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Russia/Ukraine conflict

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Russia, land of technological marvels ;):

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https://oec.world/en/profile/country/rus?latestTrendsFlowSelectorNonSubnatLatestTrends=flow0
 
I saw that news, and wondered about the timing from a money POV. My first thought was 'I'm surprised that Russian is spending money on space exploration while they have an expensive war to underwrite, not to mention the stresses on their economy from sanctions, the drop in oil prices, and loss of productive manpower.'

I still tend in that direction, but perhaps the flip side is that Russia has sunk costs and unused rockets (thanks, Tesla!) they might as well use in this manner.
According to the Wikipedia early planning for this mission started decades ago. My guess is that once the Special Military Operation didn't go as planned, it was vital for Putin to keep moving the project forward or risk losing face. @wdolson previously mentioned Putin being caught in a monkey trap and this seems like another example, adding another layer to the Jenga tower needed to keep his regime from toppling down.

My gut-feel/hope is that something's going to give out and the tower will topple. Russia losing ground in Ukraine will weaken the tower but I think something unexpected from inside Russia may be the final straw.

I haven't yet watched Purin's interview with Anders Puck Nielsen. They both know a lot more about this stuff than I do.
 

Despite Denys and many other respected sources saying the war against Putin will continue another year, I find Ukraine’s growing successes in Crimea, in and around Moscow, and the number and power of ammo depo explosions cause for much optimism.
A few explosions around Moscow make little difference and might help solidify popular support for the war, with the implication that Russia is under attack. The counter-offensive is a failure, and that's what matters. As of August 14 they could possibly turn this around, but probably not. Their successful attacks on ships in the Black Sea are a bright spot.
 
A few explosions around Moscow make little difference and might help solidify popular support for the war, with the implication that Russia is under attack. The counter-offensive is a failure, and that's what matters. As of August 14 they could possibly turn this around, but probably not. Their successful attacks on ships in the Black Sea are a bright spot.

The Ukrainian counter attack is not a failure, it's just moving more slowly than most people hoped. Ukraine is taking ground and despite the Russians throwing a lot of forces into trying to stop them, the Ukrainian army has not been stopped.

Ukraine did just about the same thing in the Kherson region last year and nobody was declaring their offensive there a failure. The fact that Kherson is back in Ukrainian hands is proof that the offensive, while slow and methodical rather than a blitzkrieg, did work.

The world has seen what the US military has done to obviously weaker foes in the last 30 years. The first Gulf War ended like a sledgehammer breaking an egg. The first phases of the second Gulf War also resulted in Saddam Hussein's army dissolving before the onslaught. In Libya and the former Yugoslavia NATO air power forced the enemy to essentially capitulate.

NATO's doctrine of overwhelming air power followed by troops on the ground is a recipe for a quick win in any conventional war against an outmatched opponent (other than an insurgency).

The last time the US fought a power that was anywhere near a peer was Korea. None of the opponents since had any kind of real military industry of their own. The last time the US fought a real peer was WW II.

The Normandy Campaign didn't end until the Falaise Gap was finally closed on August 21, 1944. That was 76 days after the D-Day landings. No significant movement was seen until late July. During that entire period the Allies enjoyed air superiority if not air supremacy. Breaking through defenses is sometimes very difficult.

Russia's army has a lot of weaknesses. The Russian army really isn't capable of pulling off a successful offensive on their own. However, the Russians have a massive stockpile of reserve equipment and ammunition left over from the Soviets. And part of this reserve was an astronomical number of mines which they have deployed in southern Ukraine.

Because Ukraine doesn't have the kind of air assets NATO can call on, and they will never have those kind of assets (they would need several hundred western jets with no restrictions on operating in Russian airspace to compete even on par with Russia), the Ukrainians have to operate slowly and move ahead at a more measured pace.

The area on the left bank of the Dnipro is shaping up into a new front. Ukraine just conducted some raids across the river after the flood, but when the Russians were unable to dislodge the raiders, the Ukrainians dug in and turned it into a bridgehead. The Ukrainians are now expanding the bridgehead. Once the Russians are pushed back from artillery range the Ukrainians can build pontoon bridges across the Dnipro and bring across heavy equipment.

The Russians didn't plan for this so the left bank of the Dnipro is not as mined as the rest of the south.

Ukraine is also doing quite a bit to starve the Russians of supplies. They are striking Russian supply depots and supply movement infrastructure like bridges. Stories coming from the Russian lines indicate that supplies are in very short supply throughout the south. This hurts the troops and most of the equipment defending the lines, but unfortunately it has no effect on mines.

If a doctor opens someone up for cancer surgery and they find once they are in there the tumor is much bigger and much more entangled than anyone thought, nobody is going to call the surgeon incompetent for taking a lot longer to do the surgery. The problem turned out to be a lot worse than anyone anticipated going in.
 
IMO, the mines are doing the job of slowing things down to a crawl if not a total stop.

”…One brigade active around Staromaiorske, a recently liberated village in the Donetsk region, said it was 30-strong on paper but that it had 13 men in reality, of whom only five were active as a result of injury. Two members of the unit lost limbs in the last fortnight...”

 
Every war seems to showcase the evolution/revolution of technologies and fighting methods. That element in this war is probably drones.

Drones in warfare is not a new thing. But the sheer scale and sophistication with which they are being used now has really made them a main battle tool, particularly smaller drones that operate around front lines for reconnaissance/attack as well as maritime drones.

This is a relatively good thing for Ukraine, who in terms of potential manpower is outnumbered significantly by the Russians. Drones are effectively a force multiplier. It is therefore vital that the West should dig deep and long-term to help Ukraine scale and advance their drone program.
 
There is something about that graphic that does not look right. The fossils add up to ~ 51% by numbers but the area in the graphic appears to be closer to 2/3.
Thought so as well, but it's mostly an optical illusion. It's also a bit confusing that they added Iron Ore into the same dark brown color category with the fossils and a few other fossil items in that corner that account for ~4%.

I actually printed out the chart and measured the areas and compared to assigned percentages and they come very close to adding up. :D
 
Thought so as well, but it's mostly an optical illusion. It's also a bit confusing that they added Iron Ore into the same dark brown color category with the fossils and a few other fossil items in that corner that account for ~4%.

I actually printed out the chart and measured the areas and compared to assigned percentages and they come very close to adding up. :D

It does demonstrate how much of a resource extraction economy Russia is.
 
I wonder how UKR views their counter-offensive. I would also suggest you reverse the sides, and ask yourself if the gains thus far, along with the enemy attrition, would still be a 'failure.'
I agree! If Ukraine gets close enough to the Sea of Azov to cut the land bridge or is able to isolate Crimea some other way then it is game over for Russia (and probably for Putin). The fact that Ukraine has not won yet does not mean the counter-offensive is a failure.

It may seem slow to some/many in the West because Ukraine lacks the air-power and enough long range strike capabilities to perform the rapid attrition warfare that people are used to seeing when the US invades.

The US is training Ukrainian pilots. Fighter jets and more tanks from the West are in the pipeline. If the extremely high standard of measuring success by cutting off Crimea were already achieved then there would be little urgent need for all this equipment and training. The defense departments supplying that equipment were not expecting the war to be almost over this summer.

Ukraine is making slow but steady progress along long stretches of the front, including in Kherson which may soon threaten some of the few remaining land routes to Crimea. They have repeated demonstrated an ability to damage the Kerch bridge and to sink and damage ships in the Black Sea.

By contrast, the Russian winter offensive was mostly a failure. Wagner troops were able to capture the strategically insignificant town of Bakhmut at a very high cost. That high costs includes a Wagner mutiny and internal strife in Russia that may lead to Putin's undoing. Ukraine played this brilliantly! Likewise, the Russian counter-counter-offensives this summer have mostly been failures with extremely modest gains that are usually quickly taken back by Ukraine.

IMO, it's about a year too early to judge success or failure. I think Ukraine needs to show significant progress (like getting close to the Sea of Azov) by next summer. Weapons are already in the pipeline for autumn, winter, and spring including Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets. It's a darn shame Ukraine did not have these weapons for their offensive this summer. It is what it is.

But by far the most important reason Ukraine needs to make progress next summer is the US election.
The outcome of the election could well depend on the result in Ukraine and further US aid to Ukraine could hang on the result of the election.

If I put on my conspiracy theory hat then I would not be at all surprised if the US is slow walking aid to Ukraine this summer in order to ensure the big breakout and breakthrough happen next summer in the heart of election season. A Ukrainian victory this summer will be hardly a blip on the radar during the election campaigns next year (what have you done for me lately?) But major victories by Ukraine next summer will be <blink> HUGE. </blink>

If the Ukrainian counter-offensive peters out next summer without major gains and if a foe to Ukraine and friend to Putin is put in the White House then I will 100% agree with @Fred42 that the counter-offensive was a bust with huge implications across the globe. But I find it extremely hard to believe that the current US administration is blind to all of this so I expect to see a major push by the US and their current allies to help Ukraine leading up to next summer.
 
I agree! If Ukraine gets close enough to the Sea of Azov to cut the land bridge or is able to isolate Crimea some other way then it is game over for Russia (and probably for Putin). The fact that Ukraine has not won yet does not mean the counter-offensive is a failure.

It may seem slow to some/many in the West because Ukraine lacks the air-power and enough long range strike capabilities to perform the rapid attrition warfare that people are used to seeing when the US invades.

The US is training Ukrainian pilots. Fighter jets and more tanks from the West are in the pipeline. If the extremely high standard of measuring success by cutting off Crimea were already achieved then there would be little urgent need for all this equipment and training. The defense departments supplying that equipment were not expecting the war to be almost over this summer.

Ukraine is making slow but steady progress along long stretches of the front, including in Kherson which may soon threaten some of the few remaining land routes to Crimea. They have repeated demonstrated an ability to damage the Kerch bridge and to sink and damage ships in the Black Sea.

By contrast, the Russian winter offensive was mostly a failure. Wagner troops were able to capture the strategically insignificant town of Bakhmut at a very high cost. That high costs includes a Wagner mutiny and internal strife in Russia that may lead to Putin's undoing. Ukraine played this brilliantly! Likewise, the Russian counter-counter-offensives this summer have mostly been failures with extremely modest gains that are usually quickly taken back by Ukraine.

IMO, it's about a year too early to judge success or failure. I think Ukraine needs to show significant progress (like getting close to the Sea of Azov) by next summer. Weapons are already in the pipeline for autumn, winter, and spring including Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets. It's a darn shame Ukraine did not have these weapons for their offensive this summer. It is what it is.

But by far the most important reason Ukraine needs to make progress next summer is the US election.
The outcome of the election could well depend on the result in Ukraine and further US aid to Ukraine could hang on the result of the election.

If I put on my conspiracy theory hat then I would not be at all surprised if the US is slow walking aid to Ukraine this summer in order to ensure the big breakout and breakthrough happen next summer in the heart of election season. A Ukrainian victory this summer will be hardly a blip on the radar during the election campaigns next year (what have you done for me lately?) But major victories by Ukraine next summer will be <blink> HUGE. </blink>

If the Ukrainian counter-offensive peters out next summer without major gains and if a foe to Ukraine and friend to Putin is put in the White House then I will 100% agree with @Fred42 that the counter-offensive was a bust with huge implications across the globe. But I find it extremely hard to believe that the current US administration is blind to all of this so I expect to see a major push by the US and their current allies to help Ukraine leading up to next summer.
I don't think you are wrong re timing in the USA election cycle. Trumps very pro putin statements will turn off a certain percent of a core voting group and Bidens team is nothing if not political.

At the current rates Ukraine should reach the Sea of Azov by the end of October. Then things turn to mud and the it will be a winter of slogging. USA and EU ammo production is increasing dramatically and that will help shift things by the spring.
 
Ruble climbed higher above before settling below 100 Rubles to the US dollar today on news of an emergency Russian Central Bank meeting tomorrow. That means more interest rate hikes are coming their way.

Russian central bank to hold emergency rate meeting as rouble flounders | Financial Times
Right you are...rates are up 3% which is huge. @unk45 I know the major transactions don't move through the open FX counters but for little guys this has got to be hitting. Why would the central bank do this if it didn't have issues with the exchange rate?
 
I don't think you are wrong re timing in the USA election cycle. Trumps very pro putin statements will turn off a certain percent of a core voting group and Bidens team is nothing if not political.

At the current rates Ukraine should reach the Sea of Azov by the end of October. Then things turn to mud and the it will be a winter of slogging. USA and EU ammo production is increasing dramatically and that will help shift things by the spring.

The further south the fighting goes the later the mud season and the shorter the winter. Crimea probably has the mildest climate of anywhere in the former USSR. The winters could be considered cold for someone used to a tropical climate, but they aren't the bitter frozen wastes they get further north.

If Ukraine gets down close to Crimea before winter there may not be much of a pause in the offensive. We also don't know if this is going to be another warm winter or not. This could be a cold winter which would be bad for the civilian population if Russia targets the grid again, but it could open up possibilities operating at least special forces units across the ice on the Azoz.

I don't think the Savash Sea (the shallow waters between Crimea and Ukraine proper) freeze over, the area is extremely salty. If it did get a hard freeze that would open the door for the Ukrainians to invade over the Savash. Nobody has ever done that, so it probably doesn't freeze hard enough.

One of the concerns people had when the Kerch Bridge was built was how it would deal with ice flows coming from the Azoz as the ice breaks up in the spring. The Azoz is one of the least salty seas in the world so it can get very thick ice in a cold winter and the Kerch Bridges could be damaged from ice flows. The Soviets tried to build a Kerch Bridge in 1943-44 but the ice flows damaged it while under construction so badly they abandoned the project.

In a severe winter I don't know how muddy Crimea gets in the spring. It's a fairly arid place so even if cold I don't think it gets the kind of snow fall seen in a lot of other regions of Ukraine and thus less mud when it all melts.

Operations in the Donbas will probably slow down as winter approaches because that region gets more mud and colder winters.
 
I am saying ..cautiously optimistic...that the two avenues of attack (towards Robotyne and towards Mariupol) are now achieving some measure of velocity and I expect this to continue with the caveat that they'll create a bit of a salient and then work to widen. But both salients are being widened, this allows artillery to move forward and they engage in attritional campaigns, then a new salient, then widen then move forward. As they move forward in the current directions the two prongs of attack will create a mutually supporting front N of the Robotyne and S of the Mariupol salients respectively. This will be a constant source of potential encirclement for Russia and if they can't halt this progress than by September the areas west of Bilmak would be at risk of encirclement...a really big cauldron. Not sure if this is what the UAF are planning to do or not but these two points of attack are it...other than the bridgeheads on the right bank in Kherson.
 
The further south the fighting goes the later the mud season and the shorter the winter. Crimea probably has the mildest climate of anywhere in the former USSR. The winters could be considered cold for someone used to a tropical climate, but they aren't the bitter frozen wastes they get further north.

If Ukraine gets down close to Crimea before winter there may not be much of a pause in the offensive. We also don't know if this is going to be another warm winter or not. This could be a cold winter which would be bad for the civilian population if Russia targets the grid again, but it could open up possibilities operating at least special forces units across the ice on the Azoz.

I don't think the Savash Sea (the shallow waters between Crimea and Ukraine proper) freeze over, the area is extremely salty. If it did get a hard freeze that would open the door for the Ukrainians to invade over the Savash. Nobody has ever done that, so it probably doesn't freeze hard enough.

One of the concerns people had when the Kerch Bridge was built was how it would deal with ice flows coming from the Azoz as the ice breaks up in the spring. The Azoz is one of the least salty seas in the world so it can get very thick ice in a cold winter and the Kerch Bridges could be damaged from ice flows. The Soviets tried to build a Kerch Bridge in 1943-44 but the ice flows damaged it while under construction so badly they abandoned the project.

In a severe winter I don't know how muddy Crimea gets in the spring. It's a fairly arid place so even if cold I don't think it gets the kind of snow fall seen in a lot of other regions of Ukraine and thus less mud when it all melts.

Operations in the Donbas will probably slow down as winter approaches because that region gets more mud and colder winters.
historically the winter/summer was the campaign season. Winter is the absolute best for equipment, ground freezes and if cold enough the marsh/swamps freeze enough for light equipment. With climate change I'm just not sure that the winters are cold enough anymore.

Our forestry friends in the far north of the USA do 50% of their work in 3 months, drive tractor trailers across frozen fields like they were pavement. Big michigan forestry specials carrying 60 tons (same sort of weight a tank carrier might have) going right across swampy forest roads. Can't work in those areas anytime other than dead of winter.

Kherson will get interesting if they can expand the bridgehead but the current direction of the Robotyne salient does not seem like it supports a turn south but East/ NE. I would caution extreme patience.