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First, you lost me at skabooshka. I tuned out right after that.

Second, ignores competely 130k VIN registration Pace and tax credit phase outs.

Note that a closer look at skabooshka's daily Tesla production data gives support to your thesis that the 100k annual production for Model S+X is a soft limit that could be significantly exceeded for a quarter or two.

The first clue is in the distribution of Model S+X daily production records. Here's the best 13 days from 38 days of data, sorted by S+X production:
date
07/11:
07/25:
07/26:
07/28:
07/14:
07/20:
07/13:
08/01:
07/12:
08/02:
07/19:
07/18:
[TD2]weekday[/TD2][TD2]M3[/TD2][TD2]MS[/TD2][TD2]MX[/TD2][TD2] MSX [/TD2][TD2]MS3X[/TD2] [TD2]Wed:[/TD2][TD2]700[/TD2][TD2]180[/TD2][TD2]140[/TD2][TD2] 320 [/TD2][TD2]1020[/TD2] [TD2]Wed:[/TD2][TD2]680[/TD2][TD2]150[/TD2][TD2]170[/TD2][TD2] 320 [/TD2][TD2]1000[/TD2] [TD2]Thu:[/TD2][TD2]780[/TD2][TD2]170[/TD2][TD2]150[/TD2][TD2] 320 [/TD2][TD2]1100[/TD2] [TD2]Sat:[/TD2][TD2]540[/TD2][TD2]170[/TD2][TD2]150[/TD2][TD2] 320 [/TD2][TD2]860[/TD2] [TD2]Sat:[/TD2][TD2]770[/TD2][TD2]150[/TD2][TD2]190[/TD2][TD2] 340 [/TD2][TD2]1110[/TD2] [TD2]Fri:[/TD2][TD2]560[/TD2][TD2]160[/TD2][TD2]180[/TD2][TD2] 340 [/TD2][TD2]900[/TD2] [TD2]Fri:[/TD2][TD2]700[/TD2][TD2]170[/TD2][TD2]180[/TD2][TD2] 350 [/TD2][TD2]1050[/TD2] [TD2]Wed:[/TD2][TD2]700[/TD2][TD2]190[/TD2][TD2]165[/TD2][TD2] 355 [/TD2][TD2]1055[/TD2] [TD2]Thu:[/TD2][TD2]800[/TD2][TD2]170[/TD2][TD2]190[/TD2][TD2] 360 [/TD2][TD2]1160[/TD2] [TD2]Thu:[/TD2][TD2]700[/TD2][TD2]180[/TD2][TD2]200[/TD2][TD2] 380 [/TD2][TD2]1080[/TD2] [TD2]Thu:[/TD2][TD2]570[/TD2][TD2]180[/TD2][TD2]210[/TD2][TD2] 390 [/TD2][TD2]960[/TD2] [TD2]Wed:[/TD2][TD2]540[/TD2][TD2]190[/TD2][TD2]210[/TD2][TD2] 400 [/TD2][TD2]940[/TD2]

Note that:
  • 34% of all days observed were able to hit 320 or better daily production rates, which corresponds to a 2,240 weekly, 29,120 quarterly and 116,480 annual S+X production rate
  • There's 6 days at 350+ rates, where 350 daily production corresponds to a 2,450 weekly, 31,850 quarterly and 127,400 annual S+X production rate
  • The record daily production is 400 S+X's, which corresponds to a 2,800 weekly, 36,400 quarterly and 145,600 annual S+X production rate
  • The 'best' days are Wednesday and Thursday. This suggests that the limit is assembly line staffing related, not supply chain related: it's unlikely for the supply chain to have significantly weekly fluctuations so late in the product's life cycle.
  • It's unclear to what extent the options mix of the Model S/X's made influences production rate: Sunroofs and Falcon Wing Doors take more time to assemble, but it's unclear to what extent that influences total throughput.
  • There do not seem to be any significant throughput interactions between Model 3 and S+X assembly throughput: "record" S+X days also feature pretty good Model 3 production days. I.e. the paint shop or absolute levels of staffing is not a visible throughput limit in this data set.
  • Note that some of the best S+X production data was in August, shortly before skabooshka shut down the data feed. This is one of the strongest hints yet I believe: statistically it's unlikely that the 3rd and 5th best result in the data set would be on August 1 and 2, just 5 days before skabooshka shut down the data. This supports your thesis that S+X production is ramping up, and maybe skabooshka's decision to discontinue this data was done because later data points showed even better production that did not support his agenda.
So based on the statistical distribution of S+X production data this tentatively suggests that the Model S/X Fremont assembly throughput is somewhere between 110k-130k. The 145k extrapolated maximum rate might be related to a simpler 'batch' of Model S+X orders and would require enhancements to the factory to reach on a sustained basis with a generic options mix.

Note that while the supply chain might be set to a 25k/quarter rate, the main limitation is Panasonic 18650 cell manufacturing supply according to Tesla:
  • which is unlikely to be a 100% hard limit on Panasonic's side, and they'd want to maximize 18650 production throughput with existing facilities too, before S+X migrates to the 2170 cells.
  • while Panasonic is unlikely to expand their 18650 capacity without Tesla entering into a long term contract (which they probably won't do, they'll migrate all their products to a 2170 base), there's no reason for Panasonic to play games with 18650 supply: it's in their interest to maximize that output for the next year or so until the 2170 migration, as long as there's no significant capex required
  • even if there's a hard limit, that limit can be exceeded for a quarter through warehousing, by storing cells in Q1 and Q2 and then using the excess supply in Q3 and Q4. Cells can be stored for a couple of months (as long as their minimum charge levels are maintained), without any significant impact to their life time. This does consume cash flow and increases inventory overhead though.
We even have an example of such warehousing: in 2017, during the 100kWh battery pack assembly choke point event Tesla managed to delay delivery of over 10,000 Model S+X orders by several weeks, without stopping assembly. (My theory is that they fully made those 100k battery pack models but warehoused (well, parked) them, and once the 100k battery pack production was back on pace they switched in those battery 100kWh packs. Switching battery packs takes only a small amount of time.)

Another data point in the skabooshka data series is the July 4th week shutdown:
date
07/01:
07/02:
07/03:
07/04:
07/05:
07/06:
[TD2]weekday[/TD2][TD2] M3 [/TD2][TD2]MS[/TD2][TD2]MX[/TD2][TD2] MSX [/TD2][TD2]MS3X[/TD2] [TD2]Sun:[/TD2][TD2] 370 [/TD2][TD2]115[/TD2][TD2]160[/TD2][TD2] 275 [/TD2][TD2]645[/TD2] [TD2]Mon:[/TD2][TD2] 18 [/TD2][TD2]91[/TD2][TD2]102[/TD2][TD2] 193 [/TD2][TD2]211[/TD2] [TD2]Tue:[/TD2][TD2] 5 [/TD2][TD2]140[/TD2][TD2]125[/TD2][TD2] 265 [/TD2][TD2] 270 [/TD2] [TD2]Wed:[/TD2][TD2] 5 [/TD2][TD2]105[/TD2][TD2]100[/TD2][TD2] 205 [/TD2][TD2]210[/TD2] [TD2]Thu:[/TD2][TD2] 150 [/TD2][TD2]110[/TD2][TD2]95[/TD2][TD2] 205 [/TD2][TD2]355[/TD2] [TD2]Fri:[/TD2][TD2] 465 [/TD2][TD2]160[/TD2][TD2]155[/TD2][TD2] 315 [/TD2][TD2]780[/TD2]

Note how S+X assembly was at ~66% capacity, while the Model 3 lines were down for 3 days and were on low throughput for another 2 days, but the S+X assembly lines were at 70%+ capacity on average. This suggests that Tesla didn't want to lose the production output from the S+X even during the July 4th weekend, and probably paid top hourly wages to keep the lines staffed.

On the flip side, there's a couple of additional factors that count against your thesis, I think:
  • While Tesla reiterated it twice this year that new orders for Model S+X is at record levels, we don't know whether this is true for the U.S., or mainly driven by global demand. In particular the Model 3 Performance might already be earning Tesla more margin per unit (~30%-40%) than a low trim Model S or X which probably has around 20% of margin. It makes sense for Tesla to promote low end S/X sales to M3P sales: if an owner has an upper limit of paying 80k for a Tesla car, it's better they buy a M3P, which:
    • only uses up 80kWh of 2170 production and not 100kWh of 18650 production (which has a supplier limit) - so it utilizes the Gigafactory better
    • has 'full trim', which have much higher margins in excess of 30% according to Munro
    • uses Autopilot and other software options that have near 100% margin
    • customers who want a Model X and can pay 100k+ for it are unlikely to be lured by even a 80k full trim M3P - so I see no negative pressure on high-trim S+X sales
    • BTW., note a nice side-effect of this dynamic: as long as there's record orders for S/X, converting low trim S/X sales to high-trim M3P sales improves the margins of both the Model 3 and the Model S/X product families - win-win.
  • I believe this explains why Tesla has discontinued the 75 kWh Model S/X model and is promoting the Model 3 Performance aggressively: beyond the frequent promotion by Elon, the M3P test-drives there also a cash-back or upgrade-to-any-other-Tesla guarantee (!) which the Model S/X does not have (they are build-to-order). All of these are pushing U.S. demand towards the higher margin M3P.
  • If we count the U.S. as about 25% of the S+X market, that's a regular order flow of 6,250 U.S. orders per quarter. While the reduction of the U.S. tax credit from $7,500 to $3,750 and then to zero by the end of 2019 will increase demand in the U.S., I think the biggest effect will be in Q4 - especially as people know that S+X gets delivered much faster. I.e. I'm not 100% sure the new U.S. orders are necessarily there to tick up to 30k or higher quarterly S+X production.
  • July was clearly a slower month with about 1-2k of S+X baseline production shortfall - which makes it more difficult to reach new records of production. Also, the best way to help Q3 financials is to increase deliveries, and S+X deliveries take much longer on average due to the global delivery chain. While Tesla could re-order to prioritize U.S. deliveries near the end of quarter, I'm not certain there's extra 4k-5k U.S. orders on top of the regular baseline that would allow them to do so to reach 30k and higher Q3 production.
Summary: if these pieces of data and my analysis of them is correct, then I'd say there's a good argument to be made for 27k Model S+X production in Q3. But my position also moved more towards your thesis of a potential 30k and higher production and I'm not dismissing it completely anymore like I did yesterday, but I'd say it would probably be easier for Tesla to make peak S+X production in Q4, not in Q3.

(I'm wondering whether @luvb2b concurs with this analysis.)

It would be nice to have 1-2 more leaks to Fred and more S+X VIN registrations to be able to measure their Q3 S+X production with higher accuracy. Because patiently waiting 3.5 weeks for the production and delivery report is so last century. ;)
 
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I see a lot of analysis on S/X production and rightly so, as they (if delivered) would contribute significantly to FCF+ & profit.

However, what about the hypothesis that they pushed S/X production in the first 2 months of the quarter and pull a significant amount of workers from these lines in September and assign them to the model 3 lines? Something they've done in the past...

IMO there is 0 chance Elon will tell they did not achieve 6k model 3's/week in the quarter. It will be more like, yeah it was not the last week of August but 2 weeks later..and we've produced 55k model 3's.
 
Tesla should not announce hard numbers for per week production. Simply say they aim to increase it whilst maintaining quality to help reduce the backlog.
They could announce percentage changes in the backlog without giving private numbers too. i.e. the US backlog is down approx 30% from peak whilst the overseas backlog is up 20% in the last 12 months.
 
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However, what about the hypothesis that they pushed S/X production in the first 2 months of the quarter and pull a significant amount of workers from these lines in September and assign them to the model 3 lines? Something they've done in the past...

I think it's disruptive (line workers generally are most familiar with the station they are normally working at), and I think Tesla is trying to ramp up Model 3 throughput without hurting S+X.

But I suspect the GA4 Tent is possibly a popular place to work at: not as much noise, good air, glimpses of the sky, and some of the most premium cars are made there, etc. - so it's possible in principle with a low worker grumpiness cost.

But note that right now making S/X's is still more profitable than making Model 3's:
  • Model S/X margins are probably around 30% right now - while Model 3 is maybe around 15%.
  • While higher Model 3 volume improves margins, there's a significant amount of per unit Model 3 depreciation left that will have to be paid off before margins can improve even more.
  • Making S/X also generates a higher per unit revenue and cash flow, as their ASP is ~$103k, while the Model 3's is ~$58k.
  • So Tesla generates about ~$31k of margin for every S/X and around ~$9k for every Model 3.
Q3 is all about maximizing profitability and cash flow, so I think they are maximizing the most mature production lines that have very little per unit depreciation overhead left: i.e. Model S+X.
 
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But note that right now making S/X's is still more profitable than making Model 3's:
  • Model S/X margins are probably around 30% right now - while Model 3 is maybe around 15%.
  • While higher Model 3 volume improves margins, there's a significant amount of per unit Model 3 depreciation left that will have to be paid off before margins can improve even more.
  • Making S/X also generates a higher per unit revenue and cash flow, as their ASP is ~$103k, while the Model 3's is ~$58k.

Yes, but the production of Model 3 will roughly reach twice the production of S&X combined this quarter. As Elon said in the MKB video, the production line also runs a lot faster for model 3.

What if the efficiency of a worker on the model 3 line is double that of the efficiency on model S/X just because the line is more automated and runs faster?

With double the throughput, revenue & margins attain a similar effect on FCF+ & profit for model 3 vs S&X.

And take in mind that all the focus is on model 3 from the street with targets set by Elon (such as the 6k/week & 15% margin) and thus, those will be focused on.

With expected refresh for S/X a year out, I'm not sure why they would pull the backlog forward this quarter

edit: I'm not disagreeing with the analysis here, absolutely not. I'm just looking at an another, maybe slightly less likely, explanation.
 
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inventory
[TD2] luv q4-18e [/TD2][TD2] luv q3-18e [/TD2][TD2] Jun-18 [/TD2][TD2] Mar-18 [/TD2] [TD2]4,382,600[/TD2][TD2]4,626,666[/TD2][TD2]3,324,643[/TD2][TD2]2,565,826[/TD2]

I noticed the following detail about your inventory figures: you seem to be assuming an increase from $3.3b to $4.6b in Q3 inventory levels, a 39% increase.

I am I correct in assuming that this is primarily driven by more 'vehicles in transit' at the end of Q3 in your modeling?

Given that Tesla has guided for sustained 5k/week production in Q3, and exited Q2 with a significant inventory of Model 3's that represent about 2 weeks of 5k/week production, i.e. which is roughly representative of a sustained 5k/week run-rate, is there any expectation to see almost 40% more "in transit" vehicles at the end of Q3 than at the end of Q2?

That would translate to a run-rate increase to ~7,000 Model 3's/week, for a sustained 2 week period - or a gradual ramp-up from 6,500 to 7,500 in the last two weeks of Q3. In fact it would require more than 40% increase in Model 3 production, because S/X inventory probably cannot increase at such levels. I don't think these end-of-quarter M3 bursts of production are realistic - in fact I'd expect Tesla to do a regular 5k/week end of Q3 and maybe even ramp down a bit.

If end-of-Q3 inventory on the other hand is around $3.5b (due to a slight increase in the S/X exit rate), then that would further improve Q3 cash flow I think: while about half of Model 3 CoG cash payments are on a ~60 day payment schedule, the other half isn't and would be a drain on Q3 cash. It has no significant effect on net income AFAICS, as the revenue is not recognized until the car is delivered.

If this quick & dirty estimate of a 50% short-term CoG cash flow effect versus 2 months delay for the other 50% of cash CoG is correct then this could improve Q3 cash flow by about ~$600m. I.e. Tesla would have an incentive to not do burst production at the end of the quarter.

What am I missing?
 
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What if the efficiency of a worker on the model 3 line is double that of the efficiency on model S/X just because the line is more automated and runs faster?

Even if that's true (which I don't think it is at the current stage), the other arguments I made still stand:
  • Model 3 equipment depreciation has a significant unit based component, i.e. if Tesla tries to reach a profitable quarter it makes sense to make as many S/X's as possible, because they generate significantly more net income (I think: @luvb2b might disagree).
  • Tesla kept their S/X lines working at ~70% capacity during July 4th 3-day holiday. It makes little sense to do that (and pay higher hourly wages for holiday time) and then idle the lines later in the quarter. I.e. July 4th weekend I think is an early signal that Tesla wants to run the S/X lines at full capacity up to the end of the quarter.
  • I think Model 3 production is 2170 cell production limited at the moment - i.e. the bottleneck is in the Gigafactory, the new lines have to go online later this year to increase Fremont M3 output.
But yes, at this point I don't think we can exclude any of the variants.

My favorite variant is that Tesla would stay at a constant run-rate or even ramp down at the end of Q3, to improve their cash flow position. The extra workers could be used in a (voluntary) end of Q3 'delivery push' to bridge the current logistics bottlenecks.
 
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Note that if the 18,300 leak from Fred's second article is accurate, that's an average of 295.1 S+X/day rate for the first 62 days of Q3.

For the full 92 days of Q3 that extrapolates to a S+X production of 27,155 - which is very close to the 27k figure used by @luvb2b.
So, slightly off topic, but does this roughly equate to
2.5 gigawatts batteries for S + X
4.8-5 gigawatts for model 3
Unknown, non zero amount for Powerwall and power pack (estimates anybody?)
 
If this quick & dirty estimate of a 50% short-term CoG cash flow effect versus 2 months delay for the other 50% of cash CoG is correct then this could improve Q3 cash flow by about ~$600m. I.e. Tesla would have an incentive to not do burst production at the end of the quarter.
I believe Tesla's said that they're trying to get away from their previous scheme of burst deliveries at the end of the quarter and go to a more steady-state delivery & production system (someone can dig up the quote). So that's just a data point for what they're planning to do.
 
I believe Tesla's said that they're trying to get away from their previous scheme of burst deliveries at the end of the quarter and go to a more steady-state delivery & production system (someone can dig up the quote). So that's just a data point for what they're planning to do.

Indeed, and that language is in their Q2 update letter:

Model S and Model X deliveries should accelerate in the second half of this year as we have now finished realigning our delivery process. While historically most deliveries were made towards the end of each quarter, our delivery pattern should smooth out in the next two quarters. Our target of delivering 100,000 Model S and Model X vehicles this year remains unchanged.​

I always understood this to be mostly related to the tax credit in-transit vehicles, but you are right, this is a broader anti-burst-production language that will affect all subsequent quarters.

So yes, this is a clear indicator that Tesla will try to reduce inventory at the end of the quarter - not balloon it via many in-transit vehicles.

Good find!
 
i sort of got lost in all the details and i believe many are wrong, but generally the idea of how the manager gets paid is this:

a short fund manager is short a basket of stocks. on a simple level, the return he earns is (similar to what you were doing):

-1 * market return + [ interest on cash+short proceeds ] - dividends paid

i say, "on a simple level" because actually the short fund manager has to rebalance regularly as his losses can be infinite, and if the market goes higher he has to cover to maintain his 100% short exposure (if he doesn't cover he gets more and more short as a percentage of equity as the market goes up).

the long fund manager on the other hand earns:

+1 * market return + dividends paid

and note if you combine the long and short fund the return is approximately the interest on cash + short proceeds, which is a virtually certain return. meaning the short fund provides a near-perfect diversification to the long fund (i am soooo a master of all things obvious).

now suppose there was a short manager with some skill who could earn

-1 * market return + [ interest on cash+short proceeds ] - dividends paid + his short skill return.

an investor with some risk appetite could take a long portfolio and partially lever it up and then pair it with this skilled short fund manager. using say 60% leverage w/30% to the long and 30% to the short, the leveraged long fund would be earning:

+1.3 * market return + 1.3 * dividends paid + borrowing cost on 30% of portfolio

now pair this position with a 30% allocation to the skilled short manager:

+1.3 * market return + 1.3 * dividends paid + borrowing cost on 30% of portfolio + -0.3*market return + [interest on 30% of cash + short proceeds] + -0.3 * dividends paid + short skill return

canceling interest and borrow costs and combining terms, gives roughly:

1* market return + dividends paid + short skill return

meaning, as long as the short fund manager can do less bad than the market in a rising market and gain as much as the market loses in a falling market, he can create value for long only investors who can use some leverage to access his skill has a short manager. in effect, the skilled short manager provides valuable portfolio diversification.

some of the other things i also believe are incorrect:

Every new short share creates a new long share out of thin air, which has two effects:
  • it decreases the share price by selling pressure,
  • plus it dilutes the float, which increases volatility, as more longs means a larger pool of investors can panic-sell on a negative event,
not entirely true. a new long position is created, but a not a new share. the new long position is missing the voting rights that go with real shares, and neither the company's float nor financials are not diluted as they are with real shares. the share price is not necessarily decreased by shorting, shorts provide a liquidity benefit due to higher volume and liquidity. they can provide an entry point for larger holders who may not otherwise have one. and, as every short share eventually gets covered, any temporary increase of supply is offset by a future increase in demand for shares. stocks with high short interest can also attract a lot of attention from speculators when the shorts are caught on the wrong side, much more so than stock without the same short interest.

his means it makes sense for shorts to "herd": more shorts against the same company depresses the price and increases the eventual drop: win-win. 30% of TSLA is shorted, these effects are significant.

again, not entirely true. the most skilled shorts i know avoided crowded shorts simply because the spikes can be astronomical and deadly. i can give you an example of aquila pharmaceuticals. on some favorable news the stock mysteriously rose from $2 to 10 (approx). it was heavily heavily shorted that day. and unbeknownst to the short, they had provided liquidity for the baker brothers who were - thanks to the shorts - able to acquire some 40% of the company, which turned out to be like 90% of the float. the rise the following day was astounding. the stock i think ended up topping out around $55. that incredible blast never could have happened without the shorts.

tasr was another stock that was always heavily shorted. around 2004-2005 the stock went up like 15x. it never would have gone that high without the shorts. aside, ticker was changed to aaxn and you want to guess who's on the ir team over there today?

you are right that if a price movement and negative atmosphere can be created, sometimes reflexivity can take care of the rest (reflexivity = soros theory of relationship between stock prices and fundamentals). but that's not every case and those trades can go spectacularly bad too.

Note how short sellers like to talk about their positions after establishing them, they are pimping for the herding effect. Longs don't "need" the herding nearly as much: just average execution gives 10% return.

this is common throughout the industry and is called talking one's book. longs are as guilty of it as shorts, and many are just as bad as some of the bad shorts, spreading various false rumors to be able to sell at higher prices etc.

Shorts are picking low market cap, high growth, high volatility stocks,

only the dumbest and most pikering shorts. low market cap stocks offer very little liquidity to exit when they are wrong. high growth is also dangerous because fundamentals can catch up to and pass reality. the best shorts are high market cap, high liquidity stocks that have no risk of takeover and easy exit if the trade goes bad. an active options market help to hedge risk and manage exposures as well, and that's not a feature of low market cap stocks.

Note the additional collateral damage persistent levels of FUD can cause: 2-3 years of non-stop news about imminent Tesla bankruptcy has material negative effects on customers, suppliers, partners and sources of financing.

no fud has been as bad as lack of execution and elon's twitter fiascos. in fact resolving both of those would put a big smackdown on the fudsters, and yet these are things we can't seem to get.

you can see it happening in front of your eyes. here we are discussing shorting and shorts and how have they damaged the company etc etc etc... and we ignore how much of this is tesla's own doing. this is why it concerns me when tesla focuses on shorts vs being laser focused on executing well. i could even make the case elon's twitter insanities have been driven by tesla's lack of execution: lack of execution => elon works more & sleeps less => making elon cranky while on twitter.

This is what happened to Solar City,

it's not... sunedison, the terraforms (power & global), nrg's yieldco etc. had gone on spending binges. they racked up huge debts and drove up the valuations on various solar/alt energy projects - including those that were being developed by solarcity. eventually the valuations got too high, and the model being driven by flipping projects to yieldcos could not sustain itself. sunedison was trapped because it owned assets it couldn't sell to pay off debts that were too high. solarcity which owned similar assets - assets that were being sold at discounted prices - should have been seen its price drop in that environment. some of the developers/yieldcos that had valuable assets found saviors like appaloosa or tesla/musk, and some did not. if you want to blame someone for solarcity's problems, blame the management and sunedison which wrecked that entire market.

Complaining about shorts is entirely justified IMO, because the damage they are inflicting is significant.

justified to what end? shorts are not going to fix our execution problems. shorts are not going to keep elon from pedo tweets or possibly false tweets. it's what i was saying before, every moment wasted on thoughts about shorts is another moment not spent getting production issues ironed out.

spacex doesn't succeed due to a lack of shorts. it succeeds because they execute.

How would that work? Here's how the calculation goes I think, please point out mistakes:

Fund manager break-even performance is (roughly) measured against index returns: the long term S&P 500 return is almost 10% (before taxes).

If the manager goes long:
  • initial position ties up 100% of cash
  • stock rises 10% annual, long term average
When going short:
  • short position collateral ties up about as much cash as when going long, so the cash opportunity cost is similar,
  • a stock borrowing fee is paid, which is around 2% for TSLA,
  • this is partially cancelled out by cash interest rate income the broker pays on the cash collateral (say 1%), which totals to a net 1% interest cost
  • the short position pays money if the stock's price is falling. The short position's returns are break-even with a long position if the stock's price falls by 11%.
  • a low volatility stock's price will fall by 10% roughly if the company underperforms S&P 500 companies by 10%. (Assuming equilibrium growth and price) For high-growth stocks even a minor miss will be leveraged by the drop in growth expectations.
This looks mostly symmetric, but note how time is working against short positions: every quarter the company performs average it will follow the market with a ~2.5% rise in the price.

The more the timing of the short thesis is off, the harder it gets to get purely break-even with a long position: 1 year delay means a 10% increase, so the subsequent drop has to be 22%. (Interest costs increase with time.) After 2 years it's 33%.

The long position has no interest costs, plus it will rise 10% with an average company.

So the "reliable" way to make money by shorting is to:
  • Every new short share creates a new long share out of thin air, which has two effects:
    • it decreases the share price by selling pressure,
    • plus it dilutes the float, which increases volatility, as more longs means a larger pool of investors can panic-sell on a negative event,
  • This means it makes sense for shorts to "herd": more shorts against the same company depresses the price and increases the eventual drop: win-win. 30% of TSLA is shorted, these effects are significant.
  • Note how short sellers like to talk about their positions after establishing them, they are pimping for the herding effect. Longs don't "need" the herding nearly as much: just average execution gives 10% return.
  • On significant herding such as TSLA, the drop in share price has partial self-fulfilling effects:
    • worse equity financing,
    • more difficult retention of key employees, who are often stock options compensated,
    • lower effective wages for employees with equity compensation, which increases opex,
    • lower credit rating in extreme cases
  • Shorts are picking low market cap, high growth, high volatility stocks,
  • Companies with significant debt structure (such as leasing programs) are targeted, because they are more exposed to credit downgrades or to uncertainty in general,
  • If the short thesis does not materialize fast enough, in today's "facts are strictly optional" media world negative news can be magnified or simply made up.
  • Note the additional collateral damage persistent levels of FUD can cause: 2-3 years of non-stop news about imminent Tesla bankruptcy has material negative effects on customers, suppliers, partners and sources of financing. I believe it's a small miracle that Tesla is able to sell so well despite the level of FUD against it.
This is what happened to Solar City, and this is how Tesla inherited this aggressive, notorious pack of NY hedge funds (Chanos & co) shorting it - and that attracted even more shorts.

Complaining about shorts is entirely justified IMO, because the damage they are inflicting is significant. Elon also knows how corporate life without shorts is: he has overseen SpaceX growing from zero to $25b+ valuation.
 
...not entirely true. a new long position is created, but a not a new share. the new long position is missing the voting rights that go with real shares, and neither the company's float nor financials are not diluted as they are with real shares. the share price is not necessarily decreased by shorting, shorts provide a liquidity benefit due to higher volume and liquidity. they can provide an entry point for larger holders who may not otherwise have one. and, as every short share eventually gets covered, any temporary increase of supply is offset by a future increase in demand for shares. stocks with high short interest can also attract a lot of attention from speculators when the shorts are caught on the wrong side, much more so than stock without the same short interest...

Our language for talking about this can create confusion.

True - a new net share is not created when a share is sold short. However, there IS a new share held long (given the standard transaction of a short seller selling-to-open, to somebody establishing a long position by buy-to-open).


Also true - you can tell the difference in the shares by which ones can be voted. As a lender of shares, when those shares were lent out, I lost my voting rights for those shares - they went with the shares I lent out and went to whoever executed a buy-to-open to acquire those shares. Of course, if that person then lends them out and they are again buy-to-open by somebody, now there are three of us that think we own that share, but only the last buyer in the chain that doesn't lend them out has voting privileges.

What I retain as the original lender is the right to recall that share, which will then cause the broker (who borrowed the share from me in the first place) to go get me a share (out of their own pocket, by buying from the market, whatever - I'm indifferent). Failure to return the share on demand by my broker constitutes default on a loan by the broker (bad - very bad).

Recalling lent shares is an example of pulling "future demand" forward to now. (Another example would be a margin call due to a rising share price).


True - the company's financials are not diluted.


I think False - the company's float IS diluted, at least functionally. There are now 2 people who at least think and act like owners of the company for that 1 share. It depends on who buys those extra shares.


True - every share 'created' by short selling is eventually redeemed when it gets covered.

But this creates a timing problem, and this is part of what I believe we're seeing with Tesla today. The way I think about it - there are ~210M shares worth of demand for Tesla today at ~$290 (whatever today's price is) - that's how many beneficial owners (in shares) of the company there are at today's price. However, there are only ~175M net shares in existence once the ~35M short shares are subtracted out. Those shorted shares have depressed today's price by that much.

Eventually those short shares will need to be redeemed, but that's the bet that the people that have established that position are making - in their ideal case, the company will go to 0, and the people that bought their share will see it become valueless, thus the short seller won't have a loan to make good on, and they can close out the position for maximum profit (eliminating the extra share, but nobody will care because the shares will have become worthless).

So yes, outside of the ideal short outcome, there is a day of reckoning when those shares will need to be redeemed. But like lots of these things in the market, the market can remain irrational longer than I / you / random person can remain solvent. We don't know when that day of reckoning and that period of future demand will actually arrive. It could be this year. It could be next year. It has arguably been coming any day now for several years, and it could still be several years away. It's a mixture of short's commitment to the trade and how deep their pockets are (and company performance, and ... market stuff).

The timing mismatch can span weeks or months, but it can also span years or decades. Future demand far enough in the future is functionally non-existent demand.

(Personally - I'm betting on that future demand chicken coming home to roost in the back half of '18 or front half of '19; sometime the next year; primarily driven by the story to be told around Tesla financials changing in a big and meaningful way over the next few quarters).


Back to the language. It's not strictly accurate to say that there are ~210M shares of Tesla in existence. The net shares are always as reported by the company. I think that the most accurate way to think about it though, is as company shares + shorted shares, as that is the number of shares beneficially owned by people with a long position in the company. The time delay between the borrow and return that 'creates' the incremental shares can be (and has been) long enough that the future demand disappears from the daily calculation.

I hope that makes more sense than confusion :)
 
sorry i agree with @Reciprocity that you lost me at kabooshka.
i personally went to the factory around a time that he was counting. and that particular day on 3 separate visits i saw many trucks leaving the factory. the lot was relatively empty but mostly because trucks were coming and loading and leaving. skabooshka was highlighting how empty the lot was and concluding various things about production.

but the way i saw it the lot was empty due to improved flow of vehicles.

it led me to conclude that his figures and description are not necessarily accurate.

but: there is someone out there who i think has a camera stationed nearby and has an analyst dedicated to counting cars. and whoever that is, they don't post on twitter.

(I'm wondering whether @luvb2b concurs with this analysis.)
 
my modeling is driven by days of inventory outstanding. dio can drop and inventory can rise if sales pace increases, which is what's happening here. my q4 estimate of dio is a level as low as q4 17, one of the lowest seen in the last few years. the assumption i have is they clear the decks to maximize the tax credit.


I noticed the following detail about your inventory figures: you seem to be assuming an increase from $3.3b to $4.6b in Q3 inventory levels, a 39% increase.

I am I correct in assuming that this is primarily driven by more 'vehicles in transit' at the end of Q3 in your modeling?

Given that Tesla has guided for sustained 5k/week production in Q3, and exited Q2 with a significant inventory of Model 3's that represent about 2 weeks of 5k/week production, i.e. which is roughly representative of a sustained 5k/week run-rate, is there any expectation to see almost 40% more "in transit" vehicles at the end of Q3 than at the end of Q2?

That would translate to a run-rate increase to ~7,000 Model 3's/week, for a sustained 2 week period - or a gradual ramp-up from 6,500 to 7,500 in the last two weeks of Q3. In fact it would require more than 40% increase in Model 3 production, because S/X inventory probably cannot increase at such levels. I don't think these end-of-quarter M3 bursts of production are realistic - in fact I'd expect Tesla to do a regular 5k/week end of Q3 and maybe even ramp down a bit.

If end-of-Q3 inventory on the other hand is around $3.5b (due to a slight increase in the S/X exit rate), then that would further improve Q3 cash flow I think: while about half of Model 3 CoG cash payments are on a ~60 day payment schedule, the other half isn't and would be a drain on Q3 cash. It has no significant effect on net income AFAICS, as the revenue is not recognized until the car is delivered.

If this quick & dirty estimate of a 50% short-term CoG cash flow effect versus 2 months delay for the other 50% of cash CoG is correct then this could improve Q3 cash flow by about ~$600m. I.e. Tesla would have an incentive to not do burst production at the end of the quarter.

What am I missing?
 
my modeling is driven by days of inventory outstanding. dio can drop and inventory can rise if sales pace increases, which is what's happening here. my q4 estimate of dio is a level as low as q4 17, one of the lowest seen in the last few years. the assumption i have is they clear the decks to maximize the tax credit.

Yes, but I mentioned your Q3 numbers, not the Q4 numbers, and your Q3 numbers are showing an increase of almost 40% from $3,324m to $4,626m, while Tesla has guided for their end of quarter inventory levels to go down. I.e. maybe even $3,3b of end-of-Q3 inventory levels might be over-estimating it.

What am I missing?
 
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i personally went to the factory around a time that he was counting. and that particular day on 3 separate visits i saw many trucks leaving the factory. the lot was relatively empty but mostly because trucks were coming and loading and leaving. skabooshka was highlighting how empty the lot was and concluding various things about production.

Do you remember the approximate date of your visit, so that we can cross-check it against skabooshka's daily production figure for that day?

I came to the conclusion that skabooshka is lying about the interpretation of the numbers pretty much all the time, including manipulation of the daily leak which he is rounding down and his withholding of the data strategically at the end of Q2, but I found no proof so far that he was fudging the absolute values. I think he used it as a 'carrot' to attract longs and to win credibility.

IIRC someone also summed up the skabooshka leak for Q2 and it came very close to the official figures? It's statistically be very hard to do a fake real-time leak of production data that would match up to the official figures in the end to such a degree.

Also note that skabooshka's numbers up to Aug 7 support the 27,000 Q3 S+X production estimate you are using, and they are also broadly consistent with the production data leaks to Fred Lambert which he claims came from a 'very reliable' source.
 
not entirely true. a new long position is created, but a not a new share. the new long position is missing the voting rights that go with real shares, and neither the company's float nor financials are not diluted as they are with real shares. the share price is not necessarily decreased by shorting, shorts provide a liquidity benefit due to higher volume and liquidity. they can provide an entry point for larger holders who may not otherwise have one. and, as every short share eventually gets covered, any temporary increase of supply is offset by a future increase in demand for shares. stocks with high short interest can also attract a lot of attention from speculators when the shorts are caught on the wrong side, much more so than stock without the same short interest.

Voting rights and dividends have little value for a closely controlled growth company like Tesla, so I think we can leave them out of the equation for now. I suspect Elon is only going to approve dividend payments the day the 100th Gigafactory is built, on Antarctica. Stock buy-back might happen much earlier: in 2-3 years Tesla might be generating a lot of cash they might not be able to spend immediately.

Anyway, the point is that shorting creates a new long position, which is 99% of the current utility of a share of TSLA.

I.e. the dilution is real: there's ~32 million more long shares, who can be panicked into selling and adding additional pressure, who will dilute existing shareholders and who add volatility.

The 'added liquidity' is only true as long as the short is wrong and is losing money. A profitable short is basically a middleman who took returns from a (weaker) long.

Understandably there's very little research into the harms of shorting in the western hemisphere, other than self-serving studies financed by the industry that benefits most from shorting.

But there was a recent natural experiment though, when China introduced short selling on a per equity basis which allowed to statistically control for the before and after effects of shorting, outlined in this paper:


"By focusing on the 30 trading days around the addition events, the results document statistically significant post-event increase in volatility relative to the overall market and absolute value of trading volume. Specifically, small-cap stocks experience the sharpest increase."​

Also note that the oft touted benefit of short selling deflating bubbles doesn't seem to be visible in the data:

"Our key finding is that short selling regulations facilitate the increase of intraday volatility relative to the overall market performance even the absolute value is almost invariant."​

I.e. according to their analysis the natural balance of bulls buying and bears selling was enough for efficient price discovery - shorting was not required.

They also succinctly point out:

"Overall, these results show that short sellers in China destabilize the market, which is in accord with the Hong Kong evidence (Chang et al. 2007) and inconsistent with the international evidence (Saffi and Sigurdsson 2011)."​

Not a surprise: I have checked those other studies - they are using mostly flawed methodology and in any case they don't observe natural data of healthy companies with/without short-selling, they mostly observe broken, distressed companies where short selling bans are implemented.

Anyway, while I agree that some level of shorting is probably beneficial to weed out the chaff, and if a quant algorithm thinks a company is overvalued I see no reason they shouldn't be able to short it, but the human trader driven value shorting that is happening in U.S. markets and which is perversely high for Tesla is dominantly parasitic: short hedge funds ganging/herding on companies and magnifying volatility to profit from it.

It's compounded by the ridiculously lax U.S. regulations that do not require large short positions to be disclosed while large longs are disclosed. This obscurity of true intent is used to hide lines of influence and conflicts of interest: in particular conflicts of interests between Wall Street analysts and the short exposure of their firms and clients.

And yes, shorts are a large source of Tesla FUD in practice, you can tell it by the pattern of the arguments - even though Tesla and Elon makes it arguably easier for them by committing unforced errors.

(Anyway, I suspect this is off-topic for your thread and I'm not going to press this argument.)
 
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shorts are not going to fix our execution problems.

I fully agree there! There's very little shorts will be able to do once Tesla starts executing - and I think they are executing pretty well by now.

BTW., sorry about derailing the thread which was mostly about financials - I've attempted to modify your Q3 projections with Tesla's guided stable (non-burst) end of Q3 inventory:
balance sheet
current assets
inventory
inventory
current liabilities
accts payable
accts payable
total current liabs
total current liabs
cash flow statement
cash flows from ops
accts pybl/accr liabs
accts pybl/accr liabs
net change in cash
net change in cash
cash & eq start
cash & eq end
cash & eq end
[TD2] luv q3-18e [/TD2][TD2] Jun-18 [/TD2][TD2] Mar-18 [/TD2] [TD2] 4,626,666 [/TD2][TD2] 3,324,643 [/TD2][TD2] 2,565,826 [/TD2] [TD2] -1,302,023 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 3,324,643 [/TD2][TD2] 3,324,643 [/TD2][TD2] 2,565,826 [/TD2] [TD2] 4,684,499 [/TD2][TD2] 3,030,493 [/TD2][TD2] 2,603,498 [/TD2] [TD2] -1,302,023 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 3,382,476 [/TD2][TD2] 3,030,493 [/TD2][TD2] 2,603,498 [/TD2] [TD2] 10,641,488 [/TD2][TD2] 9,141,362 [/TD2][TD2] 8,650,359 [/TD2] [TD2] -1,302,023 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 9,339,465 [/TD2][TD2] 9,141,362 [/TD2][TD2] 8,650,359 [/TD2] [TD2] 2,041,277 [/TD2][TD2] 591,737 [/TD2][TD2] 317,983 [/TD2] [TD2] -651,011 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 1,390,266 [/TD2][TD2] 591,737 [/TD2][TD2] 317,983 [/TD2] [TD2] 696,762 [/TD2][TD2] -436,470 [/TD2][TD2] -745,251 [/TD2] [TD2] +651,011 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 1,347,773 [/TD2][TD2] -436,470 [/TD2][TD2] -745,251 [/TD2] [TD2] 2,236,424 [/TD2][TD2] 2,665,673 [/TD2][TD2] 3,367,914 [/TD2] [TD2] 2,933,186 [/TD2][TD2] 2,236,424 [/TD2][TD2] 2,665,673 [/TD2] [TD2] +651,011 [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2][TD2] … [/TD2] [TD2] 3,584,197 [/TD2][TD2] 2,236,424 [/TD2][TD2] 2,665,673 [/TD2]

I used the following crude assumptions to save time and effort:
  • I hope the notation of the changes is obvious enough: I created an extra line for amounts I subtracted or added
  • U.S. Model 3 delivery times average around 14 days, according to the Model 3 tracker
  • Model S+X delivery times average more around 30 days, due to international deliveries
  • Q3 Model 3 exit rate would be two 5k weeks: this creates roughly as many Model 3's "in transit" as the end of Q2 burst production created.
  • This allowed me to simply use the Q2 inventory for end of Q3 as well.
  • I assumed that about 50% of the inventory cost had a cash flow component: labor and immediate cash expenses. The remaining 50% is on a 60 days delayed payment schedule.
  • Effects on net income should be near zero, unless I'm missing something.
Note that this is both sloppy and imprecise for various reasons - but I wanted to establish a basic direction for changes in the financials - did I get it right that cash flow and cash on hand would be improved significantly if Tesla exited Q3 with a similar inventory to Q2?

Or am I missing something important here? A sign error, or getting it wrong by an order of magnitude?
 
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Yes, but I mentioned your Q3 numbers, not the Q4 numbers, and your Q3 numbers are showing an increase of almost 40% from $3,324m to $4,626m, while Tesla has guided for their end of quarter inventory levels to go down. I.e. maybe even $3,3b of end-of-Q3 inventory levels might be over-estimating it.

What am I missing?

yes correct. revenue increases 65% and inventory goes up only 40%. i actually have them getting more efficient at turning over inventory - however you simply can't expand sales at this pace without having some inventory buildup. the levels you're suggesting would imply 60 days of inventory outstanding, which has not been seen since 2013 when tesla was a much smaller company.
 
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