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Wiki Tesla, TSLA & the Investment World: the Perpetual Investors' Roundtable


Model S Owner and Frustrated Tesla Fan
Apr 25, 2011
Ithaca, NY, USA
No it is not. Post calls with analysts & large institutional investors is completely common. No you can’t give material information but there is no way that a “high level bridge” is material.
New information in the DB report is that Tesla has a $1500 cash margin on Model 3. That is absolutely 100% material, no question about it. Maybe DB was misleading and this is just their guess but they made it sound like they got this information from Tesla. That's a Reg FD violation. Black and white.


Active Member
May 30, 2012
Is that sell a car or own a dealership? Because the former would violate the US constitution, while the latter is kinda obnoxious in a free market but legal.
This is why I do not understand why no one has challenged this in higher courts. If Tesla were to open a franchise dealership in Michigan they would be considered competing with their franchise if they sold CARS in Indiana. Michigan would revoke their franchise. SO TECHNICALLY they would be allowed to sell cars. They couldn't meet the Michigan franchise agreement so they'd lose that dealership.... which would take away their right to sell cars....right?

Dumber yet.... A lower Missouri courts ruled "Tesla can not be the franchisee and the franchisor". The stores in Missouri were shut down even though they were not franchises at all. The ruling was thrown out in higher MO court because that judge said the Missouri Dealer Association had no standing to sue Tesla in the first place. The judge basically said you can't sue your competition for being competition, so since the Tesla store is not a franchise they had no legal right to sue under breach of franchise laws. Guess what.... MO Senate has now put forward a bill to make it legal for the franchise dealer to sue a non-franchise company for breach of the franchise laws..... even tho they are not a franchise. Basically they will be able to shut down any competition simply for being competition. Potentially it will mean it could be illegal for Tesla to sell (even online), advertise, service, or provide chargers for their cars in Missouri in the future (yes they tried to make that a law in a bill in 2014 they will keep trying). This could be bigger than people realize. If it works many states would adjust their laws to follow.

(I think I have most of that right but here's an article about it)
Auto dealers renew fight against Tesla in Jefferson City


Jul 18, 2017
Would love for Tesla to clarify on why SR is still 2-4 weeks delivery everywhere, especially if they are only starting to produce them. Really hope InsideEVs Jan and Feb #s are wrong too

How many times does this have to be explained?
Nafnlaus on Twitter

It's 2-4 weeks because it's properly matched to production, via controlling market availability. If a mismatch forms, that ratio will change, until Tesla readjusts market availability. Current market availability is a small fraction of the total global market (peak SR demand will be in China).


Supporting Member
Supporting Member
Nov 25, 2012
I have never seen such anger and unhappiness at TMC. Who would have thought that the arrival of the promised 35K Model 3 would destabilize staunch supporters but galvanize the shorts and inspire them to ever greater FUD heights?

It is obvious to me that this is different from past raids and inflection points. This is major. It is either the beginning of the end for TSLA or it is the beginning of the best of times for TSLA.

Honestly have gotten to the point where I do not know which. I know Elon and his team are not perfect. Yet I am stunned by the anger over the price cuts. Wasn't anyone paying attention? Guess I am a bubble boy just like everyone else...

I do have considerable money in TSLA in the hope of an electric future. So I know what I would prefer, but I am willing to lose TSLA as long as we still have an electric future.

Waiting for the Model Y. Let us see what happens then.


Supporting Member
Supporting Member
Oct 3, 2018
Would love for Tesla to clarify on why SR is still 2-4 weeks delivery everywhere, especially if they are only starting to produce them. Really hope InsideEVs Jan and Feb #s are wrong too
Maybe I'm mistaken, but I don't see how it can be 2-4 weeks. I believe there should've been around 60-80k SR reservations sitting around.

Napkin math:
455k total reservations as of 8/2017 minus 20% cancelled=364k. Say 50% is N.A. That's 182k.

I believe around 100k of these were delivered as of 12/2018(all LRs prior to Q3+ ~90% of Q3(Ps and non-AWDs were up for grabs w/o reservation) + 25% of Q4 deliveries(per Elon).

So, ~82k outstanding remaining. Unknows are: How many of these canceled between 8/2017 and 3/2019. And how many new reservations were added between 8/2017 and 7/2018, when reservations were disabled.

Unlikely that any of these were ordering in Jan/Feb, since they should've gone for MR+$7.5k credit when they had the chance.

I'm thinking there was likely a net decrease due to cancellations, so maybe 70k.

These people have no excuse not to order, assuming they were saving up the last 3 years.
Unless some hardships etc.
So, say 60k. If these people ordered, it's 2 months of production. Considering that SR production is just "ramping up" and at least 50% will be LRs and MRs, I think that whomever has not ordered SR by now will not get the $3,750 credit.
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Active Member
Jun 28, 2018
He isn’t making sense. Honestly nothing makes sense right now

Perhaps Elon will throw us a bone March 14th.

I have a feeling that Gigafactory production line came online. SR+ is suppose to be this massively high volume car with low margins. So if say you take out the delivery time/cost of the new SR battery packs by assembling these cars at the source then perhaps it needs to go into a S curve again, while leaving Freemont to continue with MR, LR, and AWD. Just a guess to make sense out of all this...
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Fact Checking

Well-Known Member
Aug 3, 2018
Today's TSLA short volume is out, and today was the third day of very intense short selling:


Key feature today was higher long-initiated buying activity, compared to yesterday. Volume was very high, ~250% the typical daily volume.

Short sentiment was probably propelled by:
  • China Model 3 Label-Gate FUD coordinated by arch-short Chanos,
  • FUD linking the news of Tesla's expected $920m all-cash debt repayment to the false narrative of "low Tesla cash levels" if examined through narrow and misleading cash metrics such as "unrestricted cash",
  • FUD linking Tesla's decision to move from retail to online-only sales model to the "Tesla selling property and downsizing to create liquidity" false narrative,
  • FUD linking Tesla's decision to share margin improvements with customers by reducing prices and thus further increasing demand to the false narrative of "Tesla running out of demand",
  • FUD linking Tesla's decision to accelerate their growth program and unveil both the $35k Model 3 and the Model Y to the false narrative of "Tesla scrambling for liquidity".
For Tesla shorts and bears there is a lot to like in these narratives, and these false narratives also play into the cognitive bias of shorts - I'd not be surprised to see short interest increase.

Note how the $TSLA price transients have become "softer" and less violent in recent weeks, I believe this could be due to almost 100 million shares-equivalent options having expired mostly worthless in January - so there's much less MM delta hedging related volatility. (But see @Papafox's daily charts for intraday details.)

This is totally not advice, but I'd not be surprised if $270 proved to be a robust level of support, barring any genuine negative Tesla or macro news that is.

One thing is certain: Tesla is the stock that is never boring. :D


Active Member
Jun 12, 2018
palo alto, ca


Opinion | I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn’t the Fed?

I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn’t the Fed?


APRIL 3, 2010

Cupertino, Calif.

"ALAN GREENSPAN, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, proclaimed last month that no one could have predicted the housing bubble. “Everybody missed it,” he said, “academia, the Federal Reserve, all regulators.”

But that is not how I remember it. Back in 2005 and 2006, I argued as forcefully as I could, in letters to clients of my investment firm, Scion Capital, that the mortgage market would melt down in the second half of 2007, causing substantial damage to the economy. My prediction was based on my research into the residential mortgage market and mortgage-backed securities. After studying the regulatory filings related to those securities, I waited for the lenders to offer the most risky mortgages conceivable to the least qualified buyers. I knew that would mark the beginning of the end of the housing bubble; it would mean that prices had risen — with the expansion of easy mortgage lending — as high as they could go.

I had begun to worry about the housing market back in 2003, when lenders first resurrected interest-only mortgages, loosening their credit standards to generate a greater volume of loans. Throughout 2004, I had watched as these mortgages were offered to more and more subprime borrowers — those with the weakest credit. The lenders generally then sold these risky loans to Wall Street to be packaged into mortgage-backed securities, thus passing along most of the risk. Increasingly, lenders concerned themselves more with the quantity of mortgages they sold than with their quality.

Meanwhile, home buyers, convinced by recent history that real estate prices would always rise, readily signed onto whatever mortgage would get them the biggest house. The incentive for fraud was great: the F.B.I. reported that its mortgage fraud caseload increased fivefold from 2001 to 2004.

At the same time, I also watched how ratings agencies vouched for subprime mortgage-backed securities. To me, these agencies seemed not to be paying much attention.

By mid-2005, I had so much confidence in my analysis that I staked my reputation on it. That is, I purchased credit default swaps — a type of insurance — on billions of dollars worth of both subprime mortgage-backed securities and the bonds of many of the financial companies that would be devastated when the real estate bubble burst. As the value of the bonds fell, the value of the credit default swaps would rise. Our swaps covered many of the firms that failed or nearly failed, including the insurer American International Group and the mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

I entered these trades carefully. Suspecting that my Wall Street counterparties might not be able or willing to pay up when the time came, I used six counterparties to minimize my exposure to any one of them. I also specifically avoided using Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns as counterparties, as I viewed both to be mortally exposed to the crisis I foresaw.

What’s more, I demanded daily collateral settlement — if positions moved in our favor, I wanted cash posted to our account the next day. This was something I knew that Goldman Sachs and other derivatives dealers did not demand of AAA-rated A.I.G.

I believed that the collapse of the subprime mortgage market would ultimately lead to huge failures among the largest financial institutions. But at the time almost no one else thought these trades would work out in my favor.

During 2007, under constant pressure from my investors, I liquidated most of our credit default swaps at a substantial profit. By early 2008, I feared the effects of government intervention and exited all our remaining credit default positions — by auctioning them to the many Wall Street banks that were themselves by then desperate to buy protection against default. This was well in advance of the government bailouts. Because I had been operating in the face of strong opposition from both my investors and the Wall Street community, it took everything I had to see these trades through to completion. Disheartened on many fronts, I shut down Scion Capital in 2008.

Since then, I have often wondered why nobody in Washington showed any interest in hearing exactly how I arrived at my conclusions that the housing bubble would burst when it did and that it could cripple the big financial institutions. A week ago I learned the answer when Al Hunt of Bloomberg Television, who had read Michael Lewis’s book, “The Big Short,” which includes the story of my predictions, asked Mr. Greenspan directly. The former Fed chairman responded that my insights had been a “statistical illusion.” Perhaps, he suggested, I was just a supremely lucky flipper of coins.

Mr. Greenspan said that he sat through innumerable meetings at the Fed with crack economists, and not one of them warned of the problems that were to come. By Mr. Greenspan’s logic, anyone who might have foreseen the housing bubble would have been invited into the ivory tower, so if all those who were there did not hear it, then no one could have said it.

As a nation, we cannot afford to live with Mr. Greenspan’s way of thinking. The truth is, he should have seen what was coming and offered a sober, apolitical warning. Everyone would have listened; when he talked about the economy, the world hung on every single word.

Unfortunately, he did not give good advice. In February 2004, a few months before the Fed formally ended a remarkable streak of interest-rate cuts, Mr. Greenspan told Americans that they would be missing out if they failed to take advantage of cost-saving adjustable-rate mortgages. And he suggested to the banks that “American consumers might benefit if lenders provided greater mortgage product alternatives to the traditional fixed-rate mortgage.”

Within a year lenders made interest-only adjustable-rate mortgages readily available to subprime borrowers. And within 18 months lenders offered subprime borrowers so-called pay-option adjustable-rate mortgages, which allowed borrowers to make partial monthly payments and have the remainder added to the loan balance (much like payments on a credit card).

Observing these trends in April 2005, Mr. Greenspan trumpeted the expansion of the subprime mortgage market. “Where once more-marginal applicants would simply have been denied credit,” he said, “lenders are now able to quite efficiently judge the risk posed by individual applicants and to price that risk appropriately.”

Yet the tide was about to turn. By December 2005, subprime mortgages that had been issued just six months earlier were already showing atypically high delinquency rates. (It’s worth noting that even though most of these mortgages had a low two-year teaser rate, the borrowers still had early difficulty making payments.)

The market for subprime mortgages and the derivatives thereof would not begin its spectacular collapse until roughly two years after Mr. Greenspan’s speech. But the signs were all there in 2005, when a bursting of the bubble would have had far less dire consequences, and when the government could have acted to minimize the fallout.

Instead, our leaders in Washington either willfully or ignorantly aided and abetted the bubble. And even when the full extent of the financial crisis became painfully clear early in 2007, the Federal Reserve chairman, the Treasury secretary, the president and senior members of Congress repeatedly underestimated the severity of the problem, ultimately leaving themselves with only one policy tool — the epic and unfair taxpayer-financed bailouts. Now, in exchange for that extra year or two of consumer bliss we all enjoyed, our children and our children’s children will suffer terrible financial consequences.

It did not have to be this way. And at this point there is no reason to reflexively dismiss the analysis of those who foresaw the crisis. Mr. Greenspan should use his substantial intellect and unsurpassed knowledge of government to ascertain and explain exactly how he and other officials missed the boat. If the mistakes were properly outlined, that might both inform Congress’s efforts to improve financial regulation and help keep future Fed chairmen from making the same errors again."

Replace subprime with the current auto industry...a little dramatic but still...
Just so y’all know I got everyone out in SEPT 2008. ;-)

Btw. Way to go NIO!


Aug 13, 2012
What do you guys think about ARKK as a growth stock fund?
I bought some (perhaps a negative indicator ;)) after I read up on Editas and a few other stocks they invest in.
Then I saw Curt Renz talk them up and that was a positive in my mind. Up 10% in the few weeks I've owned it. Long term, when things go south, is hard to assess; and let's face it, a lot of funds are doing well the last 3 years.
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Reactions: Frank Einstein


Apr 1, 2015
What do you mean close to nothing? My parents uses the universal healthcare all the time. It has a coverage rate of 90%, with a co-pay for 10% on procedures that cost peanuts to begin with. Their bill after a complete check up after MRI and the works end up being about 10-20 US dollars.

Now many things are non-formulary as in if you start using imported medications/devices/tubings/etc etc then it'll cost 100% out of pocket.
傻逼 你父母代表全中国14亿啊
尼玛 全中国有几个人做MRI 只要付10-20刀 你说出去让人笑死


Active Member
Jan 23, 2019
Many on this thread talk about the (non-retail) shorts as though they're some cabal of hedge funds trying to make money battling what they believe is a fake company à la Enron. But Enron didn't have a a couple of trillion-dollar industries willing to spend massive amounts of money to depress their stock and to damage the company in as many other ways as possible.

Tesla is still in the phase of growth where they're concentrating first on the product. They're beginning to transition to the phase where they'll pay some attention to the customers, as well. The culmination of Master Plan I is an amazing achievement, but it has taken all of the company's attention, and made them vulnerable in lots of ways to the forces arrayed against them. As sales increase (and they will) the pressure under the stock price will increase as well. It remains to be seen how long Chuck and Dave and their friends can keep the lid on, as they've done so successfully for the two years.

Oh I definitely acknowledge the influence and power of the super well funded shorts and Wall St's motives. I too had a mindset of once the sales start coming in for the 3...…..the pressure will be too great to keep the value of the company down. Then Q3 earnings came out...…..blowout earnings beyond anyone's imaginations.....and we didn't move that far up and more importantly, we were starting from a low share price. Why was the share price so low right before earnings? Mostly because of Elon's ongoing issues with the SEC which originated with a reckless tweet. I actually think he didn't really do much wrong(and the new tweet scandal is so, so silly) but Elon essentially gave Wall St all the ammo they needed in order to suppress the share price.

To break it down very simply. Here's my thoughts on where the share price should be today(my estimates based off of my research, comparisons to other growth stocks, disruption of industries, Autonomy, TE, etc..)

True fair value of Tesla - 600/share
Price of Tesla share due to Wall St shenanigans - 400-450/share
Price of Tesla shares due to Wall St shenanigans and Elon's/Tesla own screw ups - current price (276/share)


Model S Owner and Frustrated Tesla Fan
Apr 25, 2011
Ithaca, NY, USA
Short answer: No, Tesla is following Old Ford's playbook. Their production curve looks almost identical. Ford went from 11K in 1909 to 500K in 1916, which is only 7 years. In 2012 Tesla made 2650 cars, in 2013 about 22K cars, and now it's 6 or 7 years later and they're going to make around 500K cars.

Ford was already a private company (though he had some minority partners who didn't get bought out until 1920). He didn't have this media circus and didn't have to report when he fired people.


Enough of the 🐩, back to 🐈‍⬛
Jul 13, 2012
Tesla friendly place
Wonder when Tesla will realize it's time for damage control.

Leaving investors with a bunch of questions unanswered about a major decision is never a good plan. They'll invent the worst possible scenarios in their minds.

  • Margins
  • Volume
  • Demand
  • Stores

Here’s the thing; it doesn’t actually matter what Tesla says. Case in point; we will not need to raise capital. Since that statement (and it’s been repeated by Tesla multiple times) I’ve seen DOZENS of headlines about how Tesla needs to raise capital. Indeed, just a new headline today. Tesla said they’d pay the bonds in cash. Up until the actual day, headlines all read how that wasn’t possible.

So, I say let the confusion run rampant. I’m not confused. I wasn’t confused when they merged Solar City, I’m not confused now. The real problem is the impatience of people. We go through this every single time Tesla does something contrary to the consensus. Every bloody time. It’s gotten old.

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