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Running into fire and police vehicles that have their flashers engaged is not all that uncommon. Been so for years. 100% sure it's not AP or FSD. People get fixated on the flashing lights and if they are not fully aware often run into them.

Tesla issued a patch to AP the last time this came up (did NOT call it a recall, because it WASN'T):


Starting to sound like sour grapes from shortzes that just can't let go of their bone (but what's new?)

Also won't surprise me at all if the yellow media at WSJ just recycled this story yesterday from an old event.
 
I once went for a ride in a friend's Lotus Elise. Lowering the door sills was not a mistake! Getting in and out of a Roadster is twice as easy as an Elise.
I'm sure it was a better design but the mistake was doing it at that time. The Roadster was a very small production run and they would have sold all of them without the costly and time consuming design change.
 
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I'm sure it was a better design but the mistake was doing it at that time. The Roadster was a very small production run and they would have sold all of them without the costly and time consuming design change.
Given that they sold all of their original production run, and managed to do so despite that change (and the infamous transmission issue), and not go bankrupt, but instead stayed alive and went on to become one of the largest companies on the planet today, it's hard to know if it was a mistake, or a good call.

Interesting thread... the link in the first post is enlightening:

 
The best predictor of future performance is past performance.

Enough 2022 data has become available to do some meaningful crunching. I've not completely finished that yet, and there are some minor inconsistencies that I either haven't scrubbed out or don't yet have good data to scrub out. (So please don't fuss about any minor data inconsistencies). The data sources are the same public domain ones as I have used in the past, for previous annual summaries that I have put out at this point in the year. Already there is some interesting stuff emerging.

Crucially this raises two interesting questions on the cell supply front, which I would appreciate the views of those who have dug further into that:

- Q1. Can the cell suppliers (and their mineral suppliers) continue to meet the total annual increases that the historical evidence suggests will continue to be met ?
- Q2. Can Tesla continue to capture at least a 20% market share of that cell supply for vehicle use ?

Let us be clear, Tesla is doing very well in growing the business. But also, and we must recognise this, so too are the aggregate of all the other auto makers and their corresponding supply chain partners.

In my analysis I only classify 'pluggable' electric vehicles as EVs, i.e. EV = BEV + PHEV. The fuel cell vehicles (FCEV) and the non-pluggable hybrids I just lump in with internal combustion (ICE) as they are rounding errors. First of all we can see that the overall vehicle market has substantially stabilised but not necessarily recovered. Dino-juice (ICE) vehicle production is now falling and there is a growing wedge of EV production making up the market. The pluggable hybrid segment (PHEV) is still growing but its growth is definitely decellerating and it is clearly going to be a dead-end for the mass-market PHEV fairly soon.

1676810049613.png


Looking more closely at the EV market here is the overall market situation at the end of 2022 with the corresponding market shares in tabular form. It is important both to understand the vehicle shares, and the cell supply shares. You can see in the battery/vehicle that all vehicles are trending towards a greater cell capacity, no surprise there. At this rate of cell/vehicle growth in another three years non-Tesla BEV will be at 60kWh vehicle pack sizes:

1676808371916.png


Or if you prefer graphical form this is the market share situation :

1676808792925.png


Tesla's share of the EV market peaked in 2019 at 17% by vehicle volume, and also in 2019 Tesla's share of EV battery supply peaked at approx 35-32%, and on both metrics Tesla's share has been sliding since, now (2022) being at 12% and 22% respectively. So one needs to recognise that Tesla has done an outstanding job of growing profitably, but also to recognise that in aggregate the other auto makers (and their supply chain partners) have grown their EV offerings even faster than Tesla since then, albeit the likelihood is that they have struggled do do so profitably in EVs.

This is relevant because the long-run dataset is now providing a good match for S-curve adoption models in a way that there was not sufficient data to meaningfully predict before. And the result is dramatic, with it being game-over by 2030 if the current adoption trajectory is sustained.

1676809732745.png


This S-curve (grey) is a three parameter logistics curve that has been history-matched against actual data (green) from 2010-2022 using a computerised 'solver' to get the least-error fit.


Previously it did not seem to me that there was sufficient data to get a reliable result, plus there was the added confusion of the Covid pandemic. But now that there is stabilisation observable - and significantly - the Covid pandemic has not been too disruptive for EV growth, then a sufficient match seems to be emerging. And it is going faster than was expected as the incumbent ICE manufacturers are trying; and as the new-entrant ICE and EV players are very competitively forcing the transition (the switch of BYD to a full-EV manufacturer is very important). Plus of course Tesla.

As a generalisation such a growth model is a good prediction tool provided that a new constraint does not impose itself on the scene, and the constraint that I think we need to be aware of is in relation to cell supply growth, and everything necessary to achieve that in terms of raw materials etc. So let us look more closely at that. I've circled two cells in red for 2024, but first observe that the overall growth rate is tending to trend down. The 345 GWh vehicular ccell capacity production adds for 2023 appear realistic given the achieved 208GWh production add for 2022, and note that there must be excess production add available - we know this because the stationary storage market is also growing.

(This tends to suggest that whilst Covid has had a discerbable effect of EV adoption, it has not been the cause of a 'catch-up' of excess capacity in 2022. My suspicion is that all manufacturers prioritised keeping EV lines going during Covid, and preferentially idled ICE lines whenever supply chain disruptions became unamanageable. That there was some impact from Covid is also discernable when one looks at the actual vs history match error term, but it is surprising how small it is. Overall I don't think the history match is being fooled by Covid artefacts.)

But the crunch year overall is 2024 where 756GWh of additional vehicle cell capacity is needed. If the 2024 growth rate of 92% can be managed then everything after that is easy. And the reason why it is so large is that this forecast now assumes a strong return to the previous size of vehicle market that had been over 90-million per year, specifically to 92m/yr in 2024, and so this flows down to the cell demand. And because in the past the cell manufacturers did meet the demand, then the question becomes will they do so again ? Especially noting that excess cell capacity, primarily LFP, is flowing into the stationary market. After all the best predictor of future performance is past performance.

1676811242332.png


The alternatives are:
- vehicle buyers will switch from BEV to ICE at the margin, and the 92m demand will persist but be met by dino-juice; or
- vehicle buyers wil postpone vehicle purchases until BEVs become available, and the market will become capped at approx 80m/yr for several years; or
- the average cell/vehicle trend will flatten through the supply crunch, with a mixture of small-pack BEV and small-pack PHEV competing against big-pack Teslas so keeping the >90m/yr vehicle count but failing on the cell-supply (bad news for wannabe US-pick-up-truck drivers migrating from ICE to BEV); or
- cell suppliers (and their mineral supply chains) will meet the challenge.

For the time being I tend to discard the option that vehicle productivity/utilisation metrics will increase, i.e. I am being pessimistic regarding the likelihood that autonomous vehicle technology will be significant in this time period. Opinions may differ on this.

Hence my posing the first question :
- Q1. Can the cell suppliers (and their mineral suppliers) continue to meet the total annual increases that the historical evidence suggests will continue to be met ?

Turning to the effect for Tesla the quick take is that if this S-curve does play out, then the maximum (best) outcome for Tesla is to achieve its own stated target of 20 million vehicles per year by 2030. There is unlikely to be significant market growth of EVs after 2030, perhaps even decrease if autonomous driving eventuates. So for Tesla to grow after 2030 would require Tesla to gain market share from other EV manufacturers at that point, which is a zero-sum game. However we then need to return to this table and note that on EV vehicles Tesla is down to 12% market share, therefore Tesla will have to recapture EV market share in order to obtain a approx 19-20% market share by 2030 that is implicit in the stated target of 20m/yr. To pre-emptively counter the valid response that the BEV market share is what matters, one really needs to look at the core underlying constraint which is the cell supply. Here the Tesla cell position is 22% at end of 2022, so still on track.

1676808371916.png

But equally one can see that the Tesla cell position has been declining from its peak, and has been declining at a rate of 2-4% per year. This is because the other manufacturers have been outperforming Tesla in sourcing cells (even if they have made some bad decisions, such as going for pouch). Nevertheless as a minimum Tesla will need to arrest that decline in the cell supply fraction and hold it above 20% for a decade if it is to achieve its 20m vehicles/year target. The reason why Tesla has to capture a >20% cell supply fraction in order to meet its vehicle ramp targets is because Tesla puts larger packs in its vehicles, so Tesla has to try harder.

At the level of a Tesla shareholder this does tend to focus the share price analysis down to 'only' the 2030 time horizon. And if one is as cautious as I am regarding the financial performance of the Tesla energy side of the business (and I'm no bear)*, then the vehicle side's performance over the next 7-years is critical. If the decay in Tesla's relative position continues then if the vehicle parameter stabilises at 12% of EV, then the Tesla vehicle quantity will be 'only' 10.5 million/yr in 2030, and even this would represent a turnaround in the rate and direction of the ongoing decline in the cell % share. Staying above a 20% cell fraction is crucial for Tesla shareholders !

Hence my posing the second question :
- Q2. Can Tesla continue to capture at least a 20% market share of that cell supply for vehicle use ?

These are absolutely dramatic rates of change we are witnessing, utterly transformative in a global sense for all humanity. At this point of course minor changes in trends might *sugar* things by a few years, or by a few tens of millions, but nonetheless the sheer scale and speed of what is going on is amazing. I've been working towards this for 30-years of my professional career in the wider energy sector, so it is very gratifying to see it coming to fruition. I am also a Tesla shareholder.

It is in that context that I pose the two questions I do.


* As an aside, by looking at the vehicle cell production add, one can see that global stationary storage uptake will really accelerate after 2025/2026. Until then the vehicle market will be the dominant cell growth driver.
 

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Given that they sold all of their original production run, and managed to do so despite that change (and the infamous transmission issue), and not go bankrupt, but instead stayed alive and went on to become one of the largest companies on the planet today, it's hard to know if it was a mistake, or a good call.

Interesting thread... the link in the first post is enlightening:

If Martin’s only avenue to stay relevant is to be in the same article as Elon with a rehashed story that has been beaten to death, I’d say we are better off with Elon at the helm.
 
Given that they sold all of their original production run, and managed to do so despite that change (and the infamous transmission issue), and not go bankrupt, almost went bankrupt...
Since Lotus sold over 35K Elise compared to the Roadster production of 2,500 it's obvious the high door sill was not going to be an impediment to sales.
 
Given that they sold all of their original production run, and managed to do so despite that change (and the infamous transmission issue), and not go bankrupt, but instead stayed alive and went on to become one of the largest companies on the planet today, it's hard to know if it was a mistake, or a good call.

Interesting thread... the link in the first post is enlightening:

(replying to my own post... but hey, it's the weekend!)

I also seem to recall there were some other issues with he original Lotus "gliders". so I looked back at Vance's book:

The Elise’s chassis, or base frame, worked fine for Tesla’s engineering purposes. But the body of the car had serious issues in both form and function. The door on the Elise was all of a foot tall, and you were meant to either jump into the car or fall into it, depending on your flexibility and/or dignity. The body also needed to be longer to accommodate Tesla’s battery pack and a trunk. And Tesla preferred to make the Roadster out of carbon fiber instead of fiberglass.

Given the body needed modification to accommodate the pack anyway, I'm not sure that the door sill redesign added all that much time/and expense.

More interesting quotes:

When some new hires came on, they were horrified to discover just how haphazard Tesla’s plan appeared. Ryan Popple, who had spent four years in the army and then gotten an MBA from Harvard, arrived at Tesla as a director of finance meant to prep the company to go public. After examining the company’s books early in his tenure, Popple asked the manufacturing and operations head exactly how he would get the car made. “He said, ‘Well, we will decide we’re going into production and then a miracle is going to happen,’” Popple said.

As word of the manufacturing issues reached Musk, he became very concerned about the way Eberhard had run the company and called in a fixer to address the situation. One of Tesla’s investors was Valor Equity, a Chicago-based investment firm that specialized in fine-tuning manufacturing operations. The company had been drawn to Tesla’s battery and powertrain technology and calculated that even if Tesla failed to sell many cars, the big automakers would end up wanting to buy its intellectual property. To protect its investment, Valor sent in Tim Watkins, its managing director of operations, and he soon reached some horrific conclusions.

...

Around the middle of 2007, Watkins came to Musk with his findings. Musk was prepared for a high figure but felt confident that the price of the car would come down significantly over time as Tesla ironed out its manufacturing process and increased its sales. “That’s when Tim told me it was really bad news,” Musk said.

...

These victories, though, were not enough to overcome the feeling shared by many of the Tesla engineers that Eberhard had reached the end of his abilities as a CEO. The company veterans had always admired Eberhard’s engineering smarts and continued to do so. Eberhard, in fact, had turned Tesla into a cult of engineering. Regrettably, other parts of the company had been neglected, and people doubted Eberhard’s ability to take the company from the R&D stage to production. The ridiculous cost of the car, the transmission, the ineffective suppliers were crippling Tesla. And, as the company started to miss its delivery dates, many of the once-fanatical consumers who had made their large up-front payments turned on Tesla and Eberhard. “We saw the writing on the wall,” Lyons said. “Everyone knew that the person who starts a company is not necessarily the right person to lead it in the long term, but whenever that is the case, it’s not easy.”

So it would seem the characterization of Eberhard as incompetent from a CEO standpoint is not just Elon's.
 
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The best predictor of future performance is past performance.

Enough 2022 data has become available to do some meaningful crunching. I've not completely finished that yet, and there are some minor inconsistencies that I either haven't scrubbed out or don't yet have good data to scrub out. (So please don't fuss about any minor data inconsistencies). The data sources are the same public domain ones as I have used in the past, for previous annual summaries that I have put out at this point in the year. Already there is some interesting stuff emerging.

Crucially this raises two interesting questions on the cell supply front, which I would appreciate the views of those who have dug further into that:

- Q1. Can the cell suppliers (and their mineral suppliers) continue to meet the total annual increases that the historical evidence suggests will continue to be met ?
- Q2. Can Tesla continue to capture at least a 20% market share of that cell supply for vehicle use ?

Let us be clear, Tesla is doing very well in growing the business. But also, and we must recognise this, so too are the aggregate of all the other auto makers and their corresponding supply chain partners.

In my analysis I only classify 'pluggable' electric vehicles as EVs, i.e. EV = BEV + PHEV. The fuel cell vehicles (FCEV) and the non-pluggable hybrids I just lump in with internal combustion (ICE) as they are rounding errors. First of all we can see that the overall vehicle market has substantially stabilised but not necessarily recovered. Dino-juice (ICE) vehicle production is now falling and there is a growing wedge of EV production making up the market. The pluggable hybrid segment (PHEV) is still growing but its growth is definitely decellerating and it is clearly going to be a dead-end for the mass-market PHEV fairly soon.

View attachment 908943

Looking more closely at the EV market here is the overall market situation at the end of 2022 with the corresponding market shares in tabular form. It is important both to understand the vehicle shares, and the cell supply shares. You can see in the battery/vehicle that all vehicles are trending towards a greater cell capacity, no surprise there. At this rate of cell/vehicle growth in another three years non-Tesla BEV will be at 60kWh vehicle pack sizes:

View attachment 908924

Or if you prefer graphical form this is the market share situation :

View attachment 908926

Tesla's share of the EV market peaked in 2019 at 17% by vehicle volume, and also in 2019 Tesla's share of EV battery supply peaked at approx 35-32%, and on both metrics Tesla's share has been sliding since, now (2022) being at 12% and 22% respectively. So one needs to recognise that Tesla has done an outstanding job of growing profitably, but also to recognise that in aggregate the other auto makers (and their supply chain partners) have grown their EV offerings even faster than Tesla since then, albeit the likelihood is that they have struggled do do so profitably in EVs.

This is relevant because the long-run dataset is now providing a good match for S-curve adoption models in a way that there was not sufficient data to meaningfully predict before. And the result is dramatic, with it being game-over by 2030 if the current adoption trajectory is sustained.

View attachment 908942

This S-curve (grey) is a three parameter logistics curve that has been history-matched against actual data (green) from 2010-2022 using a computerised 'solver' to get the least-error fit.


Previously it did not seem to me that there was sufficient data to get a reliable result, plus there was the added confusion of the Covid pandemic. But now that there is stabilisation observable - and significantly - the Covid pandemic has not been too disruptive for EV growth, then a sufficient match seems to be emerging. And it is going faster than was expected as the incumbent ICE manufacturers are trying; and as the new-entrant ICE and EV players are very competitively forcing the transition (the switch of BYD to a full-EV manufacturer is very important).

As a generalisation such a growth model is a good prediction tool provided that a new constraint does not impose itself on the scene, and the constraint that I think we need to be aware of is in relation to cell supply growth, and everything necessary to achieve that in terms of raw materials etc. So let us look more closely at that. I've circled two cells in red for 2024, but first observe that the overall growth rate is tending to trend down. The 345 GWh vehicular ccell capacity production adds for 2023 appear realistic given the achieved 208GWh production add for 2022, and note that there must be excess production add available - we know this because the stationary storage market is also growing.

(This tends to suggest that whilst Covid has had a discerbable effect of EV adoption, it has not been the cause of a 'catch-up' of excess capacity in 2022. My suspicion is that all manufacturers prioritised keeping EV lines going during Covid, and preferentially idled ICE lines whenever supply chain disruptions became unamanageable. That there was some impact from Covid is also discernable when one looks at the actual vs history match error term, but it is surprising how small it is. Overall I don't think the history match is being fooled by Covid artefacts.)

But the crunch year is 2024 where 756GWh of additional vehicle cell capacity is needed. If the 2024 growth rate of 92% can be managed then everything after that is easy. And the reason why it is so large is that this forecast now assumes a strong return to the previous size of vehicle market that had been over 90-million per year, specifically to 92m/yr in 2024, and so this flows down to the cell demand. And because in the past the cell manufacturers did meet the demand, then the question becomes will they do so again ? Especially noting that excess cell capacity, primarily LFP, is flowing into the stationary market. After all the best predictor of future performance is past performance.

View attachment 908944

The alternatives are:
- vehicle buyers will switch from BEV to ICE at the margin, and the 92m demand will persist but be met by dino-juice; or
- vehicle buyers wil postpone vehicle purchases until BEVs become available, and the market will become capped at approx 80m/yr for several years; or
- the average cell/vehicle trend will flatten through the supply crunch, with a mixture of small-pack BEV and small-pack PHEV competing against big-pack Teslas so keeping the >90m/yr vehicle count but failing on the cell-supply (bad news for wannabe US-pick-up-truck drivers migrating from ICE to BEV); or
- cell suppliers (and their mineral supply chains) will meet the challenge.

For the time being I tend to discard the option that vehicle productivity/utilisation metrics will increase, i.e. I am being pessimistic regarding the likelihood that autonomous vehicle technology will be significant in this time period. Opinions may differ on this.

Hence my posing the first question :
- Q1. Can the cell suppliers (and their mineral suppliers) continue to meet the total annual increases that the historical evidence suggests will continue to be met ?

Turning to the effect for Tesla the quick take is that if this S-curve does play out, then the maximum (best) outcome for Tesla is to achieve its own stated target of 20 million vehicles per year by 2030. There is unlikely to be significant market growth of EVs after 2030, perhaps even decrease if autonomous driving eventuates. So for Tesla to grow after 2030 would require Tesla to gain market share from other EV manufacturers at that point, which is a zero-sum game. However we then need to return to this table and note that on EV vehicles Tesla is down to 12% market share, therefore Tesla will have to recapture EV market share in order to obtain a approx 19-20% market share by 2030 that is implicit in the stated target of 20m/yr. To pre-emptively counter the valid response that the BEV market share is what matters, one really needs to look at the core underlying constraint which is the cell supply. Here the Tesla cell position is 22% at end of 2022, so still on track.

View attachment 908924
But equally one can see that the Tesla cell position has been declining from its peak, and has been declining at a rate of 2-4% per year. This is because the other manufacturers have been outperforming Tesla in sourcing cells (even if they have made some bad decisions, such as going for pouch). Nevertheless as a minimum Tesla will need to arrest that decline in the cell supply fraction and hold it above 20% for a decade if it is to achieve its 20m vehicles/year target. The reason why Tesla has to capture a >20% cell supply fraction in order to meet its vehicle ramp targets is because Tesla puts larger packs in its vehicles, so Tesla has to try harder.

At the level of a Tesla shareholder this does tend to focus the share price analysis down to 'only' the 2030 time horizon. And if one is as cautious as I am regarding the financial performance of the Tesla energy side of the business (and I'm no bear)*, then the vehicle side's performance over the next 7-years is critical. If the decay in Tesla's relative position continues then if the vehicle parameter stabilises at 12% of EV, then the Tesla vehicle quantity will be 'only' 10.5 million/yr in 2030, and even this would represent a turnaround in the rate and direction of the ongoing decline in the cell % share. Staying above a 20% cell fraction is crucial for Tesla shareholders !

Hence my posing the second question :
- Q2. Can Tesla continue to capture at least a 20% market share of that cell supply for vehicle use ?

These are absolutely dramatic rates of change we are witnessing, utterly transformative in a global sense for all humanity. At this point of course minor changes in trends might *sugar* things by a few years, or by a few tens of millions, but nonetheless the sheer scale and speed of what is going on is amazing. I've been working towards this for 30-years of my professional career in the wider energy sector, so it is very gratifying to see it coming to fruition. I am also a Tesla shareholder.

It is in that context that I pose the two questions I do.


* As an aside, by looking at the vehicle cell production add, one can see that global stationary storage uptake will really accelerate after 2025/2026. Until then the vehicle market will be the dominant cell growth driver.

Q1 - Yes and largely, nay wholly, because of Tesla.
Q2 - Doesn’t matter.

You could have asked me first and saved yourself a ton of time and effort. 🤷🏻
 
Since Lotus sold over 35K Elise compared to the Roadster production of 2,500 it's obvious the high door sill was not going to be an impediment to sales.
But that was selling a known technology (ICE) to an enthusiast customer base.

Tesla had the uphill battle of trying to get folks to adopt an entirely new technology platform as an automobile.

I don't think you can draw that direct comparison/conclusion. And as I posted at about the same time you were, the redesign wasn't nearly as significant an impediment, given they needed to do so anyway for the pack.
 
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Since Lotus sold over 35K Elise compared to the Roadster production of 2,500 it's obvious the high door sill was not going to be an impediment to sales.
Not relevant to anything for over a decade. Kindly move on to something relevant or at least a teeny tiny bit more interesting; like do you match your underwear and socks?
 
Given the body needed modification to accommodate the pack anyway, I'm not sure that the door sill redesign added all that much time/and expense.
As I recall the door sill was a later modification in the process, causing delays and increasing costs.
So it would seem the characterization of Eberhard as incompetent from a CEO standpoint is not just Elon's.
I've never suggested that Eberhard didn't have issues as CEO, I'm just trying to present a more rounded history than Elon might have one believe.
 
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What does that have to do with the reporting in the linked article? Do you see factual inaccuracies?
No, the linked article is unrelated and I did not investigate for inaccuracies.

But I have found that NPR over the last year and a half has been very slanted and has had one-sided opinion. This does not mean they are factually incorrect, but only presenting 1/2 of the picture in any particular topic means that now I take anything I hear on NPR with a huge grain of salt.
 
As I recall the door sill was a later modification in the process, causing delays and increasing costs.

Hmm, I remember the events I've heard more as described in Vance's book... if you have others with different accounts, I'd be interested in reading them...

I've never suggested that Eberhard didn't have issues as CEO, I'm just trying to present a more rounded history than Elon might have one believe.
I wasn't trying to imply you did... sorry if it came across that way. Although we've taken this discussion along the door-sill route, the context was the original article, which had the slant of questioning if Eberhard was unfairly ousted... I was attempting to provide the additional info I ran across in Vance's book.
 
Since Lotus sold over 35K Elise compared to the Roadster production of 2,500 it's obvious the high door sill was not going to be an impediment to sales.
It was not only the door sills as leg room and width were also extended an inch or so. Even then the Roadster felt like a car you put on. Tiny and I am 5’ 8” and 175lbs. Many were just too big for even the expanded Roadster.
 

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