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Brian, I was referring to this. See note 2.

https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=12&ved=0ahUKEwjB1dqeruLQAhVmzoMKHQRTBHoQFghPMAs&url=http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ABEA-4CW8X0/2713334817x0x683938/21f1fee5-a449-4171-b459-24bee1e62c7e/Potential%20Dilutive%20Shares%20for%202013%20Convert%20and%20Warrants.pdf&usg=AFQjCNEeId5dcbhi2hqi4DO2CWz_7FAEsg&bvm=bv.140496471,d.amc

I know what I'm talking about. You're quoting stuff I've already read. You seem seriously befuddled and unable to understand what I've written. This is the last time I'm going to explain it to you slowly; next time, read carefully.

It's worth noting that in March 2018 there will either be an *antidilutive effect* from Tesla's exercise of the hedges (countering the theoretical dilution which already took place from the early conversion of the $440 million in notes, if that was settled in stock, *and it's not 100% clear to me whether it was*), *or* Tesla will choose to take the hedge profits in cash at that time and it will improve cash flow. They apparently could choose either, but it's not entirely clear because we don't know the exact terms of the hedges (perhaps it has to match up with what the note-converters chose, *we don't know*).

The warrants are an entirely separate transaction albeit with the same counterparies (so there are three transactions here: convertible notes, hedges, and warrants) and their dilution has already happened.

If you were to reconcile the shares outstanding reported in the 10Q and S-4As, it shows Tesla issued shares to settle the early conversion obligations above the $184.48 hedge.
This sentence doesn't make sense and shows that you're confused. One of two things could have happened:
(1) Tesla could have settled the early conversion obligations for shares, and the warrants could have been NOT exercised yet (this seems relatively likely, as the warrant holders would want to retain the time value of the warrants)
(2) Tesla could have settled the early conversion obligations for cash, and a corresponding proportion of the warrants could have been exercised (this seems less likely but possible)

The way to check would be to check whether there was cash flow outgoing in excess of the $440 million used during the early conversion. If there wasn't, we're in scenario #1: the warrants are still outstanding and the hedges haven't paid off yet. Come March 2018, the warrants will probably be executed causing additional dilution. Again, come March 2018 hedges may be executed for their antidilutive value (which is equal to the dilution caused by the warrants, or equal to the dilution caused by the notes, whichever you prefer), or they may be executed to raise cash (allowing the increased / doubled dilution to happen).
 
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I know what I'm talking about. You're quoting stuff I've already read.

You're referencing a table that is several years old, I quoted a 10Q that is six weeks old. You may have read it, but you clearly do not comprehend it. Your own reference shows the 5.3 million shares of hedge and warrants in 2013, and Tesla's most recent disclosure states that has been reduced to 2.2 million shares. E-mail Evanson and ask him to clarify.

The way to check would be to check whether there was cash flow outgoing in excess of the $440 million used during the early conversion. If there wasn't, we're in scenario #1

OK, let's look at the entries on the cash flow statement, entitled "Repayments of convertible and other debt" (in $MM):

........................2Q16........3Q16......Delta
Repaymts...($ 578.7)...($1,678.5)..($1,099.8)

For "Repayments", we know the ABL balance at 2Q16 was $678 million and at 3Q16 $200 million for a difference of $478 million.
We also know the cash used to redeem the par value of notes redeemed during the 3Q16 was $421.8 million
So the total of those 2 repayments was ~$900 million, leaving an un-explained balance of~ $200 million.

The funds from the hedge writers show up in "Proceeds from the issuance of convertible and other debt" and are paid out in
"Repayments of convertible and other debt" on the cash flow statement

You can deceive yourself but please don't try to deceive those who are unable or unwilling to grind through the disclosures.
 
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Since my original post on cashflows, there were a number fo comments about lease accounting and cashflows. To be honest I am no expert in this. I pulled the data from a financial data tool. Most folks in the financial industry use such tools like Bloomberg Terminal and Reuters Eikon for such data. These tools are expected to show stuff in "conventional terms", even non-gaap stuff.

Broader point of my discussion is to identify the lens through which market is looking or going to look at Tesla. Not necessarily identify the best lens but the lens that the market would use.

Re-reviewing AMZN situation: Most companies valuation goes up through growing Net Income/EPS. However AMZN is one of the rare exceptions where they didn't show growing profits in the form of Net Income or EPS for a decade or more. Yet their valuation continually went up. Its been a hugely controversial stock. Thousands of bears constantly attacked with the valuation argument. Despite that, market-as-a-whole showered AMZN with growing valuations. I think the key is that market-as-a-whole found a decent way to look at AMZN's prudent growth, which is through cashflows. AMZN maintained pretty consistent OCF/Revenue ratio, with growing revenue it has been showing growing OCF. It also maintained a healthy positive FCF. Kept a growing cash pile (the "safety buffer" that Musk talks about). Finally it rarely ever came to the market for money or expressed a need to do so.

Coming back to TSLA: I believe TSLA has no choice but to run an AMZN like business model, if not an AAPL like model where they show consistently growing Net Income or EPS... Markets have already turned their back on Musk. Looking at the 7 big global investment bank ratings, not even one has a buy rating on TSLA. Institutions have net sold in Q3. The stock price is substantially below the previous round, which in itself was a down-round. Market is basically saying a big NO to the current model of continually coming to the market to support continual cash-burn.

The good news is management "gets it". They have been firmly working towards cashflow discipline since past several quarters. Its just that X and TE 1.0 didn't co-operate. Now that they are resolved we can look into the cash-flow dynamic to see where we are headed.

I'm no way any sort of an expert in accounting. I'm an Engineer. For myself, I'm happy working with round numbers and overall trends. But I appreciate all the corrections and the insights experts are bringing to the table.

I have some further insights into AMZN's cashflow / valuation analysis. I also have some views on where TSLA Q4 cashflow is headed (again, in round numbers). I believe we are on the cusp of a major uptrend in TSLA's stock price. Will post more tomorrow.
 
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You're referencing a table that is several years old, I quoted a 10Q that is six weeks old. You may have read it, but you clearly do not comprehend it.
So you're saying Note #2 was a false, mistaken statement by Tesla? Interesting. Maybe it was. Tesla's never disclosed the terms of the hedges.

From the most recent 10-Q, which is clear as mud:
"During the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016, we repaid $421.8 million and $435.5 million in aggregate principal amount of our 2018 Notes pursuant to conversions by their holders. As of September 30, 2016, we had remaining outstanding $224.3 million in aggregate principal amount of the 2018 Notes. As of September 30, 2016, there were also outstanding a corresponding amount of convertible note hedge transactions, as well as warrants to issue up to 2.2 million shares at $184.48 per share as of September 30, 2016, in each case issued in connection with the offering of the 2018 Notes. "

Looks like the hedges and warrants did get exercised at the same time as the note redemptions. Probably. Maybe. The terms of the hedges are still not published and probably never will be. Of course, regardless of the original terms of the hedges, Tesla could have made a private deal to change the terms if the counterparty thought they would benefit.

It doesn't matter much. My main point in this entire conversation has been that Tesla's potential cash flow exposure from the 2018 convertibles prior to full Model 3 production does not exceed $224.3 million. You don't seem to disagree. So I probably shouldn't have been so prickly. Sorry.

I don't consider this to be a serious impediment to the cash flow needs of Tesla in this time period, given that Tesla is sitting on a $1 billion "Credit Facility" of which it has only used $200 million, with a rate of 1% + LIBOR, which is probably lower than the 1.5% on the convertibles (depends which LIBOR they're using) but anyway is very close.

In short, they can borrow $800 million without blinking. Assume they have to pay off the convertibles, that's still $575 million.

Tesla is now breaking even on operations as of Q3.

SolarCity's accounting is inherently perplexing due to the presence of "noncontrolling interests", which always obfusticates an earnings statement, but they seem to be breaking even too -- and as long as they make sure all their new installs are externally financed, their cash flow runs ahead of their earnings (there's a slow cash drip from the maintenance and operations contracts).

So the $575 million in the "credit facility" is largely available for capital expenditures, along with whatever profits Tesla generates.

Oh, and current assets are $1 billion ahead of current liabilities as of September 30th. Enough of that is cash. SolarCity was down by $500 million on current assets - current liabilities, so subtract that. That leaves about $500 million more available for capital expenditures, though some must be kept as working capital.

This probably shouldn't be in the valuation thread; perhaps a cash flow & dilution thread. :) My main point is that so many people are suuuure that Musk will have to issue more stock very soon, and I don't think it's correct. A great deal has already been spent on the Model 3 production and the Gigafactory, and it looks to me like they can invest at least $1 billion more without any new financing source. If Musk says he doesn't need to raise capital for a while, I am inclined to believe him.

There is a pretty huge refinancing need around the end of 2018 / beginning of 2019, though. So Model 3 had better be spewing out cash, and Tesla will probably have to go to the financing markets anyway.
 
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Three points.

First, the quirks of lease accounting do not detract from cash generated by sale of lease vehicles to leasing partners, especially in the short term, which is important given cash needs for Model 3 production ramp.

Agreed. The issue is what happens when those leases expire? If the lessee buy those vehicles at the end of the lease, all is well. (How often does that happen?) Most lessees return the old vehicle and re-up for a new one.(Could be a Tesla or maybe the latest alternative.) If the return happens,the bank leasing partners sell those returned vehicles at auction. If the proceeds exceed their basis, they book the income. If the auction proceeds are less than the bank leasing partners basis, they collect the difference from Tesla

Second, there are obvious negatives to lease accounting, in that you have to push revenue recognition down the road so it tends to depress current revenue/earning figures compared to a cash sale, while building a revenue pipeline for the future. It would be great if Tesla could continue to move away from the RVG in all markets because the lease accounting tends to depress current revenue and earnings figures compared to a cash sale. But so far there have been inconsequential impacts on cash flow due to the very low percentage of vehicles Tesla is being asked to repurchase (only 2 percent of eligible vehicles in Q3). I expect that will continue..

Tesla began the Resale Value Guarantee in 2Q13, since the option to put the vehicle back to Tesla had to be exercised between months 36 to 39, 3Q16 was the first quarter returns would appear in the financial statements. Don't rely too much on the experience with those initial transactions. Direct leases started in 2Q14 (just 158 transactions in that quarter) and leases by bank leasing affiliates started in 4Q14. The difference between Resale guarantees to private owners and residual value guarantees may be significant. The buyers with the Resale guarantee have to repay the loan balance in full before putting the car to Tesla. Not so with leases by banks or direct leases funded by the warehouse lines. If the lessees do not want those cars at the end of the term, neither does the financial institutions. They will send returned cars to auction. If the auction amount is more than their basis, they will keep the overage; if it is less, they will collect the deficiency from Tesla. The additional problem with direct leases in the USA is that Tesla adds back the $7,500 FIT credit to the expected market residual value--thus assuring that few lessees will want to pay $7,500 over market value to keep the car when their lease expires.

Third, while there are challenges funding very rapid growth that same growth can also reduce some risks. For example, if for some reason depreciation patterns change and three years from now Tesla is asked to buy back a higher percentage of cars leased now under RVG programs, it will be a much bigger company, which will significantly dilute any risks to the downside. On the other hand, revenues from current leases subject to RVG that are deferred to future quarters will not have as much of a visible impact on financials, as their positive effects on revenue and income will be diluted as Tesla becomes a much larger company.

Agreed. If Tesla executes, meeting both the time-frame and GM targets for the M3, the residual issue (if any) will be lost in the weeds. However, note that Tesla fully drew down the $300 MM warehouse line from Deutsche Bank in the same quarter it was opened and that the $300 million must be repaid in August 2018. Also, $920 MM for the 2019 notes must be paid in early 2019. Tesla's future depends on whether they can execute on the M3-- on time and profitably.
 
Since my original post on cashflows, there were a number fo comments about lease accounting and cashflows. To be honest I am no expert in this. I pulled the data from a financial data tool. Most folks in the financial industry use such tools like Bloomberg Terminal and Reuters Eikon for such data. These tools are expected to show stuff in "conventional terms", even non-gaap stuff.

Broader point of my discussion is to identify the lens through which market is looking or going to look at Tesla. Not necessarily identify the best lens but the lens that the market would use.

Re-reviewing AMZN situation: Most companies valuation goes up through growing Net Income/EPS. However AMZN is one of the rare exceptions where they didn't show growing profits in the form of Net Income or EPS for a decade or more. Yet their valuation continually went up. Its been a hugely controversial stock. Thousands of bears constantly attacked with the valuation argument. Despite that, market-as-a-whole showered AMZN with growing valuations. I think the key is that market-as-a-whole found a decent way to look at AMZN's prudent growth, which is through cashflows. AMZN maintained pretty consistent OCF/Revenue ratio, with growing revenue it has been showing growing OCF. It also maintained a healthy positive FCF. Kept a growing cash pile (the "safety buffer" that Musk talks about). Finally it rarely ever came to the market for money or expressed a need to do so.

Coming back to TSLA: I believe TSLA has no choice but to run an AMZN like business model, if not an AAPL like model where they show consistently growing Net Income or EPS... Markets have already turned their back on Musk. Looking at the 7 big global investment bank ratings, not even one has a buy rating on TSLA. Institutions have net sold in Q3. The stock price is substantially below the previous round, which in itself was a down-round. Market is basically saying a big NO to the current model of continually coming to the market to support continual cash-burn.

The good news is management "gets it". They have been firmly working towards cashflow discipline since past several quarters. Its just that X and TE 1.0 didn't co-operate. Now that they are resolved we can look into the cash-flow dynamic to see where we are headed.

I'm no way any sort of an expert in accounting. I'm an Engineer. For myself, I'm happy working with round numbers and overall trends. But I appreciate all the corrections and the insights experts are bringing to the table.

I have some further insights into AMZN's cashflow / valuation analysis. I also have some views on where TSLA Q4 cashflow is headed (again, in round numbers). I believe we are on the cusp of a major uptrend in TSLA's stock price. Will post more tomorrow.

I do think cash generated from transactions that are treated as leases under GAAP is an important part of the picture especially when figuring out how much cash Tesla will have to self-fund its growth since this represents about 1/3 of Model S/X deliveries.

But I also agree with your point that many (most?) in the market will not include this cash generation in their valuations because it does not fit within the traditional definition of operating cash flow.

In any case will refrain from discussing further in this thread -- look forward to seeing more of your analysis.
 
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I do think cash generated from transactions that are treated as leases under GAAP is an important part of the picture especially when figuring out how much cash Tesla will have to self-fund its growth since this represents about 1/3 of Model S/X deliveries.

But I also agree with your point that many (most?) in the market will not include this cash generation in their valuations because it does not fit within the traditional definition of operating cash flow.

In any case will refrain from discussing further in this thread -- look forward to seeing more of your analysis.

There are two very different but highly interrelated topics here. My apologies for mixing these two up.

Topic-1: Issue of valuation

AMZN's valuation in a P/E perspective has been meaningless for a long time now. However valuation based on OCF, and (expected) growth rates, seems to be meaningful.

IF TSLA management continues with this new trend of high positive OCF, maybe AMZN style valuation model could come into play in TSLA's favor as well. So looking at OCF trends and projecting it out for next few quarters maybe meaningful.

I also believe, especially given SCTY numbers merging into TSLA numbers, Income Statement's profit numbers will start becoming meaningless. Ben Evan's blog post nothing that "As the saying goes, profit is opinion but cash is a fact" becomes much more relevant to TSLA in my view.

For this topic just looking at OCF, without getting into the weeds with lease accounting is plenty good enough I believe.

Capex is also somewhat irrelevant for this topic as well because capex is discretionary so to speak. The intention of capex is future cashflows... Again AMZN in all its infinite wisdom maintained a very steady +OCF/Revenue ratio but didn't maintain a steady capex/revenue rate, as they are accelerating capex to capture every bigger opportunities. Including capex or looking at FCF distorts the valuation picture I feel.

Topic-2: Issue of liquidity

If TSLA does not generate adequate cashflows it would be forced to come to the market for cash.

For this analysis we should be looking at projected OCF and projected Capex to arrive at projected FCF.

Additionally we may also need to get into all the nitty-gritty details around lease accounting and such, as that affects the Cash on balance-sheet.

However my gut sense is that the magnitude of lease accounting may not fundamentally change if/when TSLA will be forced to come to the market.

Consider this:
TSLA has 3B+ in Cash at end of Q3. Throwing some very raw numbers: 1B Capex for Q4, 2B Capex for 2017, 0.4B OCF in Q4 and say 2B OCF in 2017 - leaves TSLA with 2.4B cash at end of 2017.

At these magnitudes how important is lease related cashflow peculiarities for liquidity discussion? My guess is, not very much. But I'm happy to be corrected.

In any case, I'm working through some numbers on topic-1. Will post in a day or so.
 
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So you're saying Note #2 was a false, mistaken statement by Tesla? Interesting. Maybe it was. Tesla's never disclosed the terms of the hedges.

No, I was referring to the quote below which you now say is "clear as mud." I quoted the identical excerpt up thread and you said you "I know what I'm talking about. You're quoting stuff I've already read. You seem seriously befuddled and unable to understand what I've written."

From the most recent 10-Q, which is clear as mud:
"During the three and nine months ended September 30, 2016, we repaid $421.8 million and $435.5 million in aggregate principal amount of our 2018 Notes pursuant to conversions by their holders. As of September 30, 2016, we had remaining outstanding $224.3 million in aggregate principal amount of the 2018 Notes. As of September 30, 2016, there were also outstanding a corresponding amount of convertible note hedge transactions, as well as warrants to issue up to 2.2 million shares at $184.48 per share as of September 30, 2016, in each case issued in connection with the offering of the 2018 Notes. "

Looks like the hedges and warrants did get exercised at the same time as the note redemptions. Probably. Maybe. The terms of the hedges are still not published and probably never will be. Of course, regardless of the original terms of the hedges, Tesla could have made a private deal to change the terms if the counterparty thought they would benefit.

No, publicly-traded entities that issue securities subject to SEC regs do have the flexibility to make "a private deal to change the terms if the counterparty thought they would benefit" without filing an amended registration or an 8k.

It doesn't matter much. My main point in this entire conversation has been that Tesla's potential cash flow exposure from the 2018 convertibles prior to full Model 3 production does not exceed $224.3 million. You don't seem to disagree. So I probably shouldn't have been so prickly. Sorry..

Apology accepted. Tesla cash flow exposure before early 2019 is far more than early conversion of the remaining 2018 notes and redemption of the 2019 notes. You are totally ignoring working capital needs (financing of raw material, work-in-progress, finished goods, and spare parts inventories during the 5x expansion as well as the build-up of the delivery and service logistics infrastructure. Redemption/re-financing of the 2019 notes is needed before March 2019.

I don't consider this to be a serious impediment to the cash flow needs of Tesla in this time period, given that Tesla is sitting on a $1 billion "Credit Facility" of which it has only used $200 million, with a rate of 1% + LIBOR, which is probably lower than the 1.5% on the convertibles (depends which LIBOR they're using) but anyway is very close.

In short, they can borrow $800 million without blinking. Assume they have to pay off the convertibles, that's still $575 million..
There are restrictive financial covenants in the ABL agreements


SolarCity's accounting is inherently perplexing due to the presence of "noncontrolling interests", which always obfusticates an earnings statement, but they seem to be breaking even too -- and as long as they make sure all their new installs are externally financed, their cash flow runs ahead of their earnings (there's a slow cash drip from the maintenance and operations contracts).

Elon's and the Rive cousins' $100 million in 6% Solar Notes mature in early 2018.

So the $575 million in the "credit facility" is largely available for capital expenditures, along with whatever profits Tesla generates.

Oh, and current assets are $1 billion ahead of current liabilities as of September 30th. Enough of that is cash. SolarCity was down by $500 million on current assets - current liabilities, so subtract that. That leaves about $500 million more available for capital expenditures, though some must be kept as working capital.

... My main point is that so many people are suuuure that Musk will have to issue more stock very soon, and I don't think it's correct. A great deal has already been spent on the Model 3 production and the Gigafactory, and it looks to me like they can invest at least $1 billion more without any new financing source. If Musk says he doesn't need to raise capital for a while, I am inclined to believe him.

There is a pretty huge refinancing need around the end of 2018 / beginning of 2019, though. So Model 3 had better be spewing out cash, and Tesla will probably have to go to the financing markets anyway.

We'll see. My guess is 1H17 and more towards the beginning than the end.
 
We'll see. My guess is 1H17 and more towards the beginning than the end.
I'll actually bet you no stock will be issued this quarter or in Q1. You're almost certainly wrong about "more towards the beginning".

I think it's obvious that Musk and his cousins will reload their Solar Bonds when they come due.

No, Tesla doesn't have to reveal to the public any private changes to an unregistered hedge which they never released the terms of in the first place.

I think far more of the Model 3 tooling-up has already been paid for than most people are guessing.

And one of the things you haven't noticed about the Asset Based Loan deal is that it's basically an infinite revolving supply of cash for Tesla in its current state. Since they're making an operating profit now and even covering R&D, the only thing they're spending cash on is capital equipment. Each piece of capital equipment immediately increases the collateral for the ABL, in a very convincing way, making it easy to immediately borrow against it and get the cash back to spend on the next piece of capital equipment. There's a tiny drain due to depreciation and a larger drain due to interest payments, but I simply do not see a problem raising cash under these circumstance.

On top of that, Musk said the suppliers are giving Tesla longer and longer terms to pay, which effectively acts as zero-interest short-term loans -- and he specified that a bunch of the capital expenditures have been pushed out to *after* production starts, in nearly the same sentence.

Of course, this all ends up quite highly leveraged. Some cash will probably need to be raised in the second half of 2017, hopefully after the first Model 3 is delivered. He might raise cash in the second quarter just to derisk the company. I *still* don't expect it to be equity issuance, given the current environment.

I do expect a large refinancing need at the end of 2018 beginning of 2019, obviously. The idea is that with model 3 being mass produced and delivered, this will be easy enough to refinance at that time. If Model 3 release results in a large pop to the stock, then I'd expect an equity issuance to retire the debt.
 
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An interesting podcast with Bill Miller of Legg Mason, who is a value investor.

Investing Legend Bill Miller On Apple, Amazon, And Tesla

He mentioned that Jeff Bezos managed his business to gross profit growth and that Amazon's stock price was highly correlated to its gross profit growth. The idea is that all of the operational costs subtracted after the gross profit is calculated could in some sense be considered investments. The Amazon portion starts at about 18:00.

Focusing on the top-line growth, or as Bezos does on two lines below the top line, seems to be a very useful exercise. Let's leave aside the reasons why Tesla's top line is somewhat better than it has appeared because of lease accounting and the residual value guarantees. I focused on the top line in my simple analysis above. If Tesla can grow the top line at a healthy rate, the rest of it is just details. And we don't then have to argue about what should be included in the costs of revenue. The top line is where the quality of the product can be most easily measured. And it's where the product problems can be seen most easily, such as the late introduction of the X.

Bill also mentioned that he took a close look at Tesla in 2012 and got it completely wrong then. Going forward, he's not a fan because, in order of importance:

(1) Competition from traditional OEMs with vastly greater resources;
(2) Potential removal of subsidies under Trump; and
(3) Merger complicating any analysis of the company.

I don't really respect #1 and #2. I agree that #3 could be an issue inasmuch as SolarCity continues to do more residential PPAs than loan-and-purchase. The Tesla portion starts at about 35:45. Bill also addresses Apple buying Tesla, if you are interested in that sort of hypothetical.

In any event, here are the two relevant AMZN-v-TSLA tables. The first is the top-line growth. The second is gross profit growth. The second table demonstrates just how lumpy Tesla's progress has been and how much Amazon has been killing it recently. That said, I don't think Bezos would dream of 100%+ gross profit growth in year 10 of operations, as we can expect from Musk this year.

AMZNvTSLA.JPG
AMZNvTSLA-Gross-Profits.JPG
 
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Following up on the prior post, here is a refresh of the revenue and gross profit tables, including the year 2016 results.

It is striking that Amazon and Tesla are at exactly the same place with respect to two figures of merit (revenue and gross profits) 10 years into operations. Amazon got to 10 years in a much smoother fashion than TSLA, and on other figures of merit, I'm sure Amazon did much better. Also, I'm amazed at how Amazon has been able to expand gross margins at this point in its existence.

That said, Tesla likely will diverge from Amazon to the upside starting this year. In its 11th year of operations, Amazon grew revenues 22.7%. Even without any additional business (Model 3, Tesla Energy), Tesla is set to grow revenues 60 or 70%. I imagine that such growth on such a base in an 11th year of operations is exceedingly rare and deserves some sort of reward to valuation.

AMZNvTSLA-Revenue.JPG
AMZNvTSLA-Gross-Profits.JPG
 
I agree about the unlikeliness of 100% growth in year 11 of operations.

However, it's a growth rate that sounds reasonable to me when considering a company we posit to be in year 11 of operations while defining the next round of disruption in 1 or 2 major sources of economic activity - energy and transportation. Both overdue for disruption as technologies are moving along, but their underlying industries haven't yet overwhelmingly adopted.

So yeah - I see Tesla killing it, and even more so in the coming years. I also see a big secular wave Tesla is creating / riding that makes it seem reasonable.
 
I'll actually bet you no stock will be issued this quarter or in Q1. You're almost certainly wrong about "more towards the beginning" [of 1H17].

I think it's obvious that Musk and his cousins will reload their Solar Bonds when they come due.

No, Tesla doesn't have to reveal to the public any private changes to an unregistered hedge which they never released the terms of in the first place.

I think far more of the Model 3 tooling-up has already been paid for than most people are guessing.

And one of the things you haven't noticed about the Asset Based Loan deal is that it's basically an infinite revolving supply of cash for Tesla in its current state. Since they're making an operating profit now and even covering R&D, the only thing they're spending cash on is capital equipment. Each piece of capital equipment immediately increases the collateral for the ABL, in a very convincing way, making it easy to immediately borrow against it and get the cash back to spend on the next piece of capital equipment. There's a tiny drain due to depreciation and a larger drain due to interest payments, but I simply do not see a problem raising cash under these circumstance.

On top of that, Musk said the suppliers are giving Tesla longer and longer terms to pay, which effectively acts as zero-interest short-term loans -- and he specified that a bunch of the capital expenditures have been pushed out to *after* production starts, in nearly the same sentence.

Of course, this all ends up quite highly leveraged. Some cash will probably need to be raised in the second half of 2017, hopefully after the first Model 3 is delivered. He might raise cash in the second quarter just to derisk the company. I *still* don't expect it to be equity issuance, given the current environment.

I do expect a large refinancing need at the end of 2018 beginning of 2019, obviously. The idea is that with model 3 being mass produced and delivered, this will be easy enough to refinance at that time. If Model 3 release results in a large pop to the stock, then I'd expect an equity issuance to retire the debt.

Since you accused me of being "seriously befuddled and unable to understand what I've written", I just want to confirm that you wrote something like there would be no equity issue in 1Q17? [From a practical standpoint, the filing of the 10k on March 1 was a prerequisite to any offering.]

You are correct that I " haven't noticed about the Asset Based Loan deal is ... basically an infinite revolving supply of cash" I acknowledge the ABL creditors may increase the amount of the line based on increases in the underlying secured interests, but nothing close to a dollar-for-dollar increment. Also, Tesla's property in Nevada is excluded from the ABL. No rational creditor would lend money on that property because any repayment security Tesla could offer would be subordinate to PENA's rights under the lease and related agreements. [" In 2016, we used cash of $455.3 million towards Gigafactory 1 construction and expect to spend a total of approximately $770.0 million during 2017."]

As of 12/31/16, Tesla has apparently spent about half of what it expects to in California for manufacturing equipment:

"We have entered into multiple agreements over the past few years with the California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority (CAEATFA) that provide multi-year sales tax exclusions on purchases of manufacturing equipment that will be used for specific purposes including the expansion and ongoing development of Model S, Model X, Model 3 and future electric vehicles and expansion of electric vehicle powertrain production in California. We estimate the combined tax savings under these agreements will be approximately $198 million, of which $100 million has been realized as of December 31, 2016." {I thought powertrain production for the M3 had been moved to Nevada?}


It appears the interest rate on borrowings to finance in-house (direct) leases is rising just when:

"We expect the need for leasing and other financing options to be significantly higher with the volumes we expect for our vehicles in the future, especially Model 3, for which we also expect a higher proportion of uptake for such programs than for Model S or Model X."

i.e."In December 2016, we entered into a Credit Agreement with Royal Bank of Canada (the “Canada Credit Agreement”). Under the Credit Agreement, we borrowed $67.3 million which is secured by an interest in certain vehicle leases. Amount drawn under the Canada Credit agreement has a rate range of 3.6% to 4.5% and are subject to various customary events of default, covenants and limitations, including an advance rate limit and a required reserve account. The term of the loan is reflective of the term of the underlying vehicle leases, up to 48 months." [Under the current version of the Warehouse Agreement, draws can only be made through August,2017 and it all must be repaid by 9/20/18. The money factor offered on direct leases during 3Q16 was 0.0018 which likely allowed Tesla to make a little on the spread over the Warehouse Line's floating rate]

Bottom line, IMO, ~$1.4 billion in new capital helps but is insufficient. It's not just CapEx; Tesla needs significant cash to fund raw material, work in-progress, and finished goods inventories as well as expand, train, and staff its delivery and service infrastructure. My expectation is that Tesla will return to the capital markets as soon as the investment banks indicate they can sell more common shares--likely before year end. YMMV.
 
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I agree about the unlikeliness of 100% growth in year 11 of operations.

However, it's a growth rate that sounds reasonable to me when considering a company we posit to be in year 11 of operations while defining the next round of disruption in 1 or 2 major sources of economic activity - energy and transportation. Both overdue for disruption as technologies are moving along, but their underlying industries haven't yet overwhelmingly adopted.

So yeah - I see Tesla killing it, and even more so in the coming years. I also see a big secular wave Tesla is creating / riding that makes it seem reasonable.

Interesting to note that on December 31, 2004, the end of its tenth year in operations (and identical revenues and gross margins as Tesla EOY 2016), Amazon had a market cap of $18 billion ($44.29/shr x 406.48m shares).

Compare to Tesla EOY 2016 market cap of $32 billion ($213.69/shr x 149.83m shares). This is a different time in the market to be sure. But part of the differential probably is a reward to Tesla for expected future growth.
 
Since you accused me of being "seriously befuddled and unable to understand what I've written", I just want to confirm that you wrote something like there would be no equity issue in 1Q17?
Actually, I thought convertibles were moderately likely (and convertibles are *sometimes* considered equity), so I apologize for the lack of clarity there. But yes, I really did say that Tesla was very unlikely to issue stock. I guess I lost my bet and he decided to issue a little stock. It's clear the preference was to issue bonds, but Wall Street had a hunger for stock according to the leaked conference call.
 
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You are correct that I " haven't noticed about the Asset Based Loan deal is ... basically an infinite revolving supply of cash" I acknowledge the ABL creditors may increase the amount of the line based on increases in the underlying secured interests, but nothing close to a dollar-for-dollar increment.

It would be interesting to see what ratio you think it is. As far as I can tell, the amount of the lines on these things is actually pretty close to dollar for dollar for non-depreciating, non-volatile assets. You can then ask the question of true depreciation rates and pricing volatility on the land, buildings, and manufacturing equipment, and to what extent Tesla makes capital expenditures which do not result in physical capital.

Also, Tesla's property in Nevada is excluded from the ABL.
Citation please. I'll need a specific quote from Tesla or the bank.

No rational creditor would lend money on that property because any repayment security Tesla could offer would be subordinate to PENA's rights under the lease and related agreements.
Citation please. I'll need a specific quote from the lease terms or from Tesla about the lease terms.

As of 12/31/16, Tesla has apparently spent about half of what it expects to in California for manufacturing equipment:

"We have entered into multiple agreements over the past few years with the California Alternative Energy and Advanced Transportation Financing Authority (CAEATFA) that provide multi-year sales tax exclusions on purchases of manufacturing equipment that will be used for specific purposes including the expansion and ongoing development of Model S, Model X, Model 3 and future electric vehicles and expansion of electric vehicle powertrain production in California.

For reference, I never pay attention to whether Tesla has spent less than they expect to, particularly for multi-year programs with no specified end date (this one is even for "...and future electric vehicles"!) -- since we know Musk plans to continue capital expenditures and expansion indefinitely. Therefore it means absolutely nothing whatsoever regarding the next year or any other finite time period.

i.e."In December 2016, we entered into a Credit Agreement with Royal Bank of Canada (the “Canada Credit Agreement”). Under the Credit Agreement, we borrowed $67.3 million which is secured by an interest in certain vehicle leases. Amount drawn under the Canada Credit agreement has a rate range of 3.6% to 4.5% and are subject to various customary events of default, covenants and limitations, including an advance rate limit and a required reserve account. The term of the loan is reflective of the term of the underlying vehicle leases, up to 48 months."
I figured Tesla was simply getting out from under exchange rate risk here. Eventually I expect them to have one of these in every country. Do you have evidence to the contrary?

[Under the current version of the Warehouse Agreement, draws can only be made through August,2017 and it all must be repaid by 9/20/18.
I think it's pretty obvious this will be renewed, especially given that it's floating-rate. Rising interest rates are certainly a risk.

The money factor offered on direct leases during 3Q16 was 0.0018 which likely allowed Tesla to make a little on the spread over the Warehouse Line's floating rate]
Interesting point.

My expectation is that Tesla will return to the capital markets as soon as the investment banks indicate they can sell more common shares--likely before year end. YMMV.
I am absolutely 100% sure Tesla won't do that. They will, of course, return to the capital markets. All the indications are that Tesla is gunning to issue bonds, not stock. As soon as they can get into the ordinary bond market, I believe that's where they'll go. And bluntly, Musk said this; he said that if they had to raise money later in the year, he intended to do it in the form of loans, not dilution.

The investment banks would happily have agreed to let Musk sell far, far more shares right now. They would agree to let him sell more shares in 35 days. He doesn't *want* to. He wants to sell bonds. Did you notice that this capital raise, if fully oversubscribed, was roughly *4/5* convertibles and 1/5 stock? And even though the conversion price on the convertibles is lower than the last set, Tesla's hedges, warrants, and the terms were designed to make the conversion even less dilutive than the last set?

When the investment banks indicate that Tesla can sell bonds, that's when he goes to the capital markets. Apparently that wasn't this quarter, and they probably told him he couldn't do it next quarter either.

In some ways, this decision exposes Tesla to even more risk, particularly interest rate risk and refinancing risk. But it does reduce the risk of dilution. So take it for what it is.
 
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Remember when you made the specious and patently absurd assertion that if Tesla ever entered into a dealer franchise arrangement anywhere in the USA, California and New York would revoke Tesla's dealer licenses (like California would knee cap its fair haired wunderkind if it tried to sell more the cars it was producing within California in other states by entering into a commercially reasonable transaction that would benefit California rather than having an adverse effect) So as not to embarrass you, I PMed you asking for a reference or citation. You responded I should do my own research and your rate was $100/ hour. I'm not that petty, so I'll try to address your questions.

It would be interesting to see what ratio you think it is. As far as I can tell, the amount of the lines on these things is actually pretty close to dollar for dollar for non-depreciating, non-volatile assets. You can then ask the question of true depreciation rates and pricing volatility on the land, buildings, and manufacturing equipment, and to what extent Tesla makes capital expenditures which do not result in physical capital.

The initial ABL was June 15, 2015 with a limit of $750 million; amendment 5 in December 2015 increased it to $1.25 billion. The relevant definitions of collateral include:

Collateral ” shall mean all property (whether real or personal) with respect to which any security interests have been granted (or purported to be granted) pursuant to any Security Document, including all Security Agreement Collateral, all Mortgaged Properties (if any) and all cash and Cash Equivalents delivered as collateral pursuant to Section 5.02 or 11."

ABL Priority Collateral ” shall mean (i) at any time when no Permitted Additional Secured Indebtedness is outstanding, the Collateral, and (ii) at all times when any Permitted Additional Secured Indebtedness is outstanding, “ABL Priority Collateral” as defined in the Intercreditor Agreement (which shall be defined on a basis customary for transactions of this type and, in any event, shall include all cash and Cash Equivalents related to Accounts, all cash and Cash Equivalents subject to a Cash Management Control Agreement, Accounts, Pledged Equipment, Inventory (other than Gigafactory Assets), assets (other than intellectual property) related to Accounts, Inventory and Pledged Equipment and proceeds thereof of the Credit Parties) in each case constituting Collateral."

Tesla - Current Report

The creditors wrote the ABL as expansively as they could to maximize their security. Total Assets at 2Q15 were $6.5 billion and at 4Q16 were $22.7 billion. Admittedly "total assets" is not the same as but could be an analogue to "collateral," but I'll leave it to you to parse through the balance sheet growth in the relevant asset categories over those 18 months if you still think a close to 1/1 ratio applies and the collateral has only grown by only two thirds.

{Also, Tesla's property in Nevada is excluded from the ABL.}
Citation please. I'll need a specific quote from Tesla or the bank.

" Gigafactory Assets ” shall mean Inventory of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries manufactured, and located, at a Gigafactory and Equipment of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries located at a Gigafactory."

Section 1.1 "b) Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, in no event shall the security interest and lien granted under Section 1.1(a) hereof attach to, and in no event shall the term “Collateral” (and the component terms thereof) include, (i) any property, interest or other rights for so long as the grant of such security interest shall constitute or result in (A) a breach or termination pursuant to the terms of, or a default under, any General Intangible, lease, license, contract, agreement or other document, (B) a breach of any law or regulation which prohibits the creation of a security interest thereunder (other than to the extent that any such term specified in clause (A) or (B) above is rendered ineffective pursuant to Section 9-406, 9 407, 9-408 or 9-409 of the UCC (or any successor provision or provisions) of any relevant jurisdiction or any other then-applicable law (including the Bankruptcy Code) or principles of equity), (C) require consent of a Governmental Authority or any other Person (other than consent of the Company or any of its Subsidiaries) to permit the grant of a security interest therein (and such consent has not been obtained) or (D) materially adverse tax consequences as reasonably determined by the Company; provided , however , that such security interest shall attach immediately at such time as the condition causing such abandonment, invalidation, unenforceability breach or termination shall no longer be effective and to the extent severable, shall attach immediately to any portion of such property or other rights that does not result in any of the consequences specified in clause (A),(B), (C) or (D) above; (ii) any property, interest or other rights with respect to which, in the reasonable determination of the Administrative Agent, expressed in writing, the cost or other consequences of granting a security interest in favor of the Secured Creditors is excessive in relation to the value afforded thereby; (iii) Non-Eligible Motor Vehicles, airplanes and other assets subject to certificates of title; (iv) Equity Interests; (v) Securitization Related Assets; (vi) all interests in Real Property; (vii) Gigafactory Assets, (viii) Accounts that are identifiable proceeds of the sale or other disposition of property that is not Collateral, (ix) intercompany Accounts outstanding on the Effective Date and (x) Intellectual Property Rights (the assets described in preceding clauses (i) through (x) hereof, collectively, the “ Excluded Assets ”).

{PENA's rights}
Citation please. I'll need a specific quote from the lease terms or from Tesla about the lease terms.

“1.6 Quiet Enjoyment. For so long as Tenant is not in default under this Lease beyond any applicable cure period, Tenant will have, subject to the terms of this Lease, peaceful and quiet enjoyment of the Premises.”

8.1Mortgages. At Tesla’s written request, Tenant will subordinate this Lease and Tenant’s interest and rights under this Lease to any existing or future deed of trust, security deed, mortgage, security assignments and any other similar encumbrances (each, a “Mortgage”), provided that the holder of the Mortgage has executed, acknowledged and delivered to Tenant a commercially reasonable Subordination, Attornment and Non-Disturbance Agreement that provides that: (a) Tenant’s possession of the Premises and other rights under the Lease will not be disturbed in any proceeding to foreclose the Mortgage or in any other action instituted in connection with such Mortgage, (b) Tenant will not be named as a defendant in any foreclosure action or proceeding which may be instituted by the holder of such Mortgage, and (c) if the holder of the Mortgage or any other person acquires title to the Premises through foreclosure or otherwise, the Lease will continue in full force and effect as a direct lease between Tenant and the new owner, and the new owner will assume and perform Tesla’s obligations under this Lease. The holder of any Mortgage may, at any time, subordinate its Mortgage to this Lease, without Tenant’s consent, by giving written notice to Tenant"
tsla-ex101_182.htm

If you want to make the silly assertion that some creditor could be theoretically willing to loan money when PENA has rights of quiet enjoyment and non-disturbance, feel free. But then explain why no one has stepped up so far since Tesla "has incurred $825.3 million and $317.5 million of costs for our Gigafactory 1 as of December 31, 2016 and 2015," and "expects to spend a total of approximately $770.0 million during 2017." Also, note the putative creditor would have to perform Tesla's obligations under the lease (all expense with no benefits) and all the major "players" are already ABL creditors.

I am absolutely 100% sure Tesla won't do that. They will, of course, return to the capital markets. All the indications are that Tesla is gunning to issue bonds, not stock. As soon as they can get into the ordinary bond market, I believe that's where they'll go. And bluntly, Musk said this; he said that if they had to raise money later in the year, he intended to do it in the form of loans, not dilution.

The investment banks would happily have agreed to let Musk sell far, far more shares right now. They would agree to let him sell more shares in 35 days. He doesn't *want* to. He wants to sell bonds. Did you notice that this capital raise, if fully oversubscribed, was roughly *4/5* convertibles and 1/5 stock? And even though the conversion price on the convertibles is lower than the last set, Tesla's hedges, warrants, and the terms were designed to make the conversion even less dilutive than the last set?

When the investment banks indicate that Tesla can sell bonds, that's when he goes to the capital markets. Apparently that wasn't this quarter, and they probably told him he couldn't do it next quarter either.

In some ways, this decision exposes Tesla to even more risk, particularly interest rate risk and refinancing risk. But it does reduce the risk of dilution. So take it for what it is.

The ABL creditors have Tesla by the short and curlies. Are you even aware that Section 10.04 prohibits Tesla from incurring new third party indebtedness, subject to certain standard exceptions to allow it to conduct an on-going business AND ADDITIONAL CONVERTIBLE NOTES? Even if that prohibition did not exist, Tesla has no practical access to traditional debt markets until its Balance Sheet strengthens appreciably. S&P's credit rating for Tesla's debt is B-, four levels into the junk category. A financially sound company's convertible notes traditionally trade right at par until the conversion ratio is reached. Tesla's 2019 and 2021 notes are trading at 190 and 550 basis points below par respectively. Bonds - Search Results. In the intermediate term, Tesla's only access to new capital will be by issuing new shares. Yes, "The investment banks would happily have agreed to let Musk sell far, far more shares right now." as long as Musk did not mind a huge drop in the share price--the underwriters are not about to get stuck with shares they have to eat. As with most things, price matters.

Foregoing is my opinion; I will leave you with your certainties
 
Remember when you made the specious and patently absurd assertion that if Tesla ever entered into a dealer franchise arrangement anywhere in the USA, California and New York would revoke Tesla's dealer licenses
This is ACTUALLY NEW YORK STATE LAW. Look it up; the entire New York State code is available online, and it's well-organized and easily researched. It is really really trivial to look this up, and it's right at the very top of the "Franchised Motor Vehicle" laws. That's why I got annoyed at you. Your concept of "specious and patently absurd" is other people's concept of "black letter law", which shows some lack of judgment on your part.

It's possible New York would change the law, but the law in New York is that if a motor vehicle manufacturer has *any* franchise *anywhere* (presumably anywhere in the *world*, though it may only apply to the US, haven't checked court rulings) they cannot sell direct. The entire franchised motor vehicle law in NY didn't apply to manufacturers who didn't have franchises, though NADA campaigned successfully to get an amendment to apply a small part of it to Tesla; but if Tesla gets even one franchise, the whole darn thing starts applying to Tesla, every single section.

Thank you for digging up the original ABL terms from 2015; I didn't know where in the morass of SEC filings to find it!
 
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If you want to make the silly assertion that some creditor could be theoretically willing to loan money when PENA has rights of quiet enjoyment and non-disturbance, feel free.
Of course some creditor would and that is absolutely my assertion. It's not silly at all. Industrial property is an interesting thing: it's valueless when it's not operating, but can be quite valuable when it *is* operating. The fact is that no creditor would lend against the Gigafactory (by mortgage, for example) *unless* they were guaranteed that Tesla would stay and that PENA would stay and keep the lease. So you've kind of got it backwards.

But then explain why no one has stepped up so far
Because they won't lend against it until it's profitable. This is actually pretty standard with industrial property.

You can get a mortgage on a profitable factory, because the lender believes you can make the payments. Getting a mortgage on a half-built factory... is much harder, and perhaps impossible.

There's something we almost agree on but one little difference which causes us to have huge differences in analysis. You think that Tesla can't issue bonds until its *balance sheet* looks better. I think Tesla can't issue bonds until its *profit and loss* sheet looks better. Now, with the profit and loss sheet looking better, the balance sheet will follow, but there's some lag time on that, and I think the ABL creditors are somewhat forward-looking.

Thanks for finding the exclusion of all land from the ABL, as well as of the entire "Gigafactory Assets" (which does account for why Tesla's assets have grown massively without growing the eligible collateral by nearly as much -- they've actually been throwing money into both the Gigafactory and land purchases of various sorts).

That provides Tesla with a lot of opportunity to raise cash through mortgages, once they're profitable and cash flow positive. To be clear on my opinion, the lending market won't open up until they're showing profits for several quarters. I, however, expect this to happen within about a year.

This is actually a classic feature of the lending markets. They won't lend you cash unless you're already generating cash internally.
 
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I think Tesla can't issue bonds until its *profit and loss* sheet looks better. Now, with the profit and loss sheet looking better, the balance sheet will follow, but there's some lag time on that, and I think the ABL creditors are somewhat forward-looking.
+1
my internal model shows them about a year away from easy-large-scale access to P&L underwritten debt (Bonds) for continued expansion.
Although equity capital will continue- this access will be the trigger for multiple GF expansion IMO
(prepping for that between now and then is my estimation)
 
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