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Tesla is making an important strategic mistake!
As I laid out in my article in August 2016 titled, Tesla Profitability: A Game Theory Perspective, (which forum rules preclude my linking), I presented the next logical steps Tesla would take with its Model 3 program:
Bottom Line: With demand already at impossible levels, game theory would suggest that the next logical moves are (1) reach lower on the Model S demand curve to tap into Model 3 reservations, (2) price Model 3 options high in order to capture more economic profits during the initial ramp-up through 2018 and (3) focus solely on bringing Gigafactory to full capacity immediately before credible competition arrives, which will not happen until 2019 at the earliest.
Tesla followed these steps to a tee. It even set Model 3 ASP higher than most estimated. This level, however, turned out to be still very low compared to the level at which demand for Model 3 would closely align with how quickly Tesla can possibly increase production in the next twelve months. By the end of 2017, Model 3 reservations will exceed one million.
Now that the prices of options are set, however, Tesla can't increase the Model 3 ASP. The steps it can take, however, are:
fixed
As I laid out in my article in August 2016 titled, Tesla Profitability: A Game Theory Perspective, (which forum rules preclude my linking), I presented the next logical steps Tesla would take with its Model 3 program:
Bottom Line: With demand already at impossible levels, game theory would suggest that the next logical moves are (1) reach lower on the Model S demand curve to tap into Model 3 reservations, (2) price Model 3 options high in order to capture more economic profits during the initial ramp-up through 2018 and (3) focus solely on bringing Gigafactory to full capacity immediately before credible competition arrives, which will not happen until 2019 at the earliest.
Tesla followed these steps to a tee. It even set Model 3 ASP higher than most estimated. This level, however, turned out to be still very low compared to the level at which demand for Model 3 would closely align with how quickly Tesla can possibly increase production in the next twelve months. By the end of 2017, Model 3 reservations will exceed one million.
Now that the prices of options are set, however, Tesla can't increase the Model 3 ASP. The steps it can take, however, are:
- Move planned capex from Supercharger buildout to accelerating additional Gigafactory buildout. Tesla should be building five or more Gigafactories simultaneously, not three or four, and it should break ground yesterday.
- Lower referral awards and limit number of referral awards one owner can at most receive to three. Now that the brand value of Tesla has a life of its own, the purpose of this program should move slightly from increasing demand to motivating more people to talk up their Tesla's, not motivating Tesla enthusiasts to talk more. There is a slight but important difference in the benefit-to-cost ratio to Tesla.
- Further increase efforts to get Model 3 reservation holders to buy Model S. This is very important in 2018.
- Lower warranty coverage further for base-model Model 3 (i.e. decrease warranty cost/accrual as a percentage of revenue) until subsequent Gigafactories start coming online in 2019 and plow savings to Gigafactory buildout. This would also increase Tesla's borrowing capacity as it would improve its income statement and balance sheet metrics.
- Borrow non-dilutive debt to accelerate Gigafactory buildout. Tesla's cost of incremental debt = 7-8% but its Return on Capital = 100%+. By managing its balance sheet so conservatively, Tesla is foregoing substantial economic profits.
fixed
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