As I understand Macron doesn't specify exactly what France would do, but my guess is that France – if it comes to it, would at a minimum deploy everything they have in terms of drone warfare. And the French Air Force. I'm only a layman at this, but guessing that the Rafale would fare rather well against the SU-35 and everything else the Russian Dictator has.
France also has 11 of these:
en.wikipedia.org
I don't know, but I'm guessing that France has X amount of ATACMS missiles...
If France were to lead a coalition in UKR, the Baltic states also seem to be game. As does Poland and the Netherlands. Guessing that ground troops from the Baltics could man a segment of the defense lines against the Belarusian Dictator. That would give UKR X amount of troops to deploy elsewhere.
I don't know what Poland and the Netherlands could add, but the Dutch does allegedly have 31 F-35As in service...
The French air force is fairly small: 100 Refale and 91 Mirage 2000. France does not have any ATACMS.
Poland's air force is not large, but they do have one of the largest armies in Europe. Poland has been working with South Korea to license build a number of SK military vehicles including tanks. First they ordered some of the SK vehicles, but the second batch of those vehicles will be domestically built. Poland has F-35s on order, but their air force is even smaller than France's. Their combat aircraft contingent is smaller than Ukraine's at the start of the war: 13 MiG-29s (which I think already went to Ukraine), 12 Su-22s, and 36 F-16s.
If Poland contributed their ground forces, it would be a significant boost to Ukraine's side.
However, few armies in the world have the logistical depth of the US. NATO doctrine is pretty much to have enough on hand to stem the initial tide of an attack from Russia and then depend on replacement ammunition to come from the United States. A lot of the NATO armies depleted their already thin stocks of ammunition sending them to Ukraine.
The US has been more circumspect in sending ammunition because US doctrine requires the US keep a certain level of stock of ammunition in case the US does have to go to war anywhere in the world. It's part of the deterrence the US puts up 24/7 around the world. Part of what has kept Taiwan safe is the promise that the US Pacific Fleet would be off Taiwan within a few days of China making a move and they would bring the Marines with them, with the USAF and US Army following very soon after.
Relations with Saudi Arabia are a bit strained these days, but that same promise has kept SA safe for decades too.
If Russia did attack a NATO country, the US would be obligated to join in the defense (though Russian allies in government would probably try to prevent it), but there is no obligation for the US to join in if European allies voluntarily join the war in Ukraine.
Various NATO countries could probably send small forces to Ukraine without logistical problems, but without US supply chains and US European Command running the NATO response, they would run into scaling issues if they tried to send in large forces.
European countries need to work out their ammunition production issues and they need to come up with a work around to go to war without EUCOM. The NATO operation against Libya was limited because the US president can only commit US forces to a military operation for 90 days without Congressional approval and Congress refused to approve it (more politics like we're seeing now). NATO couldn't conduct operations within EUCOM in the loop and they had to shut down operations when EUCOM had to pull out.
It contributed quite a bit to the mess we see in Libya today.
www.lemonde.fr
kyivindependent.com
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www.defensenews.com
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