Despite that lack of response, the article itself appeared to be reasonably accurate. The software versions and vehicle-specific data were not in the article beyond that the vehicles one and three had 'different software versions' and vehicle two has FSD. The major conclusions that there should be some regulatory oversight and that use of agile techniques should still have software changes tested and documented are uncontroversial. Elon Musk has on occasion suggested as much.
Ms. Cummings is distinctly qualified for the proposed role. Specifically, she has very extensive experience with advanced aircraft control systems. In that context she absolutely knows the material between the Boeing 737 MAX MCAS (undisclosed to operators/pilots, largely untested, operated without notifying pilots) as well as the F-18. Both are excellent case studies for the development of better and fully documented control systems. The F-18, 100% fly-by-wire(FBW, is an especially relevant case: Also from aviation are another two cases from Airbus that demonstrate the risk of complacency.:
First, an airshow crash solely due to an exceedingly experienced pilot having overconfidence in the first commercial FBW aircraft:
en.wikipedia.org
apps.dtic.mil
Second, an Airbus A330 crash due to pilots ignoring pitot tube freezing:
en.wikipedia.org
Ms. Cummings knows very well the risks of inattention and overconfidence. She is NOT a critic of highly automated systems but she IS an advocate for careful documentation, driver monitoring and consistent timely warning of system inability to perform.
Her criticism of Tesla Autopilot is not idle nor is it ignorant. I do not believe she opposes their development and deployment. I don't even think she's anti-Tesla. She is acutely aware of both the positive and negative aspects of L2 systems including the papers invention of L2+.
Bluntly we all know these systems require careful use with diligent driver monitoring. That is what Level 2 implies, but many people do ignore the limitations and those people also get into easily preventable accidents. That in no way detracts from the obvious benefits including much lower accident rates and lower serious injuries and deaths in the Tesla systems. The dual edge of much safer but also high potential risk of inattention is quite perfectly analogous to the aircraft situations also.
She will argue for OTA updates to have rigorous vetting, and chances are high she'll argue for a formal standard for documentation. That need not even slow down OTA but it will require better release vetting and documentation. That will be "A Good Thing". It will also generate major controversy, such things are not easy.
Many may disagree but these are my views. With both FSD and FBW aircraft operation in my history, I really want better documentation, better alerting systems and driver training (maybe even some delivery-based trying would help).
Just think, please: Plaids are being delivered with ZERO instruction. When I got mine it was me who explained things to the delivery person. How can that be a good thing? I had never driven one until mine. I had read the entire manual multiple times (perhaps a residue of aircraft pilot type rating ground training habits) but I had never driven one.
How many accidents are happening because of bad training or none at all? Th spectacular ones are clearly the result of overconfidence, and ignorance can exacerbate that.
So, a does of Ms. Commings is, in my opinion, a good thing, overdue.
www.change.org
