Silverlake Math
Working with known data.
Their $100mln investment being a convertible bond, they are senior to equity. So silverlake gets their money fully paid off before anything gets paid to equity shareholder. We all know that SolarCity has a pile of about $2Bil NNRV. Effectively, return of their capital is "guaranteed".
The convertible option is akin to a LEAP call option. Assuming the price scales the same way between now and 2020 maturity vs now and 2018. Working with market data, we have a mid price around $8.30 for Jan 18 leaps. At $33 conversion price you get 3 options per $100. In other words we have $25 dollar value per $100. As this is for 2 years, on an annualized basis we have 12% yield.
At 12% yield, Silverlake buying this convertible bond is no different than buying the existing convertible bonds in the open market. It shouldn't be either because why would Silverlake leave money on the table? In fact for buying a lump sum, they are getting a higher yield than the existing bonds.
In summary, SolarCity raised additional capital at distressed levels. Perversely, this adds more proof that the firm is distressed.
Sorry to break the bubble.
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I worked for years as a solar power inspector. SolarCity as an organization simply executes, by that I mean, they are a paradigm of efficiency. As building codes and utility requirements change, they adapt and get the job done. More than this, SolarCity employees are true believers.
Importantly, solar competes at a retail level, SolarCity is competitive today. Their sales organization reminds of Alex Baldwin in Glengarry Glen Ross, a boots on the ground, drive through the finish line, no excuses.
I'm going long.
SolarCity installation crews are ultra-efficient, best in class. There is no question about it. At $1.92/W install cost, the numbers speak for themselves.
The real issue with SolarCity is various value leaks that happen at the corporate level. For example take a look at the latest 10Q. There is this line item in the Statement of operations: "Other expense - net" which happens to be a money sink of $16.8Mil in the quarter. Digging into the report to find out what it is -
"Other expense, net, increased by $13.9 million, or 469%, for the three months ended September 30, 2015, as compared to the three months ended September 30, 2014. This increase was mainly due to the $12.3 million loss from interest rate swaps and the $1.1 million of deferred financing costs written-off upon the partial prepayment of the term loan due in December 2016, in the three months ended September 30, 2015. We have entered into forward interest rate swaps, in order to fix the variable interest rates, for each draw under the MyPower revolving credit facility and the revolving aggregation credit facility. We account for interest rate swaps as non-hedging derivatives and record any changes in their fair values as a component of other expense, net."
There are many such leaks, which makes the cost that they show not add up to the ultimate shareholder value that they are generating.
As a shareholder you own all the leaks. Not just the installation crews.