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Russia/Ukraine conflict

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Latest estimates are that Russia is losing troops at the rate of ~180/day and Ukraine at the rate of ~30/day, KIA. That is a 6:1 ratio.

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and

 
A crossover post that I'm not sure which thread it may belong in. But interesting none the less. ;-) A poll in Austria found that most vaccinated Austrians believe Russia is responsible for the war in Ukraine, while the unvaccinated mostly blame the US and NATO. Related to news sources they listen to I suppose.

Vaccination shy and loyal to Putin: the unvaccinated blame the USA for the Ukraine war
Link feeds to German (untranslated) on my end, but better read as title rhymes auf Deutsch😄. Maybe translation should be “Vaccination shy and Putin ally…”
 
"Sanctions ... have a devastating effect on Russian Economy"

Full of strawmen and unbacked claims.
1. Strawman: I've not heard one person say Russia can redirect gas to Asia
2. Instead of disproving the 'myth' he redirects to higher spreads (which actually supports the claim that Russia is flooding Asia with supply)
3. Strawman. Nobody said China would replace all Russian imports. The Chinese data is interesting, though, if believable
4. Strawman. We all said Russian consumers would take a hit. No evidence it's led to a 'deteriorating political landscape' for Putin, as claimed.
5. Strawman. Businesses obviously pulled out of Russia. The extent of the capital and talent flight is unclear
6. Russia is running a trade surplus. In a command economy that's what matters. The budget is meaningless.
7. Foreign reserve freeze happened on day one. Nobody claims it didn't. The effect was not as predicted by this author's crowd, though.
8. Ruble strength is a fact, not a myth. All currencies are 'manipulated'. The issue is whether a country can sustain it. Russia can, despite his predictions
9. Better pressure is needed. Some sanctions, e.g. the high tech stuff, are great. The energy sanctions backfired horribly. As many of us predicted.
 
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Latest estimates are that Russia is losing troops at the rate of ~180/day and Ukraine at the rate of ~30/day, KIA. That is a 6:1 ratio.

View attachment 832539

and


Once Ukraine was able to neuter the artillery, their losses went way down.
 
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Full of strawmen and unbacked claims.
1. Strawman: I've not heard one person say Russia can redirect gas to Asia
2. Instead of disproving the 'myth' he redirects to higher spreads (which actually supports the claim that Russia is flooding Asia with supply)
3. Strawman. Nobody said China would replace all Russian imports. The Chinese data is interesting, though, if believable
4. Strawman. We all said Russian consumers would take a hit. No evidence it's led to a 'deteriorating political landscape' for Putin, as claimed.
5. Strawman. Businesses obviously pulled out of Russia. The extent of the capital and talent flight is unclear
6. Russia is running a trade surplus. In a command economy that's what matters. The budget is meaningless.
7. Foreign reserve freeze happened on day one. Nobody claims it didn't. The effect was not as predicted by this author's crowd, though.
8. Ruble strength is a fact, not a myth. All currencies are 'manipulated'. The issue is whether a country can sustain it. Russia can, despite his predictions
9. Better pressure is needed. Some sanctions, e.g. the high tech stuff, are great. The energy sanctions backfired horribly. As many of us predicted.
Some non paywalled versions out

and the paper itself

[edit] and the slideset ..... which is worth viewing ....
 
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I've now looked at the slideset myself. For me the key slide is #40, the forex. This seems to show a reduction from ~$640bn to ~$570bn between Feb-22 and Jul-22, or $70bn reduction in 6-months. Given that $300bn appear to be restricted that suggests it would take a further ~24-months to deplete the remaining ~$240bn of unrestricted reserves to zero if the observed flow were to continue.

If inflows (gas sales, oil sales, coal sales) were to reduce in volume or price, or both, and given that outflows have already crashed, then the forex reserves would likely not last the calculated 24m. Running to zero gets increasingly difficult, especially if institutions like the World Bank and IMF are not being supportive. That is if nothing further goes wrong within the Russian economy.

Putin clearly prepared Russia carefully for this and other similar ventures, amassing these very substantial reserves over many years for exactly an eventuality such as this. Nevertheless one has to wonder if the Russian system can last more than ~12-months on this trajectory.

Despite the very obvious attempts to crack Western resolve, my personal opinion is that the West will hold firm, even if energy rationing is required to get the EU through the coming winter. And by next year the EU will be fairly permanently off Russian energy (never to return), whilst Russian forex reserves will be getting nervously low. Russian reserves of troops, equipment, weapons, and ammunition will be similarly low by then.

Overall the West - and Ukraine - are better placed for a long war than Russia. As to Putin, I think he'll need to make personal security his primary concern.

1658831560368.png


 
I've now looked at the slideset myself. For me the key slide is #40, the forex. This seems to show a reduction from ~$640bn to ~$570bn between Feb-22 and Jul-22, or $70bn reduction in 6-months. Given that $300bn appear to be restricted that suggests it would take a further ~24-months to deplete the remaining ~$240bn of unrestricted reserves to zero if the observed flow were to continue.

If inflows (gas sales, oil sales, coal sales) were to reduce in volume or price, or both, and given that outflows have already crashed, then the forex reserves would likely not last the calculated 24m. Running to zero gets increasingly difficult, especially if institutions like the World Bank and IMF are not being supportive. That is if nothing further goes wrong within the Russian economy.

Putin clearly prepared Russia carefully for this and other similar ventures, amassing these very substantial reserves over many years for exactly an eventuality such as this. Nevertheless one has to wonder if the Russian system can last more than ~12-months on this trajectory.

Despite the very obvious attempts to crack Western resolve, my personal opinion is that the West will hold firm, even if energy rationing is required to get the EU through the coming winter. And by next year the EU will be fairly permanently off Russian energy (never to return), whilst Russian forex reserves will be getting nervously low. Russian reserves of troops, equipment, weapons, and ammunition will be similarly low by then.

Overall the West - and Ukraine - are better placed for a long war than Russia. As to Putin, I think he'll need to make personal security his primary concern.

View attachment 832920

The data for the slide on the right comes from the Russian Central Bank. The slide excludes the most recent week, which showed a rebound to 585m. That's equal to May 13, but we can't say reserves stabilized at +/= 585m because two months is too short a period for a number this noisy.

Is Putin worried? If so he's not showing it. He's cutting back on gas exports to Europe. This paper claims he's the dependent one in that relationship, yet he's the one walking away. What's his game? Is he gambling on a winter price spike? Or is there something these numbers don't show, e.g. hidden reserves?
 
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The data for the slide on the right comes from the Russian Central Bank. The slide excludes the most recent week, which showed a rebound to 585m. That's equal to May 13, but we can't say reserves stabilized at +/= 585m because two months is too short a period for a number this noisy.

Is Putin worried? If so he's not showing it. He's cutting back on gas exports to Europe. This paper claims he's the dependent one in that relationship, yet he's the one walking away. What's his game? Is he gambling on a winter price spike? Or is there something these numbers don't show, e.g. hidden reserves?
For external consumption it is natural that the Russian leadership team should not show worry, from their perspective this is a game of who-blinks-first. What I said in my post above was simply on the basis of going through the slide deck. I've now read the paper which has the following to say about that slide #40 (see p62 in the paper) and it does somewhat consider the "hidden reserves" point you raise.

"Putin’s remaining FX reserves are decreasing at an alarming pace, as Russian FX reserves have declined by $75 billion since the start of the war – a rate which, if annualized, suggests these reserves may be spent down within a few years’ time. Critics point out that official FX reserves of the central bank technically can only decrease, not increase, due to international sanctions placed on the central bank, and suggest that non-sanctioned financial institutions such as Gazprombank can still accumulate FX reserves in place of the central bank. While this may be true technically, there is simultaneously no evidence to suggest that Gazprombank is actually accumulating any sizable reserves, considering the distress facing its own loan book, pressure to fund increasing amounts of infrastructure loans and the fact that Gazprombank has been accused of being the conduit through which the Kremlin indirectly transfers the regular military pay and combat bonuses of Russian soldiers fighting in Ukraine. These signs point toward Gazprombank simply channeling massive government expenditures outward with the government spending down immediately rather than stashing away government revenues for later.

Another sign that Putin may be spending down his rainy-day funds faster than conventionally realized is in his recent executive orders related to priority spending areas. Although the finance ministry had planned to reinstate a long-standing Russian budgetary rule that surplus revenue from oil and gas sales should be channeled into the sovereign wealth fund, Russia’s National Wealth Fund, Putin axed this proposal as well as accompanying guidelines directing how and where the National Wealth Fund can be spent. These hardly seem like the actions of a leader swimming in surplus funds, but rather of a leader who is becoming increasingly stretched for funding to pay for grandiose, unsustainable and massive fiscal stimulus"


I guess we will find out in due course.
 
I've now looked at the slideset myself. For me the key slide is #40, the forex. This seems to show a reduction from ~$640bn to ~$570bn between Feb-22 and Jul-22, or $70bn reduction in 6-months. Given that $300bn appear to be restricted that suggests it would take a further ~24-months to deplete the remaining ~$240bn of unrestricted reserves to zero if the observed flow were to continue.

If inflows (gas sales, oil sales, coal sales) were to reduce in volume or price, or both, and given that outflows have already crashed, then the forex reserves would likely not last the calculated 24m. Running to zero gets increasingly difficult, especially if institutions like the World Bank and IMF are not being supportive. That is if nothing further goes wrong within the Russian economy.

Putin clearly prepared Russia carefully for this and other similar ventures, amassing these very substantial reserves over many years for exactly an eventuality such as this. Nevertheless one has to wonder if the Russian system can last more than ~12-months on this trajectory.

Despite the very obvious attempts to crack Western resolve, my personal opinion is that the West will hold firm, even if energy rationing is required to get the EU through the coming winter. And by next year the EU will be fairly permanently off Russian energy (never to return), whilst Russian forex reserves will be getting nervously low. Russian reserves of troops, equipment, weapons, and ammunition will be similarly low by then.

Overall the West - and Ukraine - are better placed for a long war than Russia. As to Putin, I think he'll need to make personal security his primary concern.

View attachment 832920

The problem with the "Russian FX Reserves Over Time" graph is that the Y axis does not start at zero, so it looks far worse than it is. (Not that I wouldn't love to see the same downward slope on a Y starts at zero graph.)
 
The context of the below is that c.28 April 2018, Boris Johnson, then UK Foreign Secretary, attended a social event in Italy where one of the other guests was Alexander Lebedev, a former KGB agent. He went to Italy straight from some sort of NATO summit and 'shed' his security detail en route (without their agreement). The following day he was seen "looking as if he had slept in his clothes" at the airport in Italy. Now read on - and as always with DAG posts the comments from the readership also are worth reading.


The phrase "I was so wrecked I can't remember anything" comes to mind, and other more damming ones accompany it.
 
To add to my post a few days back about the UK versions of MLRS (the tracked 12-cell version, as opposed to the 6-cell wheeled US HIMARS version), another person has pointed out privately that German ones appear to also have arrived, and perhaps some Netherlands ones. Personally I'm not yet sure if the DE and NL ones are yet inside Ukraine, but they appear to be getting closer. And of course USA has been sending additinal HIMARS. And perhaps Norway has sent some.

(The range is the same as the wheeled version, and so far the munitions sent appear to be a stated nominal range of c.80km, likely max 100km. But not the much longer range ATACM munition).

 
News sources seem to track HIMARS and related system deliveries. But one thing I have not come across is munition supply numbers for these vehicles. Anyone have a source?

Reportedly individual rockets cost ~$100,000. That's pricey, but they are so accurate and battlefield proven, they have shown their worth with taking out much higher value items: ammunition depots, command centers, or even S300s.
 
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News sources seem to track HIMARS and related system deliveries. But one thing I have not come across is munition supply numbers for these vehicles. Anyone have a source?

Reportedly individual rockets cost ~$100,000. That's pricey, but they are so accurate and battlefield proven, they have shown their worth with taking out much higher value items: ammunition depots, command centers, or even S300s.
That's about the same as a Javelin missile (without the launcher, which costs about $78k), so pretty good value for the type of targets it can hit.