The macro winds certainly don't help, like the energy sector getting hammered and banking sector gradually getting into a credit crisis and such. But I honestly think SolarCity is going through some sort of liquidity crisis of it's own.
Lets begin with this:
Period |
| 2014 Q1 | 2014 Q2 | 2014 Q3 | 2014 Q4 | 2015 Q1 | 2015 Q2 | 2015 Q3 | 2015 Q4 |
Debt and Cash: |
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Debt – Recourse | $M | ($153.40) | ($204.70) | ($154.00) | ($143.70) | ($284.20) | ($425.00) | ($522.00) | ($602.50) |
Debt – Convertible | $M | ($230.00) | ($230.00) | ($730.00) | ($796.00) | ($796.00) | ($796.00) | ($796.00) | ($909.00) |
Cash & Short-Term Investments | $M | $519.60 | $405.30 | $733.50 | $642.70 | $575.80 | $489.10 | $418.40 | $393.90 |
Current Portfolio Value |
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Cumulative MW Deployed under Energy Contracts – EoP | GW | 0.6 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 1 | 1.1 | 1.3 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
PowerCo Portfolio’s Pre-Tax Unlevered NPV remaining | $M | $1,030 | $1,212 | $1,445 | $1,735 | $2,032 | $2,391 | $2,790 | $3,235 |
Debt – Non-Recourse | $M | ($206) | ($324) | ($448) | ($485) | ($617) | ($731) | ($1,013) | ($1,242) |
PowerCo portfolio Pre-Tax Unlevered NPV Less Debt | $M | $824 | $888 | $997 | $1,250 | $1,415 | $1,660 | $1,777 | $1,993 |
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Actual contracted $s with proper discounting |
| $515.00 | $606.00 | $722.50 | $867.50 | $1,016.00 | $1,195.50 | $1,395.00 | $1,617.50 |
Contracted debt vs contracted future revenue |
| $445.20 | $252.60 | $124.00 | $85.50 | ($105.40) | ($267.40) | ($517.60) | ($742.10) |
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All of the data is from their slide-1 except last two lines. The last-but-one line is my estimate of NPV of actual contracted amounts with proper discounting. In my view it's roughly half the quoted NPV. The last line is basically debt vs contracted-revenue.
As you see the contracted-debt has completely ballooned the contracted-revenue.
My suspicion is that they basically are running out of borrowing options. There are some more strong indications of it recently as well.
In just about every recent CC, management said that ABS will be bigger and more frequent. But what we are seeing now is infrequent and tiny ABS. Lyndon said they had some 100s of MWs that can be put into ABS in town halls and such. But the latest round is for partly 85MWs or something. I don't have patience to dig up exact numbers but what has been said vs what’s happening is roughly a factor of 6 or more.
Stepping back a bit, in case of a company like Tesla when a car is delivered, the burden of finding money for it is largely on the purchaser. Tesla immediately makes money on sold cars. In case of SolarCity they get a contract with tiny-tiny money trickling in each month. Unless this contract is used somehow to raise money SolarCity is doomed. So SolarCity took up the burden of finding money on to itself. But what we are seeing is, they can't finance these contracts completely away. It appears only a portion of the contracts, and that too only a portion of the cash-flows of the portion of the contracts are financeable.
In any case, owing to their business model AND in the interest of growth it appears that they pushed themselves to the edge.
So now they are left with limited options. The recent news that management is looking to outright sell the contracts to 3rd party investors attests to the growing cash/credit pressures. If this doesn't work out, I don't know what will. On the other hand, I am very skeptical that this will be sustainable. In any case, it's hard to pin hopes on an unknown funding model for billions and billions of dollars every year.
SolarCity's clock is ticking. I think utmost they have a quarter or two to right the ship. It is extremely unlikely that they will deliver the 1.25GW installs this year. There is simply no capital for it.
Just to drive home the point, cash-flow-neutral for tesla is very different from that of solarcity. Tesla needs third party capital only to grow, to make investments for the future. SolarCity needs 3rd party capital simply to run the business (even when not growing at all).
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Another note, the convertible bonds that trade in the market is pricing in a default at this point. The Nov 18 one has a yield of 22% and Nov 19 one has yield of close to 20%. In addition to high yields, the inverted yield curve is usually an indication that a default is in cards.
At this point SCTY is a dead man walking, praying for a miracle.