Welcome to Tesla Motors Club
Discuss Tesla's Model S, Model 3, Model X, Model Y, Cybertruck, Roadster and More.
Register

Russia/Ukraine conflict

This site may earn commission on affiliate links.
Down at the tactical level, this might be interesting regarding the fighting around Bakhmut. This is sort of random social media, but I think the source is trustworthy, he's posted on Imgur repeatedly. It's from a Ukrainian defender of Bakhmut itself. Where some 800 orcs are being killed every day. I think it's secondarily interesting that he posts now, that sort of suggests maybe the fighting is lessening.

 
I view entities like Russia as having two tools in the bag. Both make use of an opponents momentum against them.

The first is the most obvious and that is sowing and/or amplifying disinformation and discord. There are few things less divisive than our latest political cycles in the US and thus it should surprise no one that opponents of the West would use these opportunities to create chaos. It seems from what little I have read on this thread that Brexit may well have been a similar opportunity.

The second speaks to the very underpinnings of the entities doing the dirty work and that is the basic fact that a country like Russia is simply a large, well organized criminal organization. It is rule by intimidation and control of access to money. Having Russian oligarchs controlling Ukrainian leaders and Ukrainian energy business using bribery would seem to be by the playbook. If you can snag the son of a US VP with $50k a month, that is a coup as it will surely sow discord when needed. That is only one example of US greed and corruption.

The key for me is to recognize that we are all human and build a society where people who participate in these schemes (when they are legal) are shamed and shunned or otherwise prevented from fully participating in society. This approach is not lost on our adversaries and thus they work "both sides" so that there is always sufficient people being enriched to slow or derail any attempts to address the issue and both sides can feel good about themselves as they point fingers at the other side.

We must first acknowledge that the human is flawed before humans can try to do better. I apologize if that tracks too close to the third rail of religion as that was not my intent. I do believe the tenants of most religions are sound, it is just when people are introduced that the train runs off the track.
 
You can pretty much throw Gavin Menzies "1421" in the fiction bucket, or the fireplace.

I haven't read Menzies, but I may have gotten the information from a source he influenced. I don't remember at this point, it was years ago when I first came across the information.

Escalation ladder


It might be. I'm not sure the US is going to push it though. The administration might just be raising the point to make sure the world is aware Russia is not complying.

We'll see what happens. The US has been very careful to date not to escalate things with Russia too much.
 
  • Like
Reactions: nativewolf
I only see posters who are a little touchy because a post got deleted. It’s not like a limb has been cut off.

It should come as no surprise that posts suggesting or flat out stating that Putin controlled the Trump administration have no place on this forum. It injects toxic politics into the discussion and as past experience has shown nothing good comes out of it.

It’s also in breach of the Terms and Rules of this forum, to which every member has agreed: “TeslaMotorsClub.com is not the place for debate on religion, sex, politics, or other such controversial posts;”

Subject closed.
So we can discuss Russian, Ukrainian and NATO politics related to the war, but no politics directly related to the US? Looking for clarity.
 
Russians slowly clawing their way into the eastern part of Bahkmut, while working to cut supply lines from the rear. Ukraine slowly bleeding the lifeblood from the Russian Army.

 
Russians slowly clawing their way into the eastern part of Bahkmut, while working to cut supply lines from the rear. Ukraine slowly bleeding the lifeblood from the Russian Army.


--> Read an analysis about this on a Swedish blog about the war. Made a quick English Google translate.

NOTE: THE MAIN TAKEAWAY IS IN RED AT THE END OF THE TEXT BELOW:

"
ANALYSIS – UKRAINE MAY NEED TO WITHDRAW TO BETTER DEFENSE POSITIONS IN DONETSK IN COMING WEEKSWESTERN SUPPORT TOO SLOW

Russia has tactically adapted and changed its operational behavior and the new tactic of meat waves of [regular soldiers] storming Ukrainian positions in the best Stalinist fashion – quantity is a quality in itself – unfortunately works for several reasons. On the one hand, the meat waves will act as minesweepers and gradually grind down prepared Ukrainian defense lines until Ukraine's fieldworks no longer gives any advantage. On the one hand, it is a shift from modern mobile maneuver warfare to a more static model, which makes it easier for Russia to manage the logistics, which in principle become fixed infrastructure. Russia can also, due to the slow advances, constantly improve its own positions via field work and thus become increasingly better at resisting indirect fire and other long-range combat. [They] can place static logistics hubs and command locations out of reach of HIMARS, because the front is static, and you can make maximum use of infrastructure such as rail, combined with established logistics routes [for the last ’stretch’ to the frontlines].

In short, the meat waves favor Russia, and the only price [they] have to pay is massive losses in manpower, [men that Russia doesn’t give a [beep] about anyway].

Ukraine's defense line in Donetsk is thus worn down right now, while there will be no break in the attacks against the Ukrainian defenders. The defenders are thus exhausted and have increasingly poor defensive positions, while Russian troops die and the next attack wave of new soldiers are thus not tired.

See serious commenters like Jay in Kyjiv like and this one. There are many more examples.

This has led to Russia being on the verge of breakthroughs south and north of Bakhmut and what the blog called the Donbas Bulge this spring is becoming a new small Donetsk bulge east of Siversk, which like Bakhmut is in danger of being cut off. To the extent that they are not cut off, the logistics become increasingly tough for both the [Donetsk] bulge and Bakhmut.

At the same time, there is increasing talk that Russia is building up for a major offensive around the anniversary of the invasion. This at the same time as the Ukrainian defense positions are worn down and the minefields are gone under the feet and bodies of the meat waves.

Ukraine can neutralize all this by retreating to new defensive lines, which have presumably been dug and mined in recent months.

Sometimes you have to give up terrain and territory to win. […]

A retreat to new, fresh defense lines, with [new undamaged] defenses, mines, etc. accomplishes several things.

On the one hand, it forces Russia into mobile maneuver warfare. When Russian units have to leave their field work behind, they become vulnerable to long-range combat and will be forced to group unprotected.

[On the other hand], the logistics lines that in practice have become fixed infrastructure in recent months stop working and must be replaced by vulnerable new dynamic logistics lines. A new line of defense further west also moves further away from the railway on which Russia is completely dependent to deliver troops, materiel, ammunition and supplies.

In short, a retreat would stretch Russian logistics lines and make them more vulnerable.

The area from which you retreat will be mined and you will, of course, conduct a delay battle in this delay area while the new defense line is [manned].

Above all, a planned Russian armored offensive around the 24th will be neutralized - it will not be against Ukrainian troops without mines left in front of their defensive positions, but directly against defended minefields. Ukrainian troops will thus not run the risk of being defeated, but the losses end up on the Russian side. […]

However, such a small retreat will be played up as a huge victory in Russian propaganda, but it is an operationally correct decision. It's not about winning the battle for Bakhmut, but the war for Ukraine.

The risk is that the Kremlin's useful idiots and paid influence operators in the West, including among politicians, will take every small Ukrainian operational retreat as an excuse to demand concessions from the Kremlin ("negotiated settlement"). Don't let them do it. […]

So don't be surprised if Ukraine retreats on the northern Donetsk front in the coming weeks. It's not a Russian victory, it makes operational sense and don't let it become an excuse for Kremlin henchmen to demand concessions from Russia, Moscow, the Kremlin and Putin (as in “negotiate”). [..."


The original text (in Swedish):
 
Last edited:
--> Read an analysis about this on a Swedish blog about the war. Made a quick English Google translate.

ANALYSIS – UKRAINE MAY NEED TO WITHDRAW TO BETTER DEFENSE POSITIONS IN DONETSK IN COMING WEEKSWESTERN SUPPORT TOO SLOW

Russia has tactically adapted and changed its operational behavior and the new tactic of meat waves of [regular soldiers] storming Ukrainian positions in the best Stalinist fashion – quantity is a quality in itself – unfortunately works ...............

This has led to Russia being on the verge of breakthroughs south and north of Bakhmut and what the blog called the Donbas Bulge this spring is becoming a new small Donetsk bulge east of Siversk, which like Bakhmut is in danger of being cut off. To the extent that they are not cut off, the logistics become increasingly tough for both the [Donetsk] bulge and Bakhmut...............

The risk is that the Kremlin's useful idiots and paid influence operators in the West, including among politicians, will take every small Ukrainian operational retreat as an excuse to demand concessions from the Kremlin ("negotiated settlement"). Don't let them do it. […]

I agree that Western support has constantly been too slow. The groundwar tactics and strategy of both sides at this point are obvious, and the article you cite is fair. We have to trust that the Ukraine command team will make the right judgement call regarding when (or if) to relocate to new lines. Hopefully they don't need to, but clearly it is becoming problematic in Bakhmut.

That said it may be helpful to review the data. We can only see the Russian KIA loss rate, not the Ukraine loss rate. So we do not know when the KIA exchange ratio is (or is not) changing and whether it is deteriorating for Ukraine.

- For daily data from UKR Gen Staff see (latest update below, still at a high KIA loss rate for RUS) :

- For easy to access historical data of above from UKR Gen Staff (but I can't find a updated spreadsheet for this) see :

- For automated scraping into a GitHub database of the Oryx dataset via GoogleDoc and automated daily graphs with documented process see :

If you look at the last ones in the GitHub, excepting anti-air systems the asset exchange ratio is very much in UKR favour. But first the RUS daily KIA rate is staggeringly high, practically 30,000/month. The RUS seem to have emptied out Wagner and are hoping to make a breakthrough using regular/conscript troops. But what a loss rate in the attempt.


1675269419747.png


The overall asset loss rate and exchange ratios are (I think) a good approximation of the worst case personnel KIA exchange ratio given the very limited data we have. (Remember the one real data point was back in ?? Oct ?? when it seemed to be a 6:1 KIA exchange ratio in UKR favour). Ayway these graphs of asset loss data usefully give us UKR loss data to compare with RUS data. That also suggests the current UKR loss rate is not abnormally high.

1675270925922.png


Now look at the tank loss graph, which I think is an approximation of the best case personnel KIA ratio & rate

1675271133921.png


Note how flat the UKR loss rate is. That would fit with the observed situation.

That gives hope that the UKR command team know what they are doing. My sense is that UKR will try to work to their own timetable, whatever that is.
 
--> Read an analysis about this on a Swedish blog about the war. Made a quick English Google translate.

NOTE: THE MAIN TAKEAWAY IS IN RED AT THE END OF THE TEXT BELOW:

"
ANALYSIS – UKRAINE MAY NEED TO WITHDRAW TO BETTER DEFENSE POSITIONS IN DONETSK IN COMING WEEKSWESTERN SUPPORT TOO SLOW

Russia has tactically adapted and changed its operational behavior and the new tactic of meat waves of [regular soldiers] storming Ukrainian positions in the best Stalinist fashion – quantity is a quality in itself – unfortunately works for several reasons. On the one hand, the meat waves will act as minesweepers and gradually grind down prepared Ukrainian defense lines until Ukraine's fieldworks no longer gives any advantage. On the one hand, it is a shift from modern mobile maneuver warfare to a more static model, which makes it easier for Russia to manage the logistics, which in principle become fixed infrastructure. Russia can also, due to the slow advances, constantly improve its own positions via field work and thus become increasingly better at resisting indirect fire and other long-range combat. [They] can place static logistics hubs and command locations out of reach of HIMARS, because the front is static, and you can make maximum use of infrastructure such as rail, combined with established logistics routes [for the last ’stretch’ to the frontlines].

In short, the meat waves favor Russia, and the only price [they] have to pay is massive losses in manpower, [men that Russia doesn’t give a [beep] about anyway].

Ukraine's defense line in Donetsk is thus worn down right now, while there will be no break in the attacks against the Ukrainian defenders. The defenders are thus exhausted and have increasingly poor defensive positions, while Russian troops die and the next attack wave of new soldiers are thus not tired.

See serious commenters like Jay in Kyjiv like and this one. There are many more examples.

This has led to Russia being on the verge of breakthroughs south and north of Bakhmut and what the blog called the Donbas Bulge this spring is becoming a new small Donetsk bulge east of Siversk, which like Bakhmut is in danger of being cut off. To the extent that they are not cut off, the logistics become increasingly tough for both the [Donetsk] bulge and Bakhmut.

At the same time, there is increasing talk that Russia is building up for a major offensive around the anniversary of the invasion. This at the same time as the Ukrainian defense positions are worn down and the minefields are gone under the feet and bodies of the meat waves.

Ukraine can neutralize all this by retreating to new defensive lines, which have presumably been dug and mined in recent months.

Sometimes you have to give up terrain and territory to win. […]

A retreat to new, fresh defense lines, with [new undamaged] defenses, mines, etc. accomplishes several things.

On the one hand, it forces Russia into mobile maneuver warfare. When Russian units have to leave their field work behind, they become vulnerable to long-range combat and will be forced to group unprotected.

[On the other hand], the logistics lines that in practice have become fixed infrastructure in recent months stop working and must be replaced by vulnerable new dynamic logistics lines. A new line of defense further west also moves further away from the railway on which Russia is completely dependent to deliver troops, materiel, ammunition and supplies.

In short, a retreat would stretch Russian logistics lines and make them more vulnerable.

The area from which you retreat will be mined and you will, of course, conduct a delay battle in this delay area while the new defense line is [manned].

Above all, a planned Russian armored offensive around the 24th will be neutralized - it will not be against Ukrainian troops without mines left in front of their defensive positions, but directly against defended minefields. Ukrainian troops will thus not run the risk of being defeated, but the losses end up on the Russian side. […]

However, such a small retreat will be played up as a huge victory in Russian propaganda, but it is an operationally correct decision. It's not about winning the battle for Bakhmut, but the war for Ukraine.

The risk is that the Kremlin's useful idiots and paid influence operators in the West, including among politicians, will take every small Ukrainian operational retreat as an excuse to demand concessions from the Kremlin ("negotiated settlement"). Don't let them do it. […]

So don't be surprised if Ukraine retreats on the northern Donetsk front in the coming weeks. It's not a Russian victory, it makes operational sense and don't let it become an excuse for Kremlin henchmen to demand concessions from Russia, Moscow, the Kremlin and Putin (as in “negotiate”). [..."


The original text (in Swedish):

Very good analysis. The Russians have been trying to attrit the Ukrainians with artillery, but the recent Russian tactics allow the Ukrainians to attrit the Russians at a staggering rate.

Basically message: if the Ukrainians pull back, don't panic. And I agree. Trading ground for time is something many armies that won in the end did.

@SwedishAdvocate thanks for postig that blog, very well done analysis.

Personally I'm not concerned about Western resolve if Ukraine chooses to execute a tactical withdrawal from Bakhmut. That's the nice thing about Representative Democracy: the Pols only give a *sugar* about the Voters once every four years... :p

Cheers!

The leadership in the west is getting wise counsel from military leaders who have studied the history of warfare and know what's going on in the big picture. Western militaries tend to be meritocracies. The people at the top usually aren't idiots.


Stay away from windows.

I agree that Western support has constantly been too slow. The groundwar tactics and strategy of both sides at this point are obvious, and the article you cite is fair. We have to trust that the Ukraine command team will make the right judgement call regarding when (or if) to relocate to new lines. Hopefully they don't need to, but clearly it is becoming problematic in Bakhmut.

That said it may be helpful to review the data. We can only see the Russian KIA loss rate, not the Ukraine loss rate. So we do not know when the KIA exchange ratio is (or is not) changing and whether it is deteriorating for Ukraine.

- For daily data from UKR Gen Staff see (latest update below, still at a high KIA loss rate for RUS) :

- For easy to access historical data of above from UKR Gen Staff (but I can't find a updated spreadsheet for this) see :

I don't know how accurate it is, but the latest Perun video mentioned that the Russians estimate that in artillery bombardments with their dumb artillery shells it takes about 2.5 tons of artillery ammunition to cause 1 Ukrainian casualty. That's about 45 152mm shells. That's very inefficient.

From what I've read, Russian artillery is down to about 5000 rounds a day which would mean a little over 100 Ukrainian casualties a day. The Ukrainians are achieving survival rates on par with western militaries with the wounded to killed ratios somewhere between 5:1 and 10:1. So that would mean Ukrainian upper levels of combat deaths are around 25 a day from artillery, but with a lot higher percentage of wounded than the Russians. There are Ukrainians wounded and killed by direct combat too. Still the wounded + killed would be less than the Russian dead per day if this ratio of rounds per casualty is true.

Even for an army that has a high tolerance for losses like the Russian army, these kinds of losses are unsustainable.

- For automated scraping into a GitHub database of the Oryx dataset via GoogleDoc and automated daily graphs with documented process see :

If you look at the last ones in the GitHub, excepting anti-air systems the asset exchange ratio is very much in UKR favour. But first the RUS daily KIA rate is staggeringly high, practically 30,000/month. The RUS seem to have emptied out Wagner and are hoping to make a breakthrough using regular/conscript troops. But what a loss rate in the attempt.


View attachment 902060

The overall asset loss rate and exchange ratios are (I think) a good approximation of the worst case personnel KIA exchange ratio given the very limited data we have. (Remember the one real data point was back in ?? Oct ?? when it seemed to be a 6:1 KIA exchange ratio in UKR favour). Ayway these graphs of asset loss data usefully give us UKR loss data to compare with RUS data. That also suggests the current UKR loss rate is not abnormally high.

View attachment 902067

Now look at the tank loss graph, which I think is an approximation of the best case personnel KIA ratio & rate

View attachment 902068

Note how flat the UKR loss rate is. That would fit with the observed situation.

That gives hope that the UKR command team know what they are doing. My sense is that UKR will try to work to their own timetable, whatever that is.

I have read that the Ukrainian high command is constantly weighing how many casualties they are willing to take vs the potential gains. They are willing to take losses, but they aren't willing to just throw lives away either.

Because the Ukrainian approach is so different from the Russians, I'm critical of the US analysis that claims losses are equal on both sides. The Ukrainians have taken losses, a lot more than they admit, but I'm pretty sure they are lower than the Russians who have been very cavalier about losses.