps 2 and 3 are opportunities for the analysis to become poorly calibrated and for modeler bias to creep in. I am taking a shorter route.

1) Estimate experience curve based on cumulative PEVs sold. Pack cost declines 28% per doubling of cumulative PEVs.
2) Forecast cumulative PEVs to be sold.

Notice that I don't need to fiddle around with making pack size assumptions, nor is that even appropriate. Cell cost is about 2/3 of total pack cost, but the pack specific costs may appropriately be thought of as one pack as one unit. Also we should expect the capacity per pack to increase as the cost per kWh declines. So my approach will tend to capture that. Another advantage of indexing the learning curve on EVs sold is that is it fundamentally EV sales that will be motivating R&D and scale up investments.

A critical difference here is that BNEF obtains a learning rate of 18% cost reduction per doubling of kWh volume, but my rate is a reduction of 28% per doubling of cumulative EV sales. So if one were to assume that kWh/EV where to stop growing, you might conclude with BNEF that the pack cost won't come down as fast as my model suggests. So that makes BNEF assumptions for step 2 critical.

In both modeling cases, though, we need to fight the temptation of thinking that mineral costs set a firm limit to how cheap packs can become. This would only be true if mass and mineral composition of a kWh of capacity were somehow fixed. But with increases in energy density and changes in chemistry, this is simply not true. Part of the experience curve is advancing the chemistry of battery packs finding more dense and low cost options along the way.

What will slow down the decline of pack costs will the size of the EV market. As EVs saturate the market, they shift to growing a single digit rates, so roughly linear growth. So this make it very hard to keep doubling. Fortunately this is not much of a problem until the 2030s.

So what about BNEF's 2024 prediction? My model suggest that $100/kWh will be obtained between about 10M to 50M PEVs made (regardless of how long it takes to get there, so my step 2 is not critical.) But assuming my mean logistic forecast in other posts and that the auto market grows about 3% per year, with 95% confidence the $100 threshold will be breached between 2020 and 2023, not as late as 2024. In deed for 2024, I've got a confidence interval from $35 to $78 per kWh. Now as with any predictive statistical model, if conditions fundamentally depart from what has been experienced within the training history, these projections can fail. This is basically the no-black-swans caveat.

Also in terms of when Peak oil comes, sub-$100/kWh come by 50M cumulative EV sales and oil peaks by about 75M EV sales. So these events seem likely to come just one or two years apart. I still do not see $100 as some magic number when the planets align to make EVs a thing. The fact is every year there is a double digit drop in cost, there will be an increase in EV sales. Moreover, there are many other critical elements to making EVs more powerful and cheaper to build, like improvement in motors, inverters, software control, and more. All of these components also have their own experience curve. So year after year EVs will be increasingly more desirable, more available and more affordable. Singling out the battery pack as having a make or break price risks losing sight of all the many things that advance EV adoption along the way.

One other little point, at times I've been critical of how BNEF uses a volume weighted average. Tesla appears to be leading the pack. But really this does not matter. Basically, producers that are able to get the cost down lower will tend to grow their sales faster than others. The laggards lose share of volume along the way. Part of what will continue to sustain progress down the experience curve is competition weeding the overpriced packs out of the market. If BNEF were tracking the minimum cost instead of the average cost, we would have more worries about jumps in the technology rather than steady progress to lower prices. So volume weighted averages are just fine by me.

Enjoyed.

I've personally been penciling in $50/Kwh for batteries and $0.5 per Kwh for utility solar for the late 2020s for a while now.

At those prices, absolutely nothing can really compete with solar+ storage.

At those prices, building a 5GW solar bank with 24GWh of storage (enough to put out a average 1GW plus a day of storage) would cost less than $4 billion. A 1.2 GW coal plant costs more than that, and an AP1100 nuke plant costs $8b+, both of those have far higher operational costs as well.

People are going to be seriously surprised how cheap energy gets in the late 2020s
 
So cheap oil should be a bit of a headwind for EV adoption. Do we think it'll reach the critical $20/bbl levels at which switching back from electricity to gasoline may save people money? (My guess: no. Even if the Saudis decide to kill shale with massive pumping, I bet they stop around $30/bbl.)

OPEC can't afford to left oil go too low.

While people often like to point out how their pump costs are much lower (it's true), they don't take into account enough how these governments are massively dependent on oil revenues. There is not enough of a value-added economy outside of oil in these countries to tax to pay for their governments. Oil revenues pay for imports, and oil revenues pay for the government. Without the oil revenues many of these countries would rapidly regress into third world status.

Saudi Arabia couldn't take much more than a year of $30 oil before it collapsed. They'd either need to install massive austerity that would cause the populace to riot (SA basically bribes it's citizens), or they would have to break the dollar peg, induce massive inflation, which would cause austerity and now you're back to riots.

The gulf countries should have spend more of their money getting their populace ready for when the oil is not there... instead they spent it on Ferraris, empty skyscrapers, and yachts.

Honestly, I think the biggest coming problem for the end of the oil era will be the potentially huge amount of destabilization that could come from the middle east as oil becomes geopolitically worthless.