Seems this could be used - has the largest conventional punch. Imagine would likely need to neutralize air defenses first to ensure high probability target destination reached. Maybe preceded by dozens of missiles taking out air defenses and other elements as part of a massive combination strike.
With MOAB, would have to be delivered with a heavy bomber, and there would be no doubt who delivered it. Depending on who you ask that could be a good or bad thing.
Another thought, given Russia violating so many conventions such as the Budapest Memorandum, maybe the Montreux Convention of 1936 gets dissolved until the end of the war if a tactical nuke is used by Russian and the Black Sea gets opened to NATO naval privileges allowing in submarines.
Fast attack nuclear boats are SSNs. The ones that carry the so-called second strike ICBMs are the SSBNs and they tend to pootle around extremely slowly, boringly so. It is best not to confuse the two. The UK's current SSBN fleet was launched in the period 1994 - 1999 (actually I am part of the so-called Trident bulge in the RN from those days). The point is that just because boats date from the 1990s does not mean they are not viable. There are issues in the Russian submarine service, but equally they should not be underestimated or discounted or in any way laughed at.
The MOAB is delivered off the back ramp of a C130 Hercules. It is an equally massive understatement to say that one needs an extremely permissive air environment to use it.
Flying B2s above Russia (even if completely undetected, which I personally doubt against a competent modern IADS, as the Serbs proved in a rather conclusive manner against an F117) would quite reasonably be justification for a Russian
first-strike on the USA. One needs to understand this stuff.
The Montreux Convention came into being before nuclear weapons existed, so they do not in themselves create any reason to break the Montreux Convention.
(A nuclear attack on any part of Ukraine would not in itself be a direct & clear Art 5 moment for NATO either. Perhaps indirectly, but not directly. Other responses are more likely, whether military e.g. ATACM, F16/Tornado tranche 1, Western MBT, etc; or civil e.g. vote to suspend from UNSC P5, suspend from UNGA, suspend from Swift, etc).
The Budapest Memorandum on the other hand is a possible legally valid pathway to a more 'muscular' and more direct Western intervention in Ukraine in the event of a nuclear event. But it is not well written to suit such a situation and in any case is signed by some particular nations - UK, US, France, China and Russia - rather than by NATO. Arguably it is the Chinese who might provide the most helpful to Ukraine if a nuclear event were to occur. By nuclear event I mean either tactical nuclear release, or loss of containment of one of the Ukraines nuclear power plants - and remember there are very vulnerable storage cooling ponds as well as the actual reactor containment buildings.
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The latest realistic map is up. It now shows
three significant Ukraine thrusts in the north from three widely separated breakout areas, each with independent logistics/etc paths. The amount of airpower that the Russians are prepared to lose to try and close these thrusts down is a sign of how threatening they are. Because the Ukraine now has the longer range and more precision artillery, they are least affected by the rainy weather.
The summary of the 214th day of Russian invasion to Ukraine, as of 22:00 – 25th September 2022 (Kyiv time). Day summary: Ukrainian Army crossed Oskil river near Dvorichna and is advancing east of…
militaryland.net
