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Wiki Sudden Loss Of Range With 2019.16.x Software

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If you think it's a BS, why bother posting it here?
I try not to let my personal opinion get in the way of reporting a potential data point that some here might appreciate. I believe what service is telling customers is relevant, as it is Tesla's official communication with owners. I have no horse in this race and I'll bow out of this thread. I was just trying to help, I don't mean to cause any friction. This is not my fight and I wish you the best in getting your issue resolved.

Which range loss issue was he referring to? The capping being discussed in this thread, or the Model 3 range "loss" issue? (Which is very likely a BMS/estimate issue that they are probably working on fixing.)
I wouldn't have posted it if it wasn't pertaining to the issue in this thread. The owner in question suffered loss in the last several months, drives a Model S 85, and specifically discussed update 2019.16.x as being the cause of the range loss with service. Most people are not as tuned-in as those in this thread, so their knowledge of this issue (or even their own capacity loss) is limited.

Where is it alleged that it is a battery fire? The closest detail I say in there says "Wood later tweeted it was a Model X from 2017 that was charging, but 'the fire was at the front of the car'. "

It is possible it was arson like the other recent fire in Germany.
Battery pack is designed to vent heat and flames to the front and away from passengers.
 
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MIne went back down to 208 on the charge yesterday so its gone from 228/9 every time to 208 to 220 to 208... Super strange... So I also received a TPMS error "cannot read Tire pressures fault" today, I was like ok let me just reset them, but that option no longer exists (it has been removed in V10). So I decided to select the new option of changing the wheels and clicking Confirm This promptly rebooted both screens and once they recover I now have TPMS system error, Stability control Error and traction control error (I have no Regen and the Stability control light is now on with the TPMS light).. These don't go away with a reboot. Service has been scheduled as my car has basically gone to *sugar* since V10.. First appointment December 6th!! whats the betting I come away disappointed, Oh how things have changed in 6 years......
 
You only use the best attorneys when you have too. I presume at some point Tesla has to answer the question WHY did you limit the battery performance and as far as I can see there are two answers. Safety or extend the life of the battery until the warranty has ceased. Both answers you need a good attorney to wriggle out of the MASSIVE problem. The best attorneys in the world did not save VW.

I would think a good lawyer could drive the narrative away from having the address the limit to the battery performance by focusing more on the safety and caution aspect. Perhaps a good retort would be why should Tesla have been allowed to produce and sell a product that was not safe (given the spontaneous fires).

At this point, I don't think the strategy is to get out of this Scot-free but to mitigate damages and to limit the potential losses. A class action suit sounds damaging, but it all depends on the terms of the settlement. In many cases plaintiffs lawyers do not reach anywhere near the proper value of the cases (University Southern California - Dr. George Tyndall...$215M for a class that large regarding serial sex crimes is way too low).

They might be enticed by what looks like a high value, they want to get paid, they feel like it's enough for the class, they feel like they took the case as far as they can go, or they don't want to take the risk of losing points in an ongoing trial. I imagine there will be an explanation and a payout to individual owners for the loss in utility and resale value. When we'll see it is anyone's guess.

Also, hiring top-tier defense attorneys is standard practice for any large company. To hire anyone less would be malpractice when you factor in what's on the line here. Besides, I wouldn't be surprised if the negotiating partner had to reduce their billing rate to get Tesla's business. Fortune 500 companies are no strangers to getting legal discounts. Partners love to brag about the prestige and market cap of their clients, origination bonuses, and they rely on repeat work being thrown their way once they retain a case.
 
I would think a good lawyer could drive the narrative away from having the address the limit to the battery performance by focusing more on the safety and caution aspect. Perhaps a good retort would be why should Tesla have been allowed to produce and sell a product that was not safe (given the spontaneous fires).

At this point, I don't think the strategy is to get out of this Scot-free but to mitigate damages and to limit the potential losses. A class action suit sounds damaging, but it all depends on the terms of the settlement. In many cases plaintiffs lawyers do not reach anywhere near the proper value of the cases (University Southern California - Dr. George Tyndall...$215M for a class that large regarding serial sex crimes is way too low).

They might be enticed by what looks like a high value, they want to get paid, they feel like it's enough for the class, they feel like they took the case as far as they can go, or they don't want to take the risk of losing points in an ongoing trial. I imagine there will be an explanation and a payout to individual owners for the loss in utility and resale value. When we'll see it is anyone's guess.

Also, hiring top-tier defense attorneys is standard practice for any large company. To hire anyone less would be malpractice when you factor in what's on the line here. Besides, I wouldn't be surprised if the negotiating partner had to reduce their billing rate to get Tesla's business. Fortune 500 companies are no strangers to getting legal discounts. Partners love to brag about the prestige and market cap of their clients, origination bonuses, and they rely on repeat work being thrown their way once they retain a case.
They cannot go the Safety
route as it was not reported.
 
That's why they hired the top tier lawyers. They probably did go the safety route, and not reporting it is a really big no no so they're trying to limit the damage. The NHTSA thinks so, they demanded every update's changes for the last 2 years, and since Tesla publicly admitted to planning on making BMS changes in response to fires right before 2019.16, and then again afterward when they said they would undo some (but not all) of the reductions later when they were served with class action papers, it's all but confirmed the cause is an unreported safety issue. It will be confirmed in the weeks ahead, once the NHTSA does its diligence and mails us recall notices.

I would think a good lawyer could drive the narrative away from having the address the limit to the battery performance by focusing more on the safety and caution aspect

It doesn't sound like you understand it yet, but that's everything we are all hoping for. If this was done for safety, we all get new batteries. It's illegal for Tesla to downgrade our hardware to avoid a hardware recall. Unfortunately, while that is best for us individually, it is also extraordinarily bad for TEsla. If they didn't report a safety concern, the NHTSA will fine them severely. So severly in fact, that it may not be a coincidence the big time law firm Tesla hired to fight the class action is also a big time corporate bankruptcy firm. We don't want that - restructuring could mean we all lose our warranties any way, and victory would be Pyrrhic.
 
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I've got a bit of a theory (theory in the commonly used sense of a wild guess, not a scientific theory) as to what condition Z might be related to. I'm not sure if this has been covered here to date...
What if condition Z is not a hither-to-unknown battery defect, but instead a failure of the control system meant to manage the battery temperature? This might be analogous to the MCAS system that has been the cause for the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max fleet. In that instance, Boeing relied on the design of this control system to account for differences in how the planes would fly so that they wouldn't have to do significant retraining of pilots. Instead, faulty information was fed to the control system, causing the pilots to lose control of the plane, and disaster occurred.

Here's the story I'm telling myself about how batterygate and chargegate may have come about:

Tesla battery experts are smart and certainly know of the potential for dendrite formation, lithium plating, etc. Since the effect of these occurring could be detected by a spike in temperature, they carefully monitor the temperature of the modules and account for this by kicking in cooling and shutting off or rapidly tapering charging current. In the original 85 "A" battery configuration, they have revision 1 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. This allows in their testing for safe charging at the original supercharging rates, starting at 90kW, tapering to about 60kW at 50% SOC. The battery engineers then develop the "B" packs (and later) with revision 2 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. They implement a new temperature control system in this "B" pack, with a different, more robust temperature monitoring system and a more effective coolant loop. In new testing, they are able to charge faster without seeing any signs of dendrite formation (120kW to start, tapering to ~75kW at 50% SOC). This system has some minor revisions ("C" and "D" packs) but largely continues up to when we get a change in cell chemistry (90s). March 2019 rolls around, everything is looking good, but suddenly we have some battery fires. Tesla looks into it and the common thread seems to be some erroneous information being fed to the BMS by the temperature sensors. The self-immolating cars seem to have a defect that should have been detected and mitigated by the BMS but wasn't. So, they start looking for sensors that may be reporting erroneous information. Those cars are capped as this mitigates the potential for forming a short in the cell when charged to higher voltages. The original "A" pack design doesn't have this failure mode. 90s and later also have a different design that doesn't show this failure mode. As an additional mitigating factor, they revert to the original "A" pack taper profiles for later packs (though uncapped ones can still do 120+ kW to start...maybe some other portion of the design limited the "A"s to 90kW). Newer chemistry packs also get a slight reduction in supercharging speeds at higher SOC to mitigate any future problems with those.

Now, this whole story and idea may be completely and totally wrong. It does explain why there seems to be absolutely no correlation between past charging behavior and capping - the failure is not necessarily in the chemistry of the cell (except maybe in some very rare circumstances), but instead is in the sensing system meant to mitigate the potential for thermal runaway. Failure of a temperature sensor, or any other electronic sensor, would be expected to be random and not correlated with charging behavior. Like in the Boeing example, the engineers had more confidence in their control system than maybe they should have had. This also may explain why there was a seeming correlation with the battery pre-heating update. Thoughts?
 
I've got a bit of a theory (theory in the commonly used sense of a wild guess, not a scientific theory) as to what condition Z might be related to. I'm not sure if this has been covered here to date...
What if condition Z is not a hither-to-unknown battery defect, but instead a failure of the control system meant to manage the battery temperature? This might be analogous to the MCAS system that has been the cause for the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max fleet. In that instance, Boeing relied on the design of this control system to account for differences in how the planes would fly so that they wouldn't have to do significant retraining of pilots. Instead, faulty information was fed to the control system, causing the pilots to lose control of the plane, and disaster occurred.

Here's the story I'm telling myself about how batterygate and chargegate may have come about:

Tesla battery experts are smart and certainly know of the potential for dendrite formation, lithium plating, etc. Since the effect of these occurring could be detected by a spike in temperature, they carefully monitor the temperature of the modules and account for this by kicking in cooling and shutting off or rapidly tapering charging current. In the original 85 "A" battery configuration, they have revision 1 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. This allows in their testing for safe charging at the original supercharging rates, starting at 90kW, tapering to about 60kW at 50% SOC. The battery engineers then develop the "B" packs (and later) with revision 2 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. They implement a new temperature control system in this "B" pack, with a different, more robust temperature monitoring system and a more effective coolant loop. In new testing, they are able to charge faster without seeing any signs of dendrite formation (120kW to start, tapering to ~75kW at 50% SOC). This system has some minor revisions ("C" and "D" packs) but largely continues up to when we get a change in cell chemistry (90s). March 2019 rolls around, everything is looking good, but suddenly we have some battery fires. Tesla looks into it and the common thread seems to be some erroneous information being fed to the BMS by the temperature sensors. The self-immolating cars seem to have a defect that should have been detected and mitigated by the BMS but wasn't. So, they start looking for sensors that may be reporting erroneous information. Those cars are capped as this mitigates the potential for forming a short in the cell when charged to higher voltages. The original "A" pack design doesn't have this failure mode. 90s and later also have a different design that doesn't show this failure mode. As an additional mitigating factor, they revert to the original "A" pack taper profiles for later packs (though uncapped ones can still do 120+ kW to start...maybe some other portion of the design limited the "A"s to 90kW). Newer chemistry packs also get a slight reduction in supercharging speeds at higher SOC to mitigate any future problems with those.

Now, this whole story and idea may be completely and totally wrong. It does explain why there seems to be absolutely no correlation between past charging behavior and capping - the failure is not necessarily in the chemistry of the cell (except maybe in some very rare circumstances), but instead is in the sensing system meant to mitigate the potential for thermal runaway. Failure of a temperature sensor, or any other electronic sensor, would be expected to be random and not correlated with charging behavior. Like in the Boeing example, the engineers had more confidence in their control system than maybe they should have had. This also may explain why there was a seeming correlation with the battery pre-heating update. Thoughts?

So, you are speculating there are some bad temperature sensors in the impacted packs?
 
I've got a bit of a theory (theory in the commonly used sense of a wild guess, not a scientific theory) as to what condition Z might be related to. I'm not sure if this has been covered here to date...
What if condition Z is not a hither-to-unknown battery defect, but instead a failure of the control system meant to manage the battery temperature? This might be analogous to the MCAS system that has been the cause for the grounding of the Boeing 737 Max fleet. In that instance, Boeing relied on the design of this control system to account for differences in how the planes would fly so that they wouldn't have to do significant retraining of pilots. Instead, faulty information was fed to the control system, causing the pilots to lose control of the plane, and disaster occurred.

Here's the story I'm telling myself about how batterygate and chargegate may have come about:

Tesla battery experts are smart and certainly know of the potential for dendrite formation, lithium plating, etc. Since the effect of these occurring could be detected by a spike in temperature, they carefully monitor the temperature of the modules and account for this by kicking in cooling and shutting off or rapidly tapering charging current. In the original 85 "A" battery configuration, they have revision 1 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. This allows in their testing for safe charging at the original supercharging rates, starting at 90kW, tapering to about 60kW at 50% SOC. The battery engineers then develop the "B" packs (and later) with revision 2 of the cooling and temperature monitoring system. They implement a new temperature control system in this "B" pack, with a different, more robust temperature monitoring system and a more effective coolant loop. In new testing, they are able to charge faster without seeing any signs of dendrite formation (120kW to start, tapering to ~75kW at 50% SOC). This system has some minor revisions ("C" and "D" packs) but largely continues up to when we get a change in cell chemistry (90s). March 2019 rolls around, everything is looking good, but suddenly we have some battery fires. Tesla looks into it and the common thread seems to be some erroneous information being fed to the BMS by the temperature sensors. The self-immolating cars seem to have a defect that should have been detected and mitigated by the BMS but wasn't. So, they start looking for sensors that may be reporting erroneous information. Those cars are capped as this mitigates the potential for forming a short in the cell when charged to higher voltages. The original "A" pack design doesn't have this failure mode. 90s and later also have a different design that doesn't show this failure mode. As an additional mitigating factor, they revert to the original "A" pack taper profiles for later packs (though uncapped ones can still do 120+ kW to start...maybe some other portion of the design limited the "A"s to 90kW). Newer chemistry packs also get a slight reduction in supercharging speeds at higher SOC to mitigate any future problems with those.

Now, this whole story and idea may be completely and totally wrong. It does explain why there seems to be absolutely no correlation between past charging behavior and capping - the failure is not necessarily in the chemistry of the cell (except maybe in some very rare circumstances), but instead is in the sensing system meant to mitigate the potential for thermal runaway. Failure of a temperature sensor, or any other electronic sensor, would be expected to be random and not correlated with charging behavior. Like in the Boeing example, the engineers had more confidence in their control system than maybe they should have had. This also may explain why there was a seeming correlation with the battery pre-heating update. Thoughts?

The difference between the early 85 A packs and subsequent B packs was not due to the cooling system. It was due to a different cell chemistry.
 
Essentially. It could very well be another input to the control system - temperature seemed the most obvious. “Bad” could also be overshooting in Tesla’s eyes - it may be that the sensors are still within what they’ve determined to be the specification. Hence the response that everything is within spec for the battery. It may only be in certain circumstances that certain variables could come together to create a dangerous situation.
 
Essentially. It could very well be another input to the control system - temperature seemed the most obvious. “Bad” could also be overshooting in Tesla’s eyes - it may be that the sensors are still within what they’ve determined to be the specification. Hence the response that everything is within spec for the battery. It may only be in certain circumstances that certain variables could come together to create a dangerous situation.
 
I used to share your optimism that Tesla would look after and fix the issue for capped owners. But now I'm not so sure that we can rely on Tesla's goodwill, and that legal action and investigation from regulatory authorities will be required to exert pressure on Tesla to do make good.

I expect that some of the affected owners won't trust Tesla enough to purchase another vehicle from them... so the increased trade in wouldn't really be a remedy.

If a battery upgrade programme (with new 21700 cells) was offered, I'd also consider that as an option. But trading "up" to another Model S... no way, since there's no guarantee that wouldn't get capped too.
Yeah, I am pretty gullible, but not enough to buy another Tesla until they explain what has gone wrong here and how they can be sure it won't be repeated on a new one.

I really don't understand how anyone knowing this could actually happen to them with no recourse would risk buying one.
 
Here's the story I'm telling myself about how batterygate and chargegate may have come about:

.... In new testing, they are able to charge faster without seeing any signs of dendrite formation (120kW to start, tapering to ~75kW at 50% SOC). This system has some minor revisions ("C" and "D" packs) but largely continues up to when we get a change in cell chemistry (90s). March 2019 rolls around, everything is looking good, but suddenly we have some battery fires. Tesla looks into it and the common thread seems to be some erroneous information being fed to the BMS by the temperature sensors.

Right here is already the first error. The charge rate was not the same all those years. I saw my charge rate continue to drop over the years of my 2014 85. It became so obvious that I had my car in service for it almost 2 years ago. They just said, oh well that's what happens as the car gets older. The charge rate continue to drop. All of this happened long before those fires. Right round when the fires started I saw another significant drop. All of this happened before my car was finally software limited a few weeks ago.
 
Tesla should just replace all 85 battery packs with 100's and then cap it to 85, problem solved.

That wouldn't work on a lot of cars.
There is no official 100 kWh configuration for a RWD Model S, and the 100 pack is much heavier than packs it would be replacing, requiring suspension component changes (or for some air-suspension-equipped cars, a re-calibration.)